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Our research question is: How does physician hospital integration affect the quality-
adjusted cost efficiency in U.S. hospitals in 1997? We view the physician and the 
hospital manager as a team of agents. Technologically, the physician resides within 
the firm because he allocates resources in the production of medical services. 
Production uncertainty in the sense of Arrow (1963) implies variable quality in 
medical care. Legally, a physician can be an employee in a fully integrated 
organization (FIO), a partner in a network, or an independent professional in a 
segregate hospital. The hospital owner (principal) administers a salary cum bonus 
scheme, which Holmstrom (1982) defines as a budget breaking scheme, for the 
production team in the FIO. Holmstrom shows that such a scheme removes moral 
hazard in team agency (i.e. team members shirk when their effort cannot be observed) 
and leads to Pareto efficiency (which we proxy with quality-adjusted cost efficiency). 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) argue that a self-interested principal faces a moral hazard 
problem herself and has the incentive to prevent the team achieving Pareto efficiency. 
Our result shows empirical evidence for this argument in U.S. hospitals: nonprofit 
FIOs are more cost efficient than nonprofit network or nonprofit segregate hospitals in 
our sample. However, the for-profit counterparts have similar (quality-adjusted) cost 
efficiency.  
 
The principal can monitor the agents if she cannot administer a budget breaking 
incentive scheme in network and segregate hospitals. When the principal is the 
residual claimant, monitoring is incentive compatible (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
The property rights theory predicts that for-profit hospitals are more cost efficient 
than nonprofit ones because the former have well defined residual claimants. For 
network and segregate hospitals, we find that for-profit entities are more cost efficient 
than nonprofit ones. Our results show that for-profit and nonprofit FIOs have similar 
cost efficiency statistically. We argue that both budget-breaking incentive scheme and 
monitoring are active in the FIOs because firms that administer bonus scheme also 
 iv
monitor their employees. The mechanisms produce opposing forces and indeterminate 
end point in this subgroup. 
 
Our findings extend earlier debate on cost efficiency difference between for-profit and 
nonprofit hospital. Recent empirical research generally finds no cost efficiency 
difference in recent years, but this finding does not refute the property rights theory. 
By using the team agency theory, we show how physician incentives modify the 
effect of capital owner incentives to influence cost efficiency.  
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Our research question is “How does integrating physicians into hospitals affect hospital 
cost efficiency under payer-driven competition in the U.S. in 1997?” Understanding the 
driver of hospital cost efficiency is important for health care cost containment policy for 
two reasons. First, hospital cost is a major part of U.S. health care expenditure. Second, 
improving cost efficiency is Pareto efficient. The debate in the 1980s revolves around the 
issue if for-profit hospitals are empirically more cost efficient than nonprofit ones. The 
theoretical underpinning is Frech (1976) property rights theory: for-profit hospitals have 
clearly defined residual claimants that nonprofit ones lack. The residual claimant has 
strong incentive to monitor cost efficiency to improve profit. However, empirical 
evidence from the 1990s shows little difference between cost efficiency in nonprofit and 
for-profit hospitals. Sloan (2000) attributes this result to increased competition in the 
hospital market forcing capital owners to behave in similar ways. However, theoretical 
models such as Newhouse (1970), Pauly and Redisch (1973) and Harris (1977), indicate 
that physicians are more influential than capital owners in allocating resources in the 
hospitals. Hence, the absence of physician behavior in determining cost efficiency in 
current studies needs to be addressed. Since 1990s, U.S. hospitals have started hiring 
physicians as employees (i.e. physician hospital integration) to control cost and mitigate 
physician effects on profit. This trend is congruent with Pauly and Redisch (1973) model 
where economic profit accrues to physicians. We formally define physician hospital 
integration as hospital hiring physician as employee. In this dissertation, we apply the 
team agency theory to explain how physician hospital integration may affect cost 
efficiency and produce empirical evidence to support our hypotheses. Introducing 
physician hospital integration provides new insight using team agency theory to examine 
the research in hospital cost efficiency.  
 
We approach the dissertation in this way to avoid addressing too many complex issues 
simultaneously: In this chapter (chapter 1), we provide an overview of the dissertation 
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and some background information about the U.S. hospital industry (in section 1.1) to 
provide a context for the research question. In chapter 2, we examine the debate on 
relative efficiency of nonprofit and for-profit hospital. We then formulate a richer 
theoretical framework by adding the integration dimension using team agency theory. In 
chapter 3, we assume a general hospital cost function exists and examine the techniques 
available for examining efficiency. We then summarize the discussion in the context of 
hospital cost analysis. In chapter 4, we examine the nature of hospital as a firm, its 
position in the healthcare industry, and review measures of hospital inputs and outputs. In 
chapter 5, we explain the implementation of our empirical strategy. In chapter 6, we 
present the result and discussion of our research. Finally we conclude in chapter 7. 
 
1.1 Background to Research 
 
In 2001, the United States had 5,801 hospitals managing 0.987 million beds and 
consuming 37% of the $1.4 trillion healthcare expenditure (National Center for Health 
Statistics, 2003). The hospital market is monopolistically competitive because providers 
are imperfect substitutes in their market segment. A market is monopolistically 
competitive in the short run when there is no strategic firm interaction [i.e. a firm 
optimizes its objective function assuming a given set of action of its competitors] and 
firms produce differentiated products. In the long run, a market is monopolistically 
competitive when there is no substantial mobility barrier (Chamberlin, 1933; Eaton and 
Lipsey, 1989).  
 
We observe four market characteristics from the data in Appendix B: First, 85% of all 
U.S. hospitals in 2000 were community hospitals, owning 84% of the beds. Second, most 
community hospitals were nonprofit, specifically 52% were nonprofit, 13% were for-
profit, 37% belonged to a state or local government, and 4% belonged to the federal 
government1. Third, the occupancy rate and average length of stay steadily declined 
while the number of outpatient visits and percentage of outpatient surgery significantly 
                                                 
1 The Federal government owns hospitals belonging to the Armed Forces and Veteran Association. 
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increased in the 1980-2000 period. This trend reflects both the financial pressures on cost 
containment and technological advances that reduces surgical trauma. With new 
technologies, many procedures need shorter post operative hospital stay, or even just 
outpatient surgery. Lastly, there was a general decrease in capacity (both number of beds 
and hospitals) for all hospitals except for-profit hospitals. The admission to public 
hospitals (federal and local) fell, while the admission to private (nonprofit and for-profit) 
fell and then rose, during these two decades. The reduction in capacity was slower than 
the fall in demand for beds and created excess capacity and declining occupancy. 
Together with policy changes in healthcare financing, the excess capacity has led to 
increased capacity in the hospital market. Many health care analysts link increased 
competition to the trend in physician hospital integration.  
 
Arrow (1963) defines the medical economy as the complex of services which centers on 
physicians. The hospital is an institution in this economy. The hospital purchases inputs 
from factor markets (i.e. pharmaceutical products, medical equipment, non medical goods 
such as building and food, nursing, administrative and physician time) and transform 
inputs into output using technology with product uncertainty. Arrow (1963) refers to the 
uncertainty for medical science to produce consistent outcome as product uncertainty. 
While physician and capital owners are in separate firms in the traditional institutional 
structure of hospital, it is hard to conceive a hospital production function without any 
physician component.   
 
Historically, early U.S. hospitals were philanthropic hospitals providing free care for the 
poor, or were specialized institutions for psychiatric and infectious diseases. The family 
provided most of the palliative care from home. Advances in modern surgery in the late 
nineteenth century created the need for institutionalized care using professionally trained 
labor and specialized capital equipment. Concurrent urbanization was conducive for 
hospital expansion for two reasons. First, urbanization created new health problems in a 
crowded environment. Second, the urban working class had increased opportunity labor 
cost and better ability to pay because of employer sponsored health insurance. These 
developments favored substituting institutionalized care for home care. By the mid 
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twentieth century, medical technology could modify the course of many diseases with 
institutionalized care [see Fuchs (1974) for an interesting discourse of the economic 
history of medicine]. Institutions today provide definite advantage over home for post 
operative care and during the critical phases of many diseases. Hospitals provide the 
economy of scale to acquire capital equipment for physicians. 
 
Physicians and hospitals in almost all private U.S. hospitals before the 1980s were 
separate legal entities, i.e. segregate hospitals. Arrow (1963) states that medical 
technology cannot precisely predict the outcome of diseases and calls this property 
“product uncertainty” (Later in Chapter 3, we shall argue that product uncertainty is an 
interpretation of care quality). Arrow argues that with product uncertainty, risk becomes 
non marketable and ideal insurance becomes impossible, i.e. it is not possible to pay care 
providers (i.e. physicians) based on the benefit the consumers (i.e. patients) receive. The 
social institution which arises to solve this economic problem is the agency relation 
between physician and patient (otherwise known as medical ethics, professional relation 
and so on): The patient entrusts consumption decisions to the physician who knows better 
about the production and utility of the health states. While agency relations exist in many 
professional relations (such as between a lawyer and a client), the physician-patient 
relation is unique in two aspects: the consequence is very severe, and physician has better 
knowledge about patient’s health utility. Arrows’ work shows that uncertainty in medical 
technology gives rise to the expected physician behavior to be the perfect agent for 
patients. Fuchs (1974) suggests that segregation of capital ownership from physician 
removes the inherent conflict between profit motive and the fiduciary duties to deliver the 
highest possible care quality. Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) multitask agency model 
provides the theoretical insight to Fuchs (1974). The authors consider a principal who 
assign two tasks to an agent where only one task is measured easily. If the principal also 
implement a performance incentive, the agent will neglect the task which is difficult to 
measure. Care quality is more difficult to measure (than number of discharge) because of 
product uncertainty. Removing physicians from financial incentive ensure the delivery of 
the highest feasible care quality. However, an unwanted effect of this arrangement is the 
over utilization of resources that may improve care quality and increase cost. As a 
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physician makes clinical decisions without cost consideration, he prefers a “likely useless 
but harmless” intervention to no intervention.  
 
How does product uncertainty arise in the hospital market? To be precise, we have a clear 
understanding of some diseases (such as polio), an imperfect understanding of most 
diseases (such as coronary artery diseases), and vague knowledge of a few diseases. 
Borrowing the terminology from Thomson (1975), these states are respectively known as 
high technology, halfway technology and non-technology. The state of technology 
influences the cost effectiveness of intervention: high technology has low cost because 
the cause is well known and effective treatments are available. For example, the cost 
burden of polio is low because we have effective antibiotics to treat and vaccines to 
prevent the disease. Non-technology has low cost because no treatment is available and 
care givers can only provide symptomatic relief. This category comprises two extremes: 
terminal diseases which are given palliative care; and self-limiting idiopathic2 diseases 
which are often self-medicated. Weisbrod (1991) argues that halfway technology is the 
most expensive because partial treatments are available in the hospital. The third party 
payer system insulates the physician and patient from cost consideration and promotes 
over use of halfway technology. As information about a patient’s disease often unfolds 
over time, the public health referral system is a social institution to minimize the cost 
burden of diseases: The primary care level (consisting of family physicians and self 
medication) treats most of the high technology and self-limiting non-technology cases. 
This level also serves as a gatekeeper for expensive halfway technology in secondary and 
tertiary care hospitals. Hence, providers in the medical economy deliver a complete range 
of care during a disease episode, and hospitals deliver the most expensive halfway 
technology. 
 
Broadly speaking, three institutional structures dominated the U.S. hospital market during 
different periods. They are namely cost reimbursement, prospective payment system 
(PPS), and managed care. The cost reimbursement structure dominated the market just 
after World War II: independent physicians and nonprofit hospitals were financed by cost 
                                                 
2 Idiopathic means ‘of unknown cause’ 
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reimbursement from insurance for the care that the patients received. Hospitals could not 
compete for patients with direct financial payment to physician because of the physician-
patient relation which Arrow (1963) describes. Instead, hospitals competed for referrals 
by investing in capital equipment to attract physicians (this is called Medical Arms Race 
theory, or MAR). Ethovan (1978) points out that Medical Arms Race is a non-price 
competition which drives cost above the social optimum. When there are few hospitals in 
an area (i.e. high industry concentration), Medical Arms Race is less intense, causing cost 
and price to decrease. In other words, the Medical Arms Race theory predicts that price 
and concentration is inversely related. Several studies (Robinson and Luft, 1985; 
Robinson, Garnick and McPhee, 1987) find this effect from data in the 1970s and early 
1980s, which has largely disappeared by the late 1980s.  
 
The primary event that eroded MAR is the introduction of prospective payment system. 
Healthcare financing authority3 (HCFA), the largest insurer in the U.S., introduced the 
Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1983 to reimburse hospital services. Prices of 
hospital admissions were fixed ex ante using diagnostic related group (DRG). In 1992, 
HCFA extended the method to cover physician services using resource based relative 
value system (RB-RVS). Other insurers quickly adopted these PPS schemes. PPS 
becomes standard practice by the 1990s. Shleifer (1985) points out the theoretical 
underpinning of PPS and coins the term yardstick competition: a seller has the incentive 
to select efficient technology since a buyer pays the average cost (i.e. price = average 
cost). Yardstick competition introduces incentive to minimize the cost per admission. 
However, since DRG does not capture care quality sufficiently, hospitals have incentive 
not to admit severely ill patients and discharge them early to reduce cost (Dranove, 1987; 
Ma, 1994).  
 
The advent of managed care 4 and selective contracting is the third structural change 
which gradually modifies competition. Despite initial resistance from physicians, the 
                                                 
3 On July 1, 2001 HCFA became the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).  
4 Managed care arrangements refer to diverse institutions such as staff and group HMO (Health 
Maintenance Organization), IPA (Independent Practice Association) and PPO (Preferred Provider 
Organization). In the late 1990s, IPA dominates while various vertically integrated forms such as hospital 
or physician sponsored network are growing. 
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signing of HMO Act (1973) into law provided the required regulatory environment for 
growth of managed care. By 1993, over 70% of all U.S. health insurance enrolled in 
some form of managed care [see Glied (2000) for a detailed discourse on managed care]. 
Competitions among hospital since the 1990s were increasingly payer driven with the 
objective of becoming a member of the provider panel (Dranove, Shanley and White, 
1993). Managed care introduces even greater cost pressure because a hospital needs to 
minimize cost per patient instead of cost per admission. Contrary to the Medical Arms 
Race scenario, the price concentration relation is now positive because the hospital can 
resist pricing pressure better when there are fewer hospitals in an area. Therefore, three 
decades of cost containment policies have increased competition in the hospital markets. 
Another important trend in 1990s was the rise of various forms of physician hospital 
(vertical) integration to compete for managed care contract (Shortell and Hull, 1996). 
Many researchers, such as Burns and Thorpe (1995), Shortell et al (1996), believe there 
is a causal relationship between managed care penetration and integration. Consultants 
and practitioners, such as Advisory Board (1993) and Dowling (1995) develop multistage 
market evolution models to characterize this association. 
 
Physician hospital integration raises some important questions in the context of cost 
containment. Does physician hospital integration improves cost efficiency? How? Will 
there be any difference between integration of for-profit and nonprofit entities? Varney 
(1995) states that pro-competitive benefits can occur through reducing agency cost in 
integration. An explanation may exist in the economic theory literature, but no one has 
yet applied it to answer these questions. This is the primary contribution of our research. 
 
1.2 Research Problem and Hypotheses 
 
This section consists of key ideas of the analytical framework discussed in Chapter 2. We 
wish to formulate and test a theoretical model to explain how hospital cost efficiency can 
change when physicians become employees. Holmstrom (1982) examines efficiency 
under team agency, i.e. a team of agents jointly produce the output for a principal. Joint 
 8
production means each agent produces nothing independently, but the team can jointly 
produce the output. Holmstrom shows that externality will cause shirking under team 
agency (a moral hazard problem). The principal can overcome shirking to achieve Pareto 
efficiency if she administers a reward scheme similar to a salary cum bonus scheme 
(Holmstrom calls this a budget breaking scheme). However, Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) 
shows that budget breaking will only work if the principal does not have the incentive to 
sabotage the team to maximize profit (the principal’s own moral hazard problem). 
Therefore, we can form two hypotheses from the above arguments after classifying 
hospitals into three groups: fully integrated organizations (FIOs) that hire physicians; 
networks which form alliances with physicians; segregate hospitals where physicians are 
independent:  
 
H1: In nonprofit hospitals, FIOs are more efficient than network and segregate hospitals 
H2: In for-profit hospitals, we will not observe the cost efficiency difference 
 
When there is no opportunity to administer the salary cum bonus scheme (in network and 
segregate hospitals), the principal can monitor the agents. 5  Here, we can apply the 
property rights argument (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Frech, 1976) which predicts a for-
profit entity is more efficient than a nonprofit one. We obtain the third hypothesis: 
 
H3: For-profit network and segregate hospitals are more efficient than nonprofit ones.  
 
There is no a priori reason that for-profit FIOs are more efficient than nonprofit ones 
because of two opposing forces: first, property rights theory predicts that for-profit is 
more efficient; second, team agency predicts that nonprofit is more efficient because the 
principal does not face moral hazard. Therefore, the property rights effect in FIO is 
attenuated and can go both ways.  
 
 
                                                 
5 It is easier to monitor manager than physician. 
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1.3 Justification for Research 
 
This research extends the property rights debate (i.e. for-profit hospitals are more cost 
efficient than nonprofit ones) by adding the physician incentive dimension. As Sloan 
(2000) points out, recent empirical evidence shows that hospitals with different capital 
ownerships have similar cost efficiency in an environment of increased competition. 
However, a mere comparison of cost efficiency of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals omits 
the powerful moderating effect of physician influence on resources allocation. We 
propose a richer model when comparing cost efficiency between for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals by adding the role of team agency in physician and hospital manager.  
 
Our results have direct implication for firm strategies and antitrust regulations in vertical 
hospital merger. Burns, Gimm and Nicholson (2005) show that initial investment in 
hospital merger can adversely affect financial performance. Our results show where the 
payoffs for hospital vertical integration can arise. Varney (1995) argues that hospital 
vertical integration can be pro-competitive by reducing agency cost. We apply the result 
from team agency theory to show how vertical integration can be pro-competitive. 
Therefore, our primary contribution is a theoretical application with empirical support 




We use quantitative method to examine the production unit for hospital care (i.e. the unit 
of analysis). In chapter 4, we will argue that the hospital and its affiliated physicians this 
form a production unit to deliver patient care. The concept of production unit is in line 
with theoretical models such as Pauly and Redisch (1973). Our constructs are factors 
related to cost efficiency and classification of hospitals. We can examine our research 
methodology using three types of validities: construct validity, internal validity and 
external validity (Trochim, 2000).  
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The data universe in our research question is the set of all U.S. hospitals in 1997. We 
obtain our data from six sources: the American Hospital Association’s annual survey; the 
National Inpatient Sample from Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality; the Wage 
by Area and Occupation survey from Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the CPT4-ICD9CM 
crosswalk file from Info-X Inc6. Our sample consists of a cross section of 313 hospitals, 
and we are satisfied that these hospitals are similar to the National Inpatient Sample7 
version 6 in terms of casemix and important hospital characteristics. 
 
Trochim (2000) states that the three pre-requisites for inferring causal relation (internal 
validity) are: correlation, temporal precedence and lack of alternative explanations. 
Controlled experiment 8 has the highest internal validity follow by quasi-experiment and 
cross section observation. However, only cross section observation and quasi-experiment 
of hospital type conversions are feasible for our research question. This is because we 
cannot assign constructs for capital ownership or organizational structure to hospitals. We 
can compare pre and post conversion equilibrium cost efficiency in quasi-experiment by 
observing cases over suitable periods. However, this method suffers from two related 
limitations. First, the time to reach stable cost efficiency after conversion is unknown, 
making suitable observation difficult to define. Meanwhile, environmental shocks can 
cause unpredictable change in cost efficiency. Second, the number of conversion is much 
smaller than population size. The small size increases the effects of outlier. Our next 
alternative is to observe a large cross section of firms. This is the most common method 
in econometric modeling. However, we cannot establish temporal precedence using this 
method. Without establishing temporal precedence, we need to assume that cost 
efficiency is stable in the sample to obtain valid result. Outliers may arise because some 
                                                 
6 Info-X Inc. generously supplied the crosswalk file from its commercial computer program. The file maps 
all possible CPT4 codes to ICD9CM codes and vice versa. CPT4 means current procedure terminology 
version 4; it is the code physician use to submit billable procedure to insurer. ICD9CM means international 
classification of disease for clinical management version 9; it is the code hospital use to bill insurer. 
Crosswalk is an insurance jargon that means mapping one code base to another. 
 
7 The Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality uses a stratified sampling frame to ensure that the 
National Inpatient Sample is representative of the hospitals in the participant States. 
 
8 According to Trochim (2000), controlled experiment is a research method that has five elements in its 
design: comparative groups (control and treatment groups), random assignment of sample to group, 
treatment administration (the independent variable), and measurement of pre and post treatment effects.  
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firms are not at their equilibrium efficiency just after environmental shock or 
organizational conversion. A large sample size mitigates the effect of outliers. A better 
way is to accommodate some random shocks using stochastic frontier instead of DEA or 
deterministic frontier. The choice between quasi-experiment and observation weighs 
slightly to the latter, and confirmation of the result using quasi-experiment will be fruitful.  
 
1.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the structure of the dissertation and background 
information about the U.S. hospital market. The next three chapters (chapters 2 to 4) 




2. Theory of Hospital Cost Efficiency 
 
All firms are cost efficient in the neoclassical world, and cost function is the result of 
successful cost minimization behavior for a given technology. Deviation from the 
neoclassical ideal constitutes cost inefficiency. There are several theories about physician 
behavior which may cause deviation from cost frontier in hospitals. Newhouse (1970) 
argues that nonprofit hospital jointly maximize quantity and quality. However, too many 
resources are allocated to care quality for two reasons: First, managers in nonprofit 
hospitals are not evaluated on profit performance. Second, trustees and physicians prefer 
high care quality. Therefore, nonprofit hospitals may invest in conspicuously prestigious 
but inefficient technology. Newhouse argues that measuring hospital (patient care) output 
requires quantity and quality as joint proxies. In contrast to the neoclassical production 
function that requires only quantity to proxy output, production uncertainty in hospital 
technology gives rise to the need for joint proxies. Arrow (1963) explains the meaning of 
production uncertainty9: Within acceptable medical practices, subtle differences in the 
treatment produce variations in the patient’s health status. Pauly and Redisch (1973) 
model the hospital as physician’s cooperative that maximizes the physician’s average 
revenue. Physicians, not capital owners, are the dominant decision makers in allocating 
resources in hospitals.  
 
These two models share three similarities. First, both equilibriums are not Pareto efficient. 
Quality is excessive in Newhouse’s model, and excessive profit accrues to physicians in 
Pauly and Redisch’s model. Second, physician allocates resources in the hospital even 
when physicians and hospitals are separate legal entities. This situation contrasts sharply 
with neoclassical theory where the capital owner allocates resources to maximize profit. 
Furthermore, hospital care is jointly produced using physician and hospital resources. 
Therefore, the physician is technologically part of the hospital under the neoclassical 
                                                 
9 The term ‘product uncertainty’ is used in Arrow (1963). Technology means the relation between input and 
output embodied in a production function. 
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framework, and firm internalizes technology. Adopting the neoclassical framework 
allows us to use results in the cost theory literature described in later chapters. Third, the 
Newhouse (1970) and Pauly and Redisch (1973) models are applicable to nonprofit 
hospitals where physicians are not hospital employees. The principle (patient)-agent 
(physician) relation in Arrow (1963) drives these two models and the hospital 
(administrator) has no role. The difference in the agent’s behavior results in excessive 
profit in Newhouse (1970) and excessive quality in Pauly and Redisch (1973). 
 
Harris (1977) views hospitals as two interdependent firms. A hospital provides input to a 
physician in a complicated and uncertain sequence of events. The hospital manager 
solves the rationing problem with non-price related decision rules such as rule of thumb 
and side bargain. Harris’s (1977) model captures two important aspects of hospital 
operation. First, the production technology is ex ante uncertain and bargaining becomes a 
mechanism to allocate resources. Second, the joint production of hospital services is even 
clearer in the Harris model than the previous two models. Furthermore, the Harris’s 
model is not restricted to nonprofit hospitals unlike Newhouse’s (1970) or Pauly and 
Redisch’s (1973) models. Although theoretical models from Newhouse’s (1970), Pauly 
and Redisch (1973) and Harris (1977) suggest the sources of cost inefficiency, there is no 
empirical analysis that relies on these models. We present our hospital classification in 
the next section before discussing our synthesis of hospital cost efficiency research10. 
 
2.1 Classification of Hospitals 
 
We classify hospitals along two dimensions for the purpose of this dissertation. First, we 
can classify hospitals as nonprofit and for-profit unambiguously. Second, we classify 
hospitals into those hiring physicians as employees (i.e. integrated) and those which do 
not. The 1997 American Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey lists seven 11 
mutually exclusive relationships between hospitals and physicians, namely integrated 
                                                 
10 Introducing the classification scheme at this point is convenient for the reader although the scheme arises 
from the synthesis later. 
11 The default relationship is independent physicians and hospitals (i.e. segregate hospital). 
 14
salary model, equity model, foundation model, independent physician associations, group 
practice without walls, management service organization, (close and open) physician 
hospital organization (PHO).   
 
The first three models are integrated models. In the equity model, (senior) physicians 
form a company to own assets. The for-profit company directly hires physicians (both 
owner-physicians and additional ones) as employees. In the integrated salary model, a 
nonprofit hospital (or non physician investor) directly hires physicians as employees. In 
the foundation model, the nonprofit hospital forms a foundation as a subsidiary. The 
hospital hires physicians indirectly because the latter are technically the foundation’s 
employees. The physicians in all three cases have employment contracts. For the purpose 
of this dissertation, we call these arrangements fully integrated organization (FIO). 
 
The physicians in the next four models usually have (managed care) service contracts 
with the hospitals. Group practices without walls (GPWWs) are the most common type of 
practice group today. Physicians in most GPWWs maintain independent practice but 
negotiate managed care contract as a group with the hospital. Financial arrangements 
vary from group to group. Some GPWW leaders decide to incorporate as a medical group, 
consolidate support staff and standardize procedures (such as credentialing standards). 
Key owners become managers, issue stock and set up profit-sharing plan. 12  The 
independent physician association (IPA) is a group practice formed by physicians and 
tends to be well financed (often backed with venture capital or corporation). The IPA 
negotiates with payers for a capitation rate including physician fees, then reimburses the 
physicians (although not necessarily using capitation). Both IPA and its members share 
the risk of medical costs if capitation payment is lower than required reimbursement for 
physician. An IPA can be a pure physician cooperative or a mix alliance of physicians 
and hospitals. The physician hospital organization (PHO) is a partnership between 
hospitals and physicians to either co-ordinate the delivery of healthcare services to a 
defined population, or contract directly with a self-funded employer group and/or 
                                                 
12 This is effectively forming a medical group consisting of physicians. If the owners are hospitals, then the 
arrangement will become one of the integrated forms in the previous paragraph. 
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government program. In its weakest form, the PHO is a messenger who analyzes terms 
and conditions the payer offers before letting each physician decides individually on 
participation. Usually, the participating physicians and hospitals have standard contract 
terms to negotiate with payer within a given time frame. The terms are binding if the 
PHO succeeds; otherwise the participants can negotiate with payers directly after the time 
window expires. The PHO is a bargaining vehicle where the service contract is between 
the provider and the payer. PHO is a primer for vertical integration and is often formed as 
a reaction to selective contracting in managed care. The open PHO opens its enrollment 
to all hospital accredited physician and is often specialty dominated. The closed PHO 
limits physician membership by specialty or practice profiling. The management service 
organization (MSO) is an independent corporation owned by a hospital or PHO. It 
provides administrative services for a fee to the affiliated medical practices, and also 
serves as a vehicle for planning and contracting with payer. These arrangements provide 
some co-ordination for managed care contracting and non-medical administration for the 
hospital-physician or physician-physician groups. For the purpose of this dissertation, we 
refer to these arrangements as network hospital.  
 
The medical staff model is the de facto arrangement between hospitals and physicians. 
Under this arrangement, a specialist (as oppose to primary care) physician applies to the 
hospital medical staff committee 13  to obtain the privilege to admit his patients (i.e. 
become a medical staff). Theses physicians are independent professionals and may apply 
for medical staff in competing hospitals. For the purpose of this dissertation, we refer to 
this arrangement as segregate hospital.  
 
2.2 Cost Efficiency in Nonprofit and For-profit Hospitals 
 
The model which attracts most empirical work is Frech’s (1976) property rights model. 
Frech argues that owners of for-profit hospital maximize profit because of property rights: 
                                                 
13 The committee comprises existing medical staff and representatives of the hospital and physicians. The 
Joint Commission of the Accreditation for Hospitals sets guidelines for the operations of the committees. 
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When it is possible to clearly define individual (capital) owners, they will have the 
incentive to ensure that the firm is run efficiently (Alchian, 1961; Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972). Property rights empower owners to allocate firm’s resources, keep the residue, and 
capitalize on wealth gained by selling the rights. In an efficient capital market, capital 
owners will discipline inefficient firms by divesting their capital. This mechanism is 
absent in nonprofit and public hospitals. The attenuated property rights in these hospitals 
enable hospital managers to pursue non-pecuniary objective at the owner’s expense and 
therefore reduces efficiency. These hospitals do not maximize profit because of imperfect 
agent. De Alessi (1983) argues that managers in for-profit hospitals are more likely to 
introduce cost saving innovations and adopt cost minimizing input combinations to lower 
costs, than their nonprofit hospital counterparts. The Harris’s model suggests that hospital 
manager plays an important role in determining cost efficiency. The hospital manager 
bargains with physician to allocate resource (even when physicians are not hospital 
employees), and the bargained outcome influences cost efficiency. Managers in nonprofit 
and public hospitals maximize an objective function which includes profit and non-
pecuniary benefits. Therefore, the theory of property rights motivates research on the 
efficiency difference between hospitals with different capital ownerships. 
 
However, empirical analysis of hospital cost efficiency is plagued with methodology 
problems. Almost all U.S. empirical studies to date use accounting data collected 
assuming hospital as the unit of analysis. For U.S. hospitals that do not hire physician as 
employees, the cost data do not contain any physician related component. As a result, 
analyses using these data are not consistent with theoretical models that include physician 
in the production of hospital outputs. Some U.S. hospitals hire physicians as employees 
and the accounting data contain physician costs. This sub-set of data will not be 
comparable with most hospital data. We shall defer the methodology debate on modeling 
efficiency, and specific issues on input measurement to Chapter 3.  
 
The results from these empirical studies are not conclusive. Wilson and Jadlow (1982) as 
well as Herzlinger and Krasker (1987) find higher efficiency in for-profit hospitals; Sloan 
and Vraicu (1983), Becker and Sloan (1985), Gaumer (1986), Shortell and Hughes 
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(1988), Patel, Needleman and Zechauser (1994), and Sloan et al (1998) find no difference. 
Zuckerman, Hadley and Iezzoni (1994) even find nonprofit hospitals to be more cost 
efficient than for-profit hospitals. Sloan (2000) succinctly summarizes the current 
position of the empirical research on the ownership-efficiency nexus: ‘There is probably 
not much difference in technical and allocative efficiency, and if any existed, the 
increased competition in the 1990s would narrow it 14...” Furthermore, the increased 
reliance for all hospital on debt capital 15 and decreasing donation implies that hospitals 
are becoming more similar than different.”   
 
The property rights theory predicts that for-profit hospitals are more cost efficient than 
nonprofit ones. On the other hand, Fama (1980) highlights that we should not confuse 
capital ownership with the control of the firm, specifically: “… the control over a firm’s 
decision is not necessarily the province of security holders”. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
view the firm simply as legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of contracting 
relationship among individual production factor where capital ownership is only one of 
them. Our earlier discussion of hospital behavioral models by Newhouse (1970), Pauly 
and Redisch (1973) and Harris (1977), indicates that we need to consider the role of 
physicians in hospitals. The link between performance and ownership is strong when 
physician interests are minimal (Schlesinger, Marmor and Smithey, 1987). Including 
physician influence in the empirical analysis of hospital cost efficiency is a knowledge 
gap that needs to be addressed. This is especially true when new organizational 
arrangements between physicians and hospitals have appeared in the U.S. since 1990s. 
These new arrangements arise to compete for managed care contracts in the era of payer 
driven competition. Do these new organizational arrangements have higher cost 
efficiency? If yes, what is the theoretical reason? If no, these new organizational forms 
can attract antitrust regulation because Cuellar and Gertler (2006) find they can exercise 
market power in the hospital service market. 
 
                                                 
14 It is increasingly infeasible for nonprofit hospital to fund non-pecuniary objectives, whatever these are, 
with limited donation income in the hospital revenue stream in the U.S. In this sense, hospital ownership 
research is a declining industry (Sloan, 2000). 
15 Unlike for-profit hospitals, nonprofits are exempted from tax and do not benefit from debt tax shield. 
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2.3 Team Agency and Cost Efficiency 
 
We begin our analysis by examining a theoretical model. Holmstrom (1982) considers a 
model with a principle and two agents jointly producing a product. Each agent takes an 
unobservable action a with private cost v(a) to produce an output x(a). The principal sells 
the output and allocates a share s to everyone. A balanced budget sharing scheme means 
Σs(x)= x and each agent obtains the payoff s(x(a))-v(a). Suppose the sharing rule is 
differentiable, then Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium means the optimal effort a* = 
argmax[x(a)-Σv(a)].  Differentiating the payoff obtains s’x’-v’=0, while the Pareto 
optimality implies x’-v’=0. These two results jointly imply that s’=1. However, 
differentiating the balanced budget Σs(x)= x obtains Σs’(x)= 1, which contradicts the 
earlier result that s’=1. Therefore, the conditions for budget balancing and Pareto 
efficiency cannot simultaneously coexist. This is because moral hazard (i.e. shirking) can 
occur in multi-agent production even without uncertainty in technology. The principal 
cannot identify the agent who cheats even if she can observe the joint output as an 
indicator of inputs. (Contrast this to the single agent case where the principal can identify 
shirking under certainty). Holmstrom suggests using a budget breaking sharing rule (i.e. 
Σs(x)<x) to overcome this free rider problem. Specifically, let each agent’s share be 
si(x)=bi if x>x(a*) and si(x)=0 if x<x(a*), where b is an arbitrary real number. The 
solution for bi satisfies two conditions Σbi= x(a*) and bi>v(a*)>0, which means total 
share is the optimal output provided that each share is bigger than the individual’s private 
cost (and is positive). This Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient because x(a*)-Σv(a*)>0, 
i.e. the optimal output is greater than total cost to all agents. The budget breaking scheme 
therefore neutralizes externalities in joint production. We can implement the scheme as a 
basic wage plus bonus/punishment. In a dynamic context, such punishment means firing 
the employee. Holmstrom (1982) also shows that budget breaking scheme holds under 
uncertainty.  
 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) argue that under Holmstrom (1982) scheme, the principal 
herself faces moral hazard. The authors assumes there is a residue R(x)= x-Σs(x) which 
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can be partially used as a bribe e. The self-interested principal can offer a secret scheme 
to one of the agents to receive b if x>x(a*), b+e if x < x < x(a*) and zero if x < x  where   
x ,e>0 and R = x -b-e > R(x(a*)). The equilibrium output is x which is less than x(a*). 
Therefore, introducing budget breaking gives the principal the incentive to engage in 
morally hazardous behavior. In the context of for-profit hospitals which hire physicians 
(i.e. FIO), there are several ways in which this “bribe” can be offered. For example, the 
hospital owner can start a project that reduces cost efficiency in a profitable year. The 
project administrator can receive the reward as a promotion or one-off perk (such as 
project funding). 
 
The works of Holmstrom (1982) and Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) provide us a theoretical 
framework to examine cost efficiency in hospitals. To begin with, a production function 
without either physician or hospital services is infeasible (violate the property that input 
requirement set V(.) is non-empty). Physicians and hospital managers jointly produce 
patient care even when physicians are not hospital employees. When the physician is an 
employee, the physician and the manager form a team of agents working for a principal 
who is the residual claimant. The physician is a double agent 16 because he has two 
principals (i.e. his employer and the patient). Arrow (1963) explains that agency relation 
between patients and physicians arises because of product uncertainty. Grossman and 
Hart (1986) define the firm using assets which it owns: firm ownership is about 
possessing the residual rights over assets. Residual rights are rights not taken away by 
contract with other parties; specific rights are rights memorialized in contracts. Residual 
rights negate the cost to set down all possible specific rights in a contract. The boundaries 
of the firm are delimited by the control of residual rights. In the U.S. context, hospitals 
can purchase physician services from the market17 or internalize them within the firm. 
 
When the physician is an employee, the hospital owner can administer a salary cum 
bonus scheme to the production team. If the principal does not face moral hazard problem 
                                                 
16 To be sure, the physician often faces conflict between being a professional and an employee. However, 
corporate medicine is not impossible as in the British National Health System.  
17 We use Grossman and Hart (1986) to anchor the hospital as a firm. Technologically the physician is still 
part of the production function regardless of the legal relation between physician and hospital.   
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as Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) describe, this budget breaking scheme will overcome the 
externality problem to achieve Pareto efficiency according to Holmstrom (1982). If the 
physician is not an employee, then the principal cannot administer the scheme to the 
production team. At most she can administer the scheme for the hospital manager 
because the physician has a service contract (while the manager has a labor contract)18. 
Therefore, integrated hospitals are more efficient than non-integrated ones if there is no 
principal moral hazard. This scenario happens in nonprofit hospital because there is no 
profit incentive. On the other hand, moral hazard in the principal occurs in for-profit 
hospitals and the difference in efficiency will be nullified. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: Nonprofit integrated hospitals are more efficient than non-integrated ones19 
H2: For-profit integrated hospitals are not more efficient than non-integrated ones.  
 
2.4 Monitoring and Cost Efficiency 
 
What happen in non-integrated hospitals when it is not possible to administer the salary 
cum bonus scheme? An alternative mechanism to this scheme is for the principal to 
monitor the agent. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) suggest the monitor is the residual 
claimant for incentive compatibility. Claiming the residue provides property rights. Frech 
(1976) argues that for-profit hospitals are more efficient than nonprofit ones because 
there are clearly identified residual claimants. Even in modern firms where management 
is independent of residual claimant, market discipline from external security (bond and 
equity) market can act as monitoring agency on managers. Fama (1980) explains how the 
security market can discipline manager through the effects of managerial labor market. 
Unlike security a holder who diversifies his wealth through portfolio, a manager invests 
                                                 
18 The managed care relations with hospital and physician are contracts for services. Therefore, it is 
difficult to administer the budget breaking scheme because of the ramifications of the service providers. 
Even if distinct physician group service each hospital, neither hospital nor physician are within the same 
firm in the Grossman and Hart (1986) sense. It is extremely difficult for physician to receive financial 
rewards from outside the firm as explained in Arrow (1963). Technologically, hospital care production and 
financing are distinct.  
 
19 We measure efficiency using a real number between zero and one calculated by stochastic frontier model.  
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substantial amount of his wealth (i.e. the wage income stream) in one firm as human 
capital. The manager is mobile across firms due to constant recruitment by firms, and 
hence his future wage stream is revaluated. As long as the security market evaluates the 
firm’s value efficiently, a prospective employer can use the firm’s value as proxy for the 
candidate’s competence to determine the candidate’s future wage. In this case, the 
manager has the incentive to ensure efficient operation of the firm by monitoring 
management level above and below him. As long as there is competition for the top job, 
the top manager will also be monitored by the next level. Fama and Jensen (1983) further 
pursue the market factor argument that if everything fails to overcome the agency 
problem, there is always hostile takeover as the final market disciplining device. The 
driving force for this argument is an efficient capital market where securities are traded to 
discover price. This happens in the for-profit economy but not in a nonprofit one. Hence, 
without the influence of team agency argument in the previous section, for-profit 
hospitals are more efficient than nonprofit ones. We form our third hypothesis as: 
 
H3: In non-integrated hospital, for-profit hospital is more efficient than nonprofit one.  
 
What happens when we compare for-profit FIOs with nonprofit FIOs? Team agency 
theory predicts that nonprofit FIOs will be more efficient than for-profit FIOs because of 
the principal’s moral hazard problem; property rights theory predicts that nonprofit FIOs 
will be less efficient than for-profit FIOs. There is no a priori reason which force will 
dominate, but we are likely to obtain no difference statistically.   
 
2.5 Cost Efficiency in Public Hospitals 
 
The common thread in team agency and property rights models is the behavior of payoff 
maximization in each economic agent. In the agency team, each agent’s payoff is the 
difference between his profit share and the private cost for his effort. The principal’s 
payoff is the residual claim. The literature shows that incentive in public hospitals is 
more complex than team agency and property rights models.  
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Lindsay (1976) argues that the Congress is the principal in public hospitals. The 
Congress’s objective is to please voters, so that providing the maximum output for an 
allocated budget is a desirable outcome for public firms such as public hospitals. Unlike 
private firms, public firms do not provide output at market price. In fact, outputs are often 
provided free of charge to the intended consumers. Public firms exist precisely because of 
market failure to supply certain goods, such as uncompensated medical care, which is 
politically unacceptable. The Congress cannot use profit to meter the performance of 
manager in public hospital since the public hospital’s output is not priced at market rate 
(even if this is a regulated price). The managerial labor market in Fama (1980) cannot 
discipline a public hospital’s manager because the firm’s performance is not financial 
measures. Lindsay argues that the Congress uses visible indicators, such as patient day 
and per-diem cost, to meter manager’s performance in public hospitals. The level of care 
quality in public hospitals is lower than private hospitals because public hospitals just 
need to meet minimum standards. Patients can boycott private hospitals to force private 
hospitals to improve quality. Consumers need to complain to the Congress to force public 
hospitals to raise quality. This process is costly to consumers and provides less timely 
information. Lindsay (1976) shows that Veteran Affairs hospitals have longer average 
lengths of stay and lower per diem costs than private hospitals. 
 
Wilson (1989) argues that government agencies have multiple objectives. Government 
programs have distributional effects where consideration of equity and accountability are 
often more important than economic efficiency. Therefore, the budget breaking 
mechanism will also break down because of equity and accountability considerations. We 
conclude that our theoretical framework has limited application to public hospitals. Cost 
efficiency difference between public and private hospitals indicates difference in 




2.7 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter provides an analytical framework for examining hospital cost efficiency 
using theories of team agency and property rights. We have developed three hypotheses 
and identified a situation where theses two theories provide opposite predictions. Given 
the context of cost containment from Chapter 1, cost efficiency is a natural measure for 
Pareto efficiency in the discussion in this chapter. Up to this point, we have said nothing 




3. Theory of Cost Efficiency Measure 
 
We assume that we can specify hospital production, cost or profit functions as required in 
the following discussion. We will discuss the issues of specifying hospital cost function 
in Chapter 4. In line with conventional treatment, we shall first discuss production 
efficiency and extend the result to cost efficiency. The neoclassical production theory 
assumes economic agents are successful in maximizing output subject to technological 
constraints (Similarly, they are successful in minimizing cost and maximizing profit in 
the respective cases of cost and profit functions). Depending on whether the function is 
production, cost or profit, there is a positive or negative residue if the economic agent 
fails in the constrained optimization. However, typical regression analysis produces an 
estimate of the function’s average level that fits the data. The residue can be positive or 
negative, but neoclassical economic theory only allows either one to exist depending on 
the estimated function. This paradox arises because the technique estimates mean rather 
than the frontier. The frontier is the benchmark for measuring efficiency. 
 
Only technical efficiency is meaningful for production frontier. Koopmans (1951) defines 
an output-input vector20 (y,x) is technically efficient, if and only if, (y’,x’) is not feasible 
for (y’,-x’)>(y,-x). From this definition, Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) suggest 
definitions for technical efficiencies. The input-oriented technical efficiency arises from 
the firm’s ability to minimize inputs; the output-oriented technical efficiency arises from 
the firm’s ability to maximize output. We can use a suitable distance function to measure 
technical efficiency from the single output production frontier, or an isoquant for the 
single and multiple output cases. If the assumption of cost minimizing behavior is 
appropriate, the cost frontier provides the standard to measure cost efficiency. Achieving 
input-oriented technical efficiency is necessary but not sufficient for cost efficiency. This 
is because a technically efficient producer can use inappropriate input mix for a given set 
of input prices. We can decompose cost efficiency into technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency components. Decomposing profit efficiency is even more exacting than cost 
                                                 
20 y denotes the output quantity, x denotes the input quantity, see Appendix A for a summary on notation. 
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efficiency. Profit efficiency requires output-oriented technical efficiency, input-oriented 
allocative efficiency, and output-oriented allocative efficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000. p.60). 
 
3.1 Measuring Technical Efficiency with Production Frontier 
 
There are three ways to measure technical efficiency using a production function: non-
statistical frontier, (statistical) deterministic frontier, and (statistical) stochastic frontier 
(Schmidt, 1986).    
For a production function 21  yi=f(xi,b), the corresponding production frontier is 
yi=f(xi,b)TEi, where TEi is ith firm’s technical efficiency. Taking log, lnyi =lnf(xi,b)+lnTEi 
= lnf(xi,b)-ui, where ui is the technical efficiency because ui = -lnTEi ≈ 1-TEi. We can 
estimate ui either as a slack using mathematical programming, or as an error term using 
regression. We obtain Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) using mathematical 
programming, and deterministic frontier using regression. Data Envelopment Analysis 
uses best practice observations to trace the production frontier [see Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978) for a review of the technique]. This technique is sensitive to noise. The 
regression technique gives us the deterministic frontier. [Note: there is only one error 
term here. The stochastic frontier method that we will discuss later has two error terms. 
The literature often refers to these two error terms as composed errors or composite 
errors]. We cannot obtain the one-sided error term ui directly from regression using 
ordinary least square (OLS). There are three proposed methods in the literature to do this. 
First, Winstein (1957) proposes the corrected ordinary least square method (COLS)22. 
This method requires finding the error terms ei from the regression, followed by shifting 
the error up by a constant term until none of the error terms is negative, i.e. ui = max(ei)-
ei. Second, Richmond (1974) proposes the modified least square method (MOLS). 
Richmond obtains the error term ei from ordinary least square regression follow by 
                                                 
21 f(.) denotes the production function, the arguments are input quantity xi and function parameters b. See 
Appendix A for the notation convention. 
22 Gabrielsen (1975) is usually credited for defining the corrected ordinary least square.   
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estimation of the variance of the error term. The author then assumes the error is a half-
normal distribution and uses the variance to estimate the expected value. Finally, he shifts 
the error term up by the expected value to recover ui, i.e. ui = E (ei) - ei. Other one-sided 
distributions can also be used. Stevenson (1980) uses the exponential and truncated 
normal, and Greene (1980) suggests the gamma distribution. Afriat (1972) suggests the 
third method to estimate ui using maximum likelihood estimator. These three methods 
estimate the deviation from the deterministic frontier and require assuming any deviation 
as inefficiency. Hence, the deterministic frontier and data envelopment analysis treat 
statistical noise as inefficiency. The difference between these two techniques is: 
deterministic frontier is a statistical technique that allows for drawing inference outside 
the sample, but data envelopment analysis only allows us to specify bounds when 
drawing inference.  
 
The problem of treating statistical noise as inefficiency is the motivation for developing 
stochastic frontier models. Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), and Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977) pioneer the stochastic frontier model by introducing two independent error 
terms. The first error term (ui) measures inefficiency and the second error term (vi) 
measures environmental shocks. For example, a fire that damages a factory and reduces 
output is not inefficiency, and its effect is captured by vi. The stochastic production 
frontier is yi = f(xi,b)TEi.exp(vi), and approximately lnyi=lnf(xi,b)-ui+vi. [Note: by 
definition ei= vi-ui for production function, where ei is the composed error]. Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) formulate the composed error as normal-half normal, and 
estimate the stochastic frontier model using cross section data under three assumptions: 
the noise vi is distributed as normal distribution with mean zero and variance σv [i.e. v~iid 
N(0,σv2)]; the inefficiency term ui is distributed as half normal on the positive side only 
[i.e. u~iid N+(0,σu2)]; the error terms ui, vi and parameters  bi are independent. Weinstein 
(1964) derives the maximum likelihood estimator for normal-half normal. The normal 
probability density function is 2212 . 2( ) exp( )v v
vz v π σ σ
−= and half-normal probability density 
function is 2222 . 2( ) exp( )u u
uz u π σ σ
−= . Given that ui and vi are independent, the joint density 
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∞= = − Φ − = Φ −∫ , where σ2 = σu2+ σ2v, 
λ =  σu/σv, Φ(.) and φ(.) are respectively the cumulative density function and probability 
density function for the standard normal23. The normal error dominates the half-normal 
error when λ approaches zero. We get the case where most firms are efficient, and the 
parameter estimates from ordinary least square are approximately correct. The half-
normal error dominates the normal error when λ approaches infinity. We get the 
deterministic frontier without statistical noise. The marginal density function z(e) is 
asymmetrically distributed with expected value E(e) = - E(u) = . 2 /uσ π−   and variance 
var(e)= 2 22 u vππ σ σ− + . 
 
The next step after obtaining the marginal density of the composed error, z(e), is to obtain 
its log likelihood function lnL = constant-I.lnσ + ΣlnΦ(eλ/σ)−1/2σ2Σei2 for I producers. 
We can maximize the log likelihood function for the respective parameters bi to obtain its 
maximum likelihood estimators, and then recover the composed error ei for each firm. 
The last step is to decompose ei into the two error terms. Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and 
Schmidt (1982) show that if the efficiency term is half-normal, i.e. ui ~N+(0,σu2), the 
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− − −= = − Φ  where, μ∗ = −eσu2/σ2 and σ∗ = σuσv/σ ; We 
can use either the mean E(ui│ei) or the mode M(ui│ei) to estimate ui as follows: 
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M(ui│ei) = -ei(σu2/σ2) if ei≤0, and 0 otherwise 
 
Battese and Coelli (1988) propose a more accurate point estimator for TEi: 
* * *
* *
1 ( / ) 1
* *1 ( / ) 2(exp{ }) [ ].exp{ }i iii i iTE E u e
σ μ σ
μ σ μ σ−Φ −−Φ −= − = − +  
                                                 
23 Standard normal refers to the normal distribution with mean zero and variance of one. 
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This estimator does not rely on the ui = -lnTE ≈1-TEi approximation and produces more 
accurate result when ui is not close to zero. However, both estimators will not converge 
towards population mean over large number of observation (econometrically inconsistent) 
because the variation associated with (ui│ei) is independent of i. This is the limitation of 
cross-section data. Greene (1997) argues that using different distributions (such as 
normal-exponential, normal-truncated normal, normal-gamma) will not have as much 
value as moving towards panel data estimation. 
 
3.2 Production Frontier and Panel Data 
 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) state that the stochastic production frontier model using cross 
section data suffers from three related problems. First, we must specify the distribution of 
the error terms before using the maximum likelihood method. Second, we need to assume 
the error terms (ui and vi) and the parameters (bi) are independent. However, it is likely 
that firms which are aware of their inefficiency (ui) will change input choices, and hence 
the regression parameters. Therefore, the error terms and the parameters are unlikely to 
be independent. Third, technical inefficiency estimated with Jondrow, Lovell, Materov 
and Schmidt (1982) method is not asymptotically efficient since the variance of the mean 
E(ui│ei) or the mode M(ui│ei) does not converge when the sample sizes increase. 
 
A panel data is a set of observations of I firms over T periods, although there is no need 
for all firms to be observed in each period. When panel data are available, many new 
techniques become feasible. First, repeated observations can substitute for distributional 
assumption in panel data. Second, some of these new techniques do not require the 
efficiency and the parameters to be independent. Finally, the estimated technical 
efficiency converges when the number of periods increases. However, this benefit is 
small since panels must be short for technical efficiency to be time invariant. Dor (1994) 
gives three advantages of panel data over cross-section data: First, panel data are less 
likely to introduce omitted variable bias. Second, panel data techniques need less 
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distribution assumption on the efficiency term unless we use maximum likelihood 
method for estimation. Third, these techniques allow direct test for output endogeneity.  
 
The basis of the panel data approach is the association of firm effect in the panel data 
literature with one-sided inefficiency term from the efficiency frontier literature. If 
technical efficiency is time invariant, i.e. lnyi =lnf(xit,bi)-ui+vit, we can use panel data 
techniques for fixed and random effects to estimate inefficiency. In the fixed effect model, 
we assume ui ≥0, the noise vit is normally distributed, and vit and parameters bi are 
independent. We need not make any assumption on the distribution of inefficiency term 
ui and its independence with parameters bi or noise vit. We can recover the inefficiency 
term from the variable intercept ai for each firm by defining24 ˆ ˆ ˆmax( )i i iu a a= − . The fixed 
effect model is the least square dummy variable model in the panel data literature. This 
method requires at least one firm to be 100% efficient. The fixed effect model has three 
drawbacks. First, we need to assume there is no selective environmental shock (e.g. a 
new law affecting only some firms) because ui captures all the time-invariant effects 
across firms. Effects of selective environmental shocks will be incorrectly captured as 
inefficiency. Second, the fixed effect model consumes one degree of freedom for each 
firm effect. Third, the parameter estimates do not converge to the population mean in the 
fixed effect model for short time series with period T, although it is still √T times better 
than cross-section data. Increasing the period decreases validity of the assumption that ui 
is time invariant.  
 
The problem of confounding environmental shock with inefficiency in the fixed effect 
model motivates researcher to formulate the random effect model. In the random effect 
model, we assume the inefficiency term ui is a positive random variable (i.e. ui ≥0) with 
constant variance and independent of the noise vit and the parameters bi. [Note: Unlike 
the random effect model, we need not assume ui and bi are independent in the fixed effect 
model]. We assume noise vit is normal as usual. Starting from the production frontier 
                                                 
24 Following the convention in econometric literature, the ‘hat’ (or circumflex) terms indicate estimated 
terms. 
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lnyi=a0+lnf(xi,bi)-ui+vit, we rewrite the terms25 as lnyi=(b0-E[ui])-lnf(xi,bi)-(ui-E[ui])+vit = 
a0*+lnf(xi,bi)-ui*+vit, which fits the one-way error component model in the panel data 
literature. We can then use two-step generalized least square or maximum likelihood to 
estimate the function. For the generalized least square method, we begin by using 
ordinary least square to estimate the parameters bi. We then re-estimate a0 and bi using 
feasible generalized least square, recover ui* and normalize the efficiency term using 
* *ˆ ˆ ˆmax( )i i iu u u= − . The estimates converge to the population mean when the number of 
firms (I) or number of periods (T) becomes large. The generalized least square is suitable 
when there is a large number of firms (I is large), and ui is uncorrelated with the 
parameters bi. Hausman and Taylor (1981) develop a test to check if the variance of the 
inefficiency (σu2) is uncorrelated with the parameters bi by using the Hausman (1978) test 
of significant for the fixed effect estimator. The maximum likelihood method for panel 
data is similar to the cross-section data method. Pitt and Lee (1981) illustrate the 
maximum likelihood method for the normal-half normal case. The random effect model 
has two drawbacks. First, we need to assume firm inefficiency is independent of input 
level (i.e. firm size). Second, we need to assume a distribution when using maximum 
likelihood method, thereby introducing the risk of specification error.  
 
Recent research in panel data for stochastic frontier focuses on relaxing the assumption 
on time invariant efficiency (Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles, 1990; Kumbhakar, 1990; 
Battese and Coelli, 1992; Lee and Schmidt, 1993). In particular, Lee and Schmidt (1993) 
re-specify the intercept term as ait=θtδt where δt is firm specific effect and θt is an 
estimable parameter. Note that the firm effect varies with time in this specification. Many 
of these new models are non-linear and complex. The main advantage of these complex 
models is econometric consistency (i.e. the convergence of parameter estimates towards 
population mean over a large sample) in fixed and random effect models. 
 
 
                                                 
25 The ‘star’ terms replace the corresponding terms in the bracket, e.g. a* = (b0 –E[ui]) 
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3.3 From Production to Cost Frontier 
 
The concepts in production frontier provide the foundation for discussing cost frontier. 
There are five important differences between estimating production and cost frontiers. 
First, the data requirements are different. Estimating production frontier requires only 
input and output quantities; estimating cost frontier requires output quantities, cost, input 
expenditures and possibly input quantity or cost share.26 In general, we can obtain the 
data for cost frontier more easily than for production frontier. Second, the cost frontier 
can accommodate multi-product technology directly, while the production frontier 
requires distance functions. Third, we can accommodate fix inputs in the variable cost 
frontier but cannot distinguish which inputs are fixed in the production frontier. Fourth, 
the production frontier has no behavioral assumption and only measures technical 
efficiency. The cost minimizing assumption is applicable in a competitive environment 
when the input price (rather than quantity) is exogenous; the output is demand driven and 
therefore exogenous. In the service industries where output cannot be stored, output-
oriented technical efficiency is not meaningful. Lastly, we can decompose cost efficiency 
into input-oriented technical efficiency and allocative efficiency.  
 
The simplest cost frontier model is the one that uses single equation for cross section data. 
The Cobb Douglas cost function is lnci = a0+bylnyi+Σbnlnwni+vi+ui. Imposing linear 
homogeneity in input prices27 to conform to economic theory, and Σbi = 1 for Cobb 
Douglas form, we obtain ln(ci /wki)= a0+bylny +Σbnln(wni/wki)+vi+ui. We can estimate 
this cost frontier by using the methods for production frontier we have described earlier: 
For example, using Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmdt’s (1982) maximum likelihood 
method, or Battese and Coelli’s (1988) exact estimator, for the normal-half normanl 
composed errors. In fact, the Cobb Douglas production frontier and cost frontier are 
exactly the same apart from changing a few signs. We can change the cost function to a 
flexible function, such as translog, to accommodate multiproduct technology. However, 
the flexible functional form often give rise to multicollinearity in single equation-cross 
                                                 
26 Cost share means the ratio of the expenditure for an input divided by the total cost. 
27 Recall this means C(yi,θwi;bi)= θC(yi,wi;bi) 
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section analysis. This results in insignificant parameter estimates, although the estimates 
remain unbias. Multicollinearity may be problematic for analyzing production structure 
which require precise parameter estimates (Harvey, 1977). However, it has no effect on 
the composed errors, and ultimately the efficiciency measure. Therefore, it is still feasible 
to use flexible functional form for cost efficiency studies. We can use the variable cost 
function if we wish to accommodate quasi-fixed inputs (see chapter 4 for details). Using 
flexible functional form and accomodating fixed input affect only the cost kernel and not 
the composed errors.  
 
The main problem of using single equation-cross section analysis is its inability to 
decompose cost efficiency into allocative and technical efficiency components. We need 
a simultaneous equation system to decompose the efficiency components. Another 
advantage of using an equation system is the improvement in econometric efficiency 
when estimating a flexible cost frontier. We can invoke the Sheppard’s lemma to 
implement the simultaneous equation system28 using two methods: First, we can estimate 
a system of cost frontier and its cost minimising input demand equations. Second, we can 
estimate a system of natural logarithim of cost frontier and its cost minimising input share 
equations. Schmidt and Lovell (1979) use the self-dual29 Cobb Douglas functional form 
to estimate the allocative and technical efficiency under four distributional assumptions: 
the noise is normal (i.e. v~iid N(0,σv2)); the inefficieny term is half-normal (i.e. u~iid 
N+(0, σu2)); the error vector of input demands (ηi) is normal with zero mean and variance 
matrix Σ (i.e. ηi = (η2i...ηNi)’~iid N(0,Σ)); and these errors vi, ui, ηi are independent.  
 
We can use the method in Christensen and Greene (1976) to model multiproduct cost 
frontier by estimating an equation system comprising the cost frontier and N-1 cost share 
equations (where N is the number of inputs). After deleting (any) one cost share, we add 
error terms to each equation in the system, i.e. we estimate the cost frontier lnc = lnC(yi, 
wi;bi)+ui+vi jointly with the cost shares Sni=S(yi,wi;bi)+ηi, where bi is the regression 
parameters and ηi is the vector of cost share error term. Depending on the relation 
                                                 
28 See section 4.3 for this result. 
29 The Sheppard lemma provides duality between cost and production functions. The dual of the Cobb 
Douglas production is the Cobb Douglas cost function, hence it is self-dual. 
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between ηi and ui, the error term ui can capture the effects of technical, allocative or cost 
efficiency. We make the same four distribution assumptions as in the Cobb Douglas case, 
i.e. v~iid N(0,σv2); u~iid N+(0, σu2)); ηi = (η2i...ηNi)’~iid N(0,Σ)); and the errors vi, ui, ηi 
are independent. Greene (1980) notice an inherent incosistency in these four assumptions. 
If we assume that ηi represents allocative efficiency, then ui captures the effects of 
technical and allocative efficiencies. This means the distribution for ui depends on ηi 
because the cost of allocative inefficiency must vary with the extent of allocative 
inefficiency. While the equation system provides more efficient estimates of the 
regression parameters bi, the failure of independence in error terms (i.e. ui and ηi) lead to 
econometrically inconsistent estimates (meaning the estimates do not converge to 
population mean over a large sample). Alternatively, we can assume ηi represents 
statistical noise just like vi. We assume no allocative inefficiency in this case and ui 
represents only technical inefficiency. Then, the equation system contains no more 
information than the cost frontier. Including the share equation provides more efficient 
parameter estimates but introduces bias from assumptions about share equation error term 
ηi. This dilemma is known as the “Greene’s problem” and limits the usefulness of 
equation system to estimate cost efficiency. 
 
There are several proposals to overcome the Greene’s problem. Schmidt (1984) suggests 
assuming ηi as allocative inefficiency distributed as a normal function, then breaking 
down the inefficiency term u  as the sum of costs of allocative and technical inefficiencies, 
(i.e. u=uT +uA), and assuming the technical inefficiency is distributed as half normal, (i.e. 
uT ~N+(0,σT2)). Schmidt specifies the cost of allocative inefficiency in terms of the cost 
share error ηi instead of assuming a distribution for uA. Specifically, uA=η’Aη,  where A 
is a NxN positive semi-definite matrix.  When uA is zero, η is also zero; η is not zero 
when uA is positive, and uA is positively correlated with the absolute value of η. We can 
then derive uA from η and A without making distribution assumption in uA. Schmidt 
proposes that A=D1/(N-1)Σ+ where D is the product of non-zero eigenvalues of the 
multivariate covariance matrix Σ, and Σ+ is the generalized inverse of Σ. With this 
specification for A, we can use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the cost 
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frontier parameters, the magnitude of allocative efficiency, and the costs of allocative and 
technical efficiencies. However, maximizing the maximum likelihood estimator is a 
formidable task because of the sheer complexity. Melfi (1984) and Bauer (1985) simplify 
A to implement Schmidt’s solution. Melfi (1984) assumes A is an identity matrix so that 
uA is the sum of square of input errors. However, this specification forces uA towards zero. 
Bauer (1985) allows A to be a positive semi-definite matrix whose elements become N-1 
additional estimable parameters (where N is the number of inputs). In this formulation uA 
is the weighted sum of square of the errors from the share equations. We can then 
estimate the cost frontier system using the maximum likelihood method after making 
distribution assumptions on v, uT and η. Kumbhakar (1991) suggests another specification 
without additional estimable parameters. However, these four modifications are often 
empirically intractable because of two problems. First, there are many parameters to 
estimate even if the cost kernel consists of few inputs and outputs. Second, we often 
estimate the system by imposing additional structure such as restricting A and Σ to be 
diagonal matrices. However, there is no a priori reason to believe that these imperfect 
models linking allocative efficiency with share equations provide better estimate than 
ignoring these relationships. 
 
3.4 Cost Frontier, Panel Data and Other Techniques 30 
 
 
The disadvantages of cross section data in the production frontier carries over to 
estimating the cost frontier. We need to impose two types of assumptions when using 
cross section data. First, we need to impose assumptions about the distributions of error 
terms to use the maximum likelihood method. Second, we need to assume these errors are 
independent of the regression parameters. Still, the parameter estimates do not converge 
towards population means over large sample using the maximum likelihood method in 
Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982). Similar to the case of production frontier, 
we can overcome these disadvantages by using panel data techniques. We can use the 
                                                 
30 The first paragraph of this section is basically a summary of section 3.2 because, apart for a few sign 
changes, the techniques in estimating production and cost frontiers are essentially the same. 
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fixed effect model to produce econometrically consistent estimates for long time series if 
cost efficiency is time invariant. We can also overcome the problem of time invariant 
fixed effects over long time series with more recent techniques, such as Lee and Schmidt 
(1993), but the model is nonlinear and complex. If we assume cost efficiency is randomly 
distributed and independent of the regression parameters, we can use the generalized least 
square or the maximum likelihood method to estimate the random effect model. In fact, 
the parameter estimates in the random effect model converges to the population means in 
either long time series or large cross section. However, the assumption that the regression 
parameters (bi) are independent of the firm specific random effect is problematic. This is 
because firms are likely to modify their input choices using knowledge about their 
inefficiency.  
 
So far, there has been no satisfactory cost frontier specification for simultaneous equation 
using panel data techniques because of the Greene’s problem31. There are two possible 
cases just like in the production frontier. First, we can estimate a self-dual cost funtion 
using seemingly unrelated regression for the fixed effect model. We can use the 
maximum likelihood method for the random effect model. Second, we can impose 
distributional assumptions to estimate a system of cost frontier and its cost shares using 
the maximum likelihood method (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000 p.174). There are two 
additional approaches to estimate cost efficiency which are increasingly popular in the 
empirical literature, namely the thick frontier method and the distribution free approach. 
Berger and Humphrey (1991; 1992) pioneer the former and Berger (1993) pioneers the 
latter.  
3.5 Application to Hospital Efficiency 
 
The stochastic frontier and data envelopment analysis (DEA) techniques are widely used 
in hospital efficiency analysis32. In fact, over half of volume 13(2) of the 1994 issue of 
                                                 
31 As we have discussed earlier, the Greene’s problem relates to the interpretation of the error terms in the 
cost shares.  
32 Hospital application using stochastic frontier includes Zuckerman, Hadley and Iezzoni (1994), Wagstaff 
(1989), Linna, Hakkinen and Linnako (1998). Hospital application using DEA include Valdmanis (1990) 
and Register and Burnings (1987). 
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the Journal of Health Economics is dedicated to the debate of these techniques in hospital 
efficiency analysis. Kooreman (1994) highlights the key difference between these two 
techniques: DEA measures technical efficiency while stochastic frontier measures a 
combination of technical and allocative efficiencies. Furthermore, we need to treat all the 
deviations, including any measurement errors, from the frontier as inefficiency in DEA. 
Newhouse (1994) explains that the variables in hospital cost function are almost always 
measured with error. A sufficiently large measurement error for a firm near the frontier 
can shift the frontier and affect the efficiency score of all firms in that segment. The same 
argument also applies to random shock in the environment. Using the stochastic cost 
frontier method, Wagstaff (1989) finds that 90% of the cost variation is due to random 
environmental shock and only 10% due to firm specific cost efficiency. On the other 
hand, DEA is a nonparametric technique that does not require specifying a distribution 
for the efficiency term. This avoids the possibility of introducing specification errors. A 
working paper by Cummins and Zi (1998) compares the efficiency ranking of insurance 
companies using several variants of DEA and stochastic frontier models. The authors find 
that efficiency ranking within the varaints of stochastic frontier models are fairly robust, 
but the robustness decreases rapidly when comparing stochastic frontier-DEA varaints 
and within the DEA variants. 
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4. Theory of Hospital Cost Function 
 
Our research question is framed in the context of the U.S. hospital cost containment 
policy outlined in Chapter 1. We developed our analytical framework in Chapter 2 
assuming that we can measure the cost efficiency in hospitals. In Chapter 3, we examined 
the methods for measuring cost efficiency assuming we can specify a suitable hospital 
cost function. In this chapter, we focus our attention on cost theory, problems in existing 
empirical research of hospital cost function, and measuring hospital inputs and outputs.  
 
4.1 A Review of Production and Cost Theory 
 
The historical development of neoclassical production theory precedes cost theory. 
Ferguson (1969), Fuss and McFadden (1978), Naidiri (1982), Diewert (1974; 1982) and 
Chambers (1988) have provided comprehensive reviews which show the close links 
between production and cost theories. In fact, it is conventional to discuss production 
theory before examining cost theory. The production function exists because we assume a 
stable relation between inputs and outputs governed by physical laws. Therefore, a 
production function describes the technology which transforms inputs into outputs. The 
various strands of production theory are largely scattered until the consolidation into a 
coherent theory by Hotelling (1932), Hicks (1932; 1939), Carlson (1939), Sameulson 
(1947) and Frisch (1965). There are several maintained hypotheses in a well-behaved 
production function. First, we assume individuals are rational and will use more input 
only if that helps to increase output. Therefore the marginal product of any input x is 
positive, implying that the production function f(.) is monotonically increasing, i.e. if x1 ≥ 
x2, then f(x1) ≥ f(x2). Second, the technology is feasible and convex. Mathematically, 
feasibility means the set of inputs that can produce an output y, which is called the input 
requirement set V(.), is closed and non-empty. Convexity means a weighted combination 
of two feasible inputs is also feasible. These two assumptions on V(.) are critical to 
guarantee a solution exist for optimization. Third, Cassels (1936) proposes the “law of 
marginal productivity” in production: the marginal products, and therefore the marginal 
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rates of technical substitutions, diminish as input x increases. This implies that the 
production function is concave, i.e. for inputs x1, x2 and a constant θ, f(θx1+(1-θ)x2) ≥ 
θf(x1)+(1-θ)f(x2), and the isoquant is convex to the origin in the input space. For a twice-
continuously differentiable production function f(.), concavity mathematically means the 
Hessian33 is negative semi-definite. Given the earlier assumption that V(y) is a convex set, 
the production function becomes quasi-concave, i.e. a concave function with a convex 
upper level set. Finally, there are assumptions about essentiality, meaning inputs are 
required to produce output [i.e. f(0…0)=0 for weak essentiality, and f(x1…0…xi)=0  for 
strict essentiality]; range [i.e. f is single valued, positive, finite and real valued], and 
differentiability [i.e. f is everywhere twice continuous differentiable]. 
 
The production function is a useful tool to study elasticity of scale and input substitutions 
using cross section data, and technical change using time series. Researchers usually 
impose two more restrictions on homotheticity and separability. A production function is 
homothetic when it can be represented by the transformation F(f*(x))=f(x), where f(x) has 
the usual properties (i.e. monotonicity, feasibility, essentiality and differentiability) and is 
homogeneous, i.e. f*(θx)=θ.f*(x). Homothetic production functions have parallel 
isoquants, i.e. marginal rates of technical substitution are constant along any ray from the 
origin. The family of homogeneous production functions, which has constant elasticity of 
scale, is a subset of homothetic functions. We define separability based on how the 
marginal rate of technical substitutions of two inputs, x1 and x2, relates to a third input x3. 
Specifically, separability implies that derivative of the marginal rate of technical 
substitution34 between x1 and x2 on x3 is zero, i.e. ' '1 2 3( / ) / 0f f x∂ ∂ = . We can distinguish 
two forms of separability. In weak separability, x1 and x2 belong to the same group but x3 
belongs to another group. In strong separability, x1 and x2 belong to different groups, and 
x3 does not belong to either group.35 A separable technology is one that can proceed in 
                                                 
33 The Hessian is the matrix of second order derivatives of the function. 
34 From economic theory, the marginal rate of technical substitution is the ratio of the marginal products, i.e. 
MRTS = f’1/f’2. 
35 In set notation, strong separability means 1 2 3, ,x A x B x A B∈ ∈ ∉ ∪ ; weak separability 
means 1 2 3, ,x x A x A∈ ∉ . Therefore, strong separability is a more restrictive condition. 
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independent stages. Separability allows collecting inputs into similar groups and makes 
empirical analysis tractable. 
 
The cost function is a mathematical representation of the cost minimizing problem 
subject to a technological constraint in a price taking multi-market environment. Hicks 
(1939) lays the foundation of modern cost theory by analyzing the consumer expenditure 
function. Samuelson (1947) consolidates Hicks’ results into the modern cost theory. 
Shepard (1953) contributes the idea for analyzing well-behaved cost function as a dual of 
the production function. Hence, it is equally easy to analyze technology (such as scale, 
inputs substitutions or technical change) by using either production or cost function.  
However, the econometric implementation of cost and production functions differs in the 
assumption about exogenous variables. We assume output quantities are endogenous and 
input prices are exogenous when estimating production function. We assume cost is 
endogenous while input prices and output quantities are exogenous in the dual cost 
function. Cost function requires market observable data such as cost, output quantities 
and input prices. Production function requires input and output quantities. In general, 
disaggregated input quantities are more difficult to obtain than cost and input prices. 
 
The formal definition for cost function is C(w,y)= min[w,x:x∈V(y)], x ≥0, where C(.) is 
the cost function and w is the vector of input prices. We need two fundamental 
assumptions for the cost function. The cost function is only meaningful for a feasible 
technology, i.e. the input requirement set V(y) must be non-empty. In addition, optimized 
solution exists if and only if V(y) is closed and bounded. Applicable assumptions on 
production function also apply to cost function. The positive marginal cost assumption 
means that a cost function is non-decreasing in input price. In other words, increasing 
input price can never decrease cost. This assumption also implies that the derived 
demands for inputs are downward sloping and the cost function is concave and 
continuous (Chambers, 1988 p.53). The diminishing marginal productivity assumption 
means that the cost function is concave. The essentiality assumption means that the cost 
to produce positive output is positive under positive input prices. In other words, it is 
impossible to produce positive output at zero cost.  In weak essentiality, it is costless to 
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produce zero output. Given that the input requirement set V(y) is strictly convex and the 
cost function is differentiable, Shepard (1953) shows that there is a unique cost 
minimizing bundle mapping the product space into the cost space given by the 
relation ( , ) *( , )
i
c w y
iw x w y
∂
∂ = . This result is known as Shepard’s lemma. Uzawa (1962) uses 
the Shepard’s lemma and the input requirement set V(y) to reconstruct a linearly 
homogenous 36  cost function. Assumption of homotheticity and separability may be 
applied as further restrictions in empirical analysis. Chambers (1983; p.111) shows that 
imposing separability is equivalent to restricting the Allen elasticity of substitution 37: if 
w1 and w2 are separable from w3, then x1 and x3 can only be Allen substitute if x2 and x3 
are Allen substitute. Flexible cost functions relax the restrictions on elasticity of 
substitution. 
 
4.2 Incorporating Multi-product Technology 
 
Incorporating the multi-product nature of hospital production into empirical analysis is 
the most debated issue in the hospital cost literature. The multi-product case extends the 
single output case by adding the concepts of jointness, input-output separability, and 
multi-product returns to scale. Samuelson (1966) defines a joint production technology as 
one that produces a higher production possibility frontier than the separate production of 
commodities. Jointness arises when the cost of producing two or more products is less 
than the cost of producing the same products separately, i.e. C(y1,y2) < C(y1,0)+C(0,y2). 
This concept is related to the economy of scope concept in Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
(1982). Baumol et al show that jointness occurs in cost complementarities38or shared 
fixed cost, e.g. C(y1,y2)=F+y1+y2. Jointness implies economy of scope but the reverse is 
not always true. Kolsen (1968) states the condition to distinguish joint and common costs. 
                                                 
36 Recall that linearly homogenous means C(θw,y)=θ.C(w,y) 
37 Allen (1938) p.503 defines this elasticity measure as 
''
' '
( , ). ( , )
( , ). ( , )
( , ) ij
i j
C y w C y wA
ij C y w C y w
y wσ = where C is the cost 
function with arguments y for the output and w for the input price vector; Ci’ means the derivative on j 
input and Cij” the second derivative. An equivalent definitions in the production function is σ 
=∂ln(xi/xj)/∂ln(fi’/fj’) where x is the input, f’ is the marginal product. 
38 This means the marginal cost of a product falls as the output of another product increases, specifically 
∂2C/∂y1∂y2 < 0 
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Joint costs arise when we make product jointly in technically necessary proportions, and 
the two alternatives to produce any one of them are not to produce the joint bundle, or to 
treat the other product as waste. Common costs arise when we make product jointly, and 
the alternative to producing more (fewer) of any one of them is producing fewer (more) 
of the others. In a joint production, joint cost arises from fixed proportion and common 
cost arises from variable proportion. In the fixed proportion case, the general cost 
function is C=C(y,w1,w2) where y is the sum of output weighted by their proportions. In 
the variable proportion case, the cost function becomes C=C(y,w)+C1(y1,w)+C2(y2,w). In 
either case, some costs are product specific and allocable to the product. If production is 
non-joint, then the multi-product production is simply the sum of separate production 
functions for each output, and the dual cost function is also additively separable. Total 
cost is the sum of the costs of producing each product separately. Since all costs are 
separable, there is neither joint nor common cost. 
 
To discuss input-output separability, we first define an input aggregator function h(.) for 
grouping inputs, an output aggregator function g(.) for grouping outputs, and a multi-
product production function t(.). Mundlak (1963) defines input-output separability as the 
lack of interaction between inputs and outputs, i.e. t(y1,y2,x1,x2)= -g(y1,y2)+h(x1,x2). 
Laitinen (1980) argues that under the input-output separability restriction, firm can 
choose its output allocation independent of its input decisions, i.e. we do not need 
information on factor allocation to obtain the cost function. Hall (1973) shows that the 
separability restriction limits the cost function to the form C(y1,y2,w1,w2)=C(g(y),w1,w2). 
The cost function becomes a function of output aggregation g(.) and input prices, and 
marginal cost becomes independent of input prices.  
 
Hanoch (1970) defines the multi-product return to scale (or homogeneity of degree k) 
analogously as the single output case for the multi-output function t(θky1,θky2,θx1,θx2) =0. 
It is not possible to define the overall return to scale in the variable proportion case 
because an equal proportionate change in all inputs may not result in proportionate 
change in all outputs. Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) show that a multi-output 
production function which is homogenous of degree k, has a cost function that is 
 42
homogeneous of degree 1/k, i.e. C(θy1,θy2,w1,w2)=θ 1/kC(y1,y2,w1,w2). The authors 
distinguish between the overall return to scale (SN) and the product specific return to scale 
(Si). Baumol et al define the overall return to scale as the ratio of total cost to the sum of 
product of output and marginal cost, i.e. SN = C(.)/Σ(yiCi’). The product specific return to 
scale is the ratio of average incremental cost and marginal cost for ith product. Return to 
scale and economy of scale are different concepts: return to scale is the homogeneity 
between input and output in the production function, whereas economy of scale refers to 
the change in the long run average cost as output increases. In other words, return to scale 
refers to movement along a ray through the origin in the input space, whereas economy of 
scale refers to movement along long run cost curve in the cost-output space. Solberg 
(1982) shows that the two concepts coincide only in homothetic technology where 
isoquants are parallel. Input substitution is constant along the expansion path, which is a 
ray through the origin. 
 
If we impose non-jointness and input-output separability on multi-product cost function, 
the function becomes multiplicative between input price and output aggregator. The 
output aggregator is the sum of separate output functions, each of which depends only on 
the output of one product. If we impose input-output separability and overall constant 
return to scale on the multi-product cost function, the function becomes multiplicative 
between input price and output aggregator, but the output aggregator is not constrained. If 
we impose non-jointness and overall constant return to scale on multi-product cost 
function, the function is a linear sum of each output quantity weighted by marginal costs 
of producing each output. The marginal cost of each output may vary with output 
quantity, and allow for product specific economy/diseconomy of scale. If we impose non-
jointness, input-output separability and overall constant return to scale, the multi-product 
cost function becomes a linear sum of each output quantity weighted by constant 
marginal costs of producing each output. In this case, there will be no product specific 
economy of scale.  Fuss, McFadden and Mundlak (1978) state that it is important to 
model multi-output technology with flexible production/cost function where assumptions 
about jointness, input-output separability and returns to scale are testable hypotheses. 
However, there is a tradeoff between parameter parsimony and flexibility. This is a 
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particularly serious problem in hospital cost analysis due to the large number of outputs. 
This section provides the foundation to discuss research issues in functional form 
specification in the next section. 
 
4.3 Functional Forms 
 
The issue of functional form arises when we wish to use the stochastic frontier method to 
measure efficiency. This is because the frontier requires a cost or production function as 
pre-requisite. The purpose of a production or cost function is to characterize a production 
structure (e.g. scale, input substitutions and technical change). Hence, the purpose of 
applied cost analysis is to measure the function’s value, its gradient vector (i.e. derived 
demand) and the Hessian (i.e. the matrix for substitution elasticity). The purpose of 
stochastic frontier is to evaluate the composed errors (that capture efficiency), and not 
about evaluating production structure. However, there is a need for analysis not to use 
restrictive functional form that result in specification error. This is because specification 
errors are captured in the composed errors. 
 
It is useful to examine the historical development of the cost function to understand how 
flexible forms arise. Cobb and Douglas (1928) derive the first closed form production 
function to test the theory of marginal productivity. Specifically, they propose the 
production function lny = lnA+aKlnK+aLlnL, where A, K, L and ai are respectively the 
total factor productivity, the aggregate quantities for capital and labor, and the regression 
parameters. Assuming constant return to scale means aK+aL= 1. Taking partial derivative 
of y with respect to the inputs K and L gives the respective marginal products. Profit 
maximizing firms in a competitive market will choose inputs such that marginal products 
equal real prices, for example fK’=wK/p. The authors show that the cost share for capital 
is wKK/p.y=aK under constant return to scale. Therefore, the cost share for capital, and 
similarly for labor, is the regression parameter obtained by ordinary least square. The 
Cobb Douglas function is monotonic, concave, separable and homogeneous of degree 
one in inputs. The Allen elasticity of substitution, defined as σ =∂ln(xi/xj)/∂ln(fi’/fj’) 
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where x is the input, f’ the marginal product, is restricted to one because of homogeneity 
and strong separability. We can derive the reduced form Cobb Douglas cost function 
from first order conditions of the production function.39  
 
The Cobb Douglas function is not suitable for studying capital-labor substitution because 
the elasticity of substitution is restricted to one. Arrow, Chenery, Minhas and Solow 
(1961) introduce the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) function where the elasticity 
of substitution (σ) is constant but not restricted to one. The CES production function is 
y=A(δK-ρ+(1-δ) L-ρ)-1/ρ  and is obtained from double integration of the elasticity of scale 
assuming constant return to scale. The authors assume that the elasticity of substitution (σ) 
varies across industries but is invariant within industry. We can obtain the elasticity by 
three methods using the CES function, namely by labor productivity, capital productivity 
and capital-labor ratio. However, the survey of empirical results from Nerlove (1967) and 
Berndt (1976) show that elasticity (σ) is close to one using labor productivity but 
significantly less than one for the other two measures. This is because capital adjusts 
slowly relative to labor and does not achieve long run equilibrium instantly. Hence, some 
researchers increasingly use variable cost function which distinguishes variable inputs 
from quasi-fixed inputs. We need to use quantity instead of price for the quasi-fix input in 
the variable cost function. The CES function is monotonic, concave, quasi-additive and 
homothetic. The Cobb Douglas function is a special case of the CES where the elasticity 
of substitution is one and the Leontief function (Leontief 1936) is a limiting case where 
the elasticity of substitution is zero. Uzawa (1962) generalizes the CES function to 
include factors other than capital and labor, Sato (1967) models more disaggregated 
substitutions40 with the two-level CES function. Nevertheless, the CES function and its 
variants still impose a priori restrictions on homotheticity and separability. 
 
The motivation for the flexible functional form arises from the need to impose as few a 
priori restrictions on the technology as possible to avoid potential specification error. 
Diewert (1973) proposes the concept of flexible function which Blackorby, Primont and 
                                                 
39 The reduced form Cobb Douglas cost function is C=(α+β)(y.wKαwLβ)1/(α+β)(ααββ)−1/(α+β) 
40 Sato modeled substitutions among skilled labor, unskilled labor, structural capital and machines. 
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Russell (1978) later refine. A functional form is flexible if we can choose parameters of 
the function to make its first and second derivatives equal to corresponding derivatives of 
the estimated function at any point in the domain 41 . Diewert (1971) derives the 
generalized Leontief production function using the second order Taylor expansion of the 
production function y=√x. The generalized Leontief function is the first flexible 
functional form.  
 
Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973) introduce the translog function that allows 
empirically testing the homotheticity and separability restrictions as hypotheses. The 
quadratic nature of the translog function ensures regularities (i.e. monotonicity and 
convexity) at least locally. Blackorby and Diewert (1979) demonstrate the duality of the 
translog cost and production functions, and Chambers (1988) p.169 demonstrates the 
duality of the profit and production functions. The translog function has become the most 
popular flexible function in empirical analysis because it has the least number of 
estimable parameters. The translog cost function with i inputs and m outputs is: 42 
 
lnC = a0+Σailnwi+1/2ΣΣaijlnwilnwj+Σbmlnym+1/2ΣΣbmnlnymlnyn+Σgimlnwilnym 
 
We need to impose two restrictions on the cost function to conform to economic theory. 
First, the symmetry condition requires aij=aji, bmn=bnm and gim=gmi. Second, the cost 
function needs to be homogenous of degree one in input prices, i.e. Σai=1, Σaijlnwj=0 and 
Σginlnyn=0. We can also impose additional restrictions to the underlying technology. For 
homotheticity, the sufficient and necessary condition is gin=0. To be homogeneous of 
degree n in output, we need to impose homotheticity and bmn=0 (the function becomes 
homogenous of degree 1/Σbn). To have constant return to scale, we need homogeneity 
and Σbn=1.  If we have constant return to scale and aij=0, we are back to the Cobb 
Douglas function.  
                                                 
41 For the n-dimension input vector, there are n marginal products and 0.5n(n-1) symmetrical Hessian terms. 
Adding the value of the function, there are 0.5(n+1)(n+2) effects to estimate. 
42 Note that we use i and j for inputs and m and n for outputs, the parameters are a0 for the intercept, ai for 
the input parameters, bi for the output parameters, gi for the parameters containing both inputs and outputs. 
This is explained in Appendix A. 
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However, there are two main disadvantages of the translog function. First, Brown, Caves 
and Christensen (1979) show that the m-output n-input translog function contains 
(m+n)(m+n+1)/2 estimable parameters. There is a need to tradeoff feasible econometric 
estimation with aggregation of inputs/outputs. Second, the translog form cannot take zero 
value that often occurs in disaggregated data. Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1980) 
generalize the translog form by applying Box-Cox transformation. The transformation 
2
0
lim( 1) / lni iY Y
λ
λ λ→ − = changes zero outputs to non-zero. However, the transformation 
complicates estimation especially in stochastic frontier.  
 
We can directly estimate the translog cost function, but multicollinearity can easily arise 
from a large number of parameters. Christensen and Greene (1976) suggest a more 
(econometrically) efficient way. They use Sheppard’s lemma to obtain cost minimizing 
input demand functions and then derive the cost shares. They then jointly estimate the 
translog cost function with cost share, lnln ln lni i ii i
w w xC C
i i ij j mn nw C w CS a a w g y∂ ∂∂ ∂= = = = + ∑ + ∑ . 
We need to specify a stochastic framework for the share equations to estimate the system. 
Typically, we add an error term (ηi) to each cost share assuming that the error vector is 
multivariate normal with zero mean vector and constant covariance matrix43. However, 
we wish to estimate the cost function jointly with the cost shares. Since the sum of cost 
share is one by definition, i.e. Σbi=1, we need to delete one share equation so that all the 
equations are independent, i.e. deleting one equation will prevent singular covariance 
matrix. We can use seemingly unrelated regression to estimate the system. This 
procedure produces the maximum likelihood estimator (Kmenta and Gilbert, 1968). The 
parameter estimates are the same whichever share equation is deleted (Barten, 1969). 
 
 
                                                 
43 This is the case when we are interested in the regression parameters. Recall that in the stochastic frontier, 
assumptions related to the error term ηi and the error terms in the cost frontier is the root of the Greene’s 
problem. 
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4.4 Hospital Cost Function  
 
Feldstein (1967) pioneers the use of econometric techniques in hospital cost analysis. 
There are usually two types of motivations for hospital cost analysis: the first is to obtain 
the characteristics of technology such as scale effects and input substitution; the second is 
to study the relationship between ownership and cost efficiency. We can also view these 
two streams of research in an econometric sense: the former is interested in the regression 
parameters, and the latter is interested in the composed errors.44 Breyer (1987) highlights 
three approaches in specifying the hospital cost function: the ad hoc or behavioral 
approach, the structural approach, and the hybrid approach. 
 
Earlier studies tend to use the ad hoc specification to explain unit cost45 among hospitals. 
Total cost is rarely used in these studies because of three disadvantages: heteroscedastic 
residue, multicollinearity, and the coefficient of determination (R2) depending largely on 
the hospital bed size. Evans (1971) argues that there is a systematic difference between 
observed and minimum costs in hospitals because the behavior of its agents is influenced 
by incentive. Therefore, statistical analysis of hospital cost in the real world should 
include material variables even though these variables do not have any clear role in cost 
theory. The most common regressors are capacity (bed size), activity (case flow rate, 
occupancy or average length of stay), casemix (proportion of patients in each category), 
wage level (proxy for input prices), and dummy variables for teaching status, hospital 
facilities and characteristics of the market. Authors using the ad hoc specification often 
omit variables that are difficult to measure. Given the heterogeneity of these variables, 
we cannot easily specify a suitable functional form nor interpret the regression 
parameters. Most of these studies use a linear additive form which has implicit 
restrictions, e.g. an additional patient day raises cost by a fixed amount independent of 
the casemix. These restrictions are not realistic. Cowing, Holtmann and Powers (1983) 
argue that the problem of the ad hoc cost function is the lack of theoretical foundation.  
                                                 
44 Although we can measure cost efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis (which is a nonparametric 
method), only the stochastic cost frontier need a cost function.  
45 Unit cost includes ‘cost per case’ or ‘cost per day’. 
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Conrad and Strauss (1983) and Cowing and Holtmann (1983) provide the earliest studies 
which specify a cost function using the cost theory we have described in the previous 
three sections. These cost functions contain only input prices and output quantity as 
arguments. If we assume economic agent always minimizes cost, the cost function 
becomes the dual of the production function through Shepard’s lemma. While this 
approach has a strong theoretical foundation, there is a risk of omitting variables that 
affect cost. These variables include the hospital’s teaching status, ownership and care 
quality.  
 
Granneman, Brown and Pauly (1986) seek a compromise between the ad hoc and 
structural functions by introducing the hybrid function. The authors modify a translog 
cost function to obtain lnC=φX+ΣαilnPi+f(Y,D,CM,R,Z)+ε. Here,  X is a vector of 
variables affecting cost, P is a vector of input prices, Y and D are vectors of outputs 
(being inpatient day and discharge cases respectively), CM is a vector of casemix 
variables,  R is a vector of the sources of revenue, Z is a vector of other outputs, and ε is 
the error term. The authors assume the vector X affects cost level but not the shape of the 
cost function. After imposing further restrictions, the cost curve becomes locally concave, 
continuous, non-decreasing and homogenous of degree one in input prices. The authors 
estimate the hybrid function by using ordinary least square. 
 
The hybrid cost function is an uncomfortable compromise. It is basically a structural cost 
function which includes additional variables. These additional variables are restricted so 
that the estimation of scale and input substitutions elasticity are not affected. We shall 
adopt the structural cost function approach in our empirical strategy in Chapter 5 and 
treat these additional variables in two ways. First, we will apply theoretical argument to 
incorporate care quality as a joint proxy for output. Second, we will eliminate teaching 
hospital because we cannot disentangle the effects of patient care and clinical teaching. 
The remaining part of this chapter will focus on specific topics related to the formulation 
of hospital cost function.  First, we will discuss the issues related to hospital patient care 
output, especially the issue of casemix aggregation and care quality. We shall introduce 
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the idea that care quality should be one of two proxies for hospital care and legitimately 
enters a structural cost function. Second, we shall discuss the issues related to hospital 
inputs, paying special attention to the boundary of hospital. Finally, we shall argue that 
teaching hospitals produce teaching and patient care with joint technology. Therefore, 
eliminating these hospitals improve the internal validity of this research. 
 
4.5 Issues Relating to Hospital Outputs 
 
In the neoclassical economic theory, a firm produces products (or services) which 
consumer buys. We use Grossman and Hart (1986) approach of defining the firm 
boundary based on asset ownership. The consumer is willing to pay a price equal or 
above the firm’s cost (depending on the market structure) because the products increase 
the consumer’s utility. In this sense, it is difficult to view the hospital’s products as 
patient-day and availability of medical treatment such as pharmaceutics and surgery. The 
consumer has negative marginal utilities for these services. The consumer’s utility arises 
from the protection or recovery of her health capital in the sense of Grossman (1972).46 
The physician coordinates the production of hospital output (protection or restoration of 
patient’s health) by ordering suitable medical services as information unfold as described 
in Harris (1977). The output is more like a tailored suit than a standardized widget. 
Hospital services are like the odd shaped clothes that need to be sewn together for each 
individual customer. Our earlier review of the U.S. hospital industry in section 1.1 has 
shown that hospitals use halfway technology which is the most expensive part of the 
episode of disease. Arrow (1963) argues that medical care is characterized by product 
uncertainty where there is a great scope for “clinical judgments” by physicians. 47 We 
expect product uncertainty to be especially severe for halfway technology. There are 
great variations in the outcome of the same disease treated within acceptable medical 
practice. In the context of nonprofit segregate hospitals, Newhouse (1970) argues that 
                                                 
46 Health capital is affected by many factors outside the influence of medical service (including hospital 
services). These other factors include “investments” (like medical care, diet and exercise) and behavioral 
modifiers (like wage rate, education level and price level of home produced goods).  
47 In fact Arrow explained that the scope of clinical judgments meant that patient delegate the consumption 
decision to physician.  
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quality should be part of the objective function of hospital decision makers. The board of 
trustees has a taste for care quality as philanthropists. The physicians prefer high quality 
because of professional expectation (Arrow, 1963) and competition for patients. The 
manager has a taste for prestige which depends on quality, and is also not evaluated on 
profit. It is therefore sensible to measure hospital care using joint proxies, hospital 
services and care quality, and not any one alone. The primary issue about hospital cost 
containment is about controlling the cost of patient care without compromising care 
quality.  
 
4.5.1 Aggregating Hospital Services 
 
The hospital is a multi-product firm even if we limit ourselves to patient care services. 
All hospitals deliver patient care as inpatient service, 48  with some hospitals also 
delivering outpatient care. Hospital labor and capital are used to produce diagnostic, 
therapeutic and hotel services, which are really intermediate products ordered by the 
physicians. We can use admission or patient day to measure the hospital’s output. Butler 
(1995) argues that case is a better unit of measure than patient day as follows: The total 
cost per admission is the sum of the fixed cost (such as administrative cost for admission 
and discharge), the variable cost (mainly the hotel component) and the treatment cost. 
Within the limits of medical technology, it is possible to the treat patient with high 
intensity-short stay strategy or low intensity-long stay strategy. The former has higher 
cost per patient day but lower total cost due to lower variable cost. If the hospital output 
is the protection or recovery of health capital, then the patient day measure is a problem. 
This is because the hospital cost should vary with the treatment and not the hotel 
component. Using admission avoids this problem. 
 
Using admission alone is not satisfactory because the casemix proportion varies among 
hospitals. Barer (1982) outlines three approaches to standardize casemix variation among 
hospitals: (i) grouping cases without weighting, (ii) grouping cases with intra-group 
weighting, and (iii) grouping cases and total weighting. Many cost studies such as 
Granneman et al (1986) adopt the first strategy to group cases by medical specialty. 
                                                 
48 The distinction is inpatient service requires hospital stay while outpatient service does not. 
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These authors use fractions of cases by specialty as outputs. There are two disadvantages 
in doing this: First, there is an implicit assumption to weigh each specialty group equally. 
Second, there is a tradeoff between getting homogenous group and tractable number of 
groups. This is especially true for the flexible cost function as the number of estimable 
parameters increases rapidly with the number of groups. The second strategy involves 
deriving weights for each group using a data reduction technique such as factor analysis 
or principal component analysis. The third strategy assumes equal weights within each 
group and uses group specific weights to aggregate the proportion of cases falling within 
each group into a scalar casemix. In all three cases, we weigh heterogeneous inpatient 
output with the market value of treated case, i.e. using the price patient pays and not the 
cost. Three prominent casemix measures have dominated the literature: the International 
Classification of Disease (ICD), diagnostic related group (DRG) and Resource Need 
Index (RNI). 
 
The ICD codes49 are derived from the Manual of International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases, Injuries and Cause of Death published by the World Health Organization. This 
is an important starting point for classifying hospital output because the codes are 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive. However, the large number of groups limits the 
usefulness of ICD because the hospital outputs contain many cells. On the other hand, the 
lack of severity measure increases the chance of case variation. The ICD originates from 
the International Statistic Institute’s international list of the causes of death in 1893, and 
is revised by the Institute every decade. In 1948, the Institute extended the list (at the 6th 
revision) to include non-fatal conditions and recommended its use for mortality and 
morbidity statistics. In 1979, the ICD9CM codes50 became the sole classification system 
for morbidity reporting in the U.S. The Healthcare Financing Authority (HCFA) took 
over the annual maintenance and update of the codes in 1985. More importantly, the ICD 
codes (especially ICD9CM) have become the standard tool for data collection, quality 
monitoring, research and reimbursement in the U.S.  
                                                 
49 ICD stands for the International Classification of Diseases 
50 ICD9CM stands for the International Classification of Disease 9th Revision – Clinical Modification. It is 




The original codes for the diagnostic related group (DRG) are derived from ICDA8 (ICD 
adapted for America, version 8). The first version of the DRG for Medicare-Medicaid51 
Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1983 is developed in the paper by Fetter, Shin, 
Freeman, Averill and Thompson (1980). The primary objective of the DRG is to group 
cases which use similar resources and hence should receive the same reimbursement from 
the Medicare-Medicaid program. Fetter et al initially divide all cases into 23 major 
disease classes (MDC) to simplify the analysis over diverse diseases in the acute care 
setting. These early divisions ensure the bundling of medically meaningful groups.52 
Medical meaningfulness is important to ensure the homogeneity in the treatment 
provided in each group. The DRG is economically meaningful in reducing the variance in 
hospital cost down the hierarchy from the surgical medical dichotomy, to major disease 
class (MDC), and finally to DRG. In moving down this hierarchy, clinicians propose a 
list of variables to group patients. Fetter et al calculate the (cost) variance reduction that 
each variable can produce. The authors select the variable producing the greatest variance 
reduction as the basis for classification of the groups. They repeat the process with the 
next variable until the variance or group size becomes small. 
 
Grimaldi and Micheleti (1982) point out four problems with Fetter’s DRG which may 
cause cost variation. First, some DRG groups depend on diagnosis alone and are 
independent of the treatment, number of diagnosis, and co-morbidity. Second, DRG does 
not recognize disease staging and severity. Third, there are some errors classifying certain 
surgical procedures (done outside the operating theatre) as medical cases. Forth, the 
primary diagnosis often consumes fewer resources than the complications. Horn and 
Sharkey (1983) produce the evidence that disease severity is a source of cost variation 
within DRG. The heterogeneity problem is especially acute in the low volume DRG for 
pediatric and psychiatric diseases. The dilemma in the DRG scheme is the tradeoff 
between having fewer groups containing inherent variations within each group, and 
                                                 
51 These two public insurance schemes are managed by HCFA, and are the largest insurance in the U.S. 
52 Fetter et al illustrated that patients diagnosed with hemorrhoid, tonsil hypertrophy and normal pregnancy 
may consume similar dollar value resource, but these cases are medically unrelated.  
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having more groups with enough numbers within each group. The DRG cost weights are 
population specific.  
 
There is a general agreement that casemix exerts a (statistically) significant influence on 
inter-hospital cost variations (see for example Evans and Walker, 1972; Tatchell, 1977; 
Hardwick, 1986; Butler, 1995). This influence increases significantly when the casemix 
scheme is more disaggregated. Butler (1995) highlights the twin problems of losing 
degree of freedom and multicollinearity when imposing casemix directly on the cost 
function. A feasible alternative is the use of a scalar casemix index constructed separately 
from patient data in the sample hospital. Hornbrook (1982a; 1982b) explains that the 
method consists of a diagnostic classification scheme, a weighting scheme and an 
aggregation formula. The ICD is the most common classification scheme. Klastorin and 
Watts (1980) argue that aggregation formulae are usually linear for simplicity because 
there is no a priori support for more complex forms.  There are three common scalar 
casemix indices in the literature: First, Evans and Walker (1972) develop the Information 
Index based on the theoretical foundation of Theil (1967). Second, Ament (1976a; 1976b) 
develops the Resource Need Index from 1.8 million admissions in 50 hospitals from the 
Professional Activities Studies. Fetter et al (1980) develop the DRG which Medicare-
Medicaid has adopted for hospital reimbursement. Sloan, Feldman and Steinwald (1983) 
state that several studies (Klastorin and Watts, 1980; Hardwick, 1981; Barer 1981) 
comparing the performance of these three indices in explaining cost variation produce no 
consensus on which index is superior. Using the weights from any of these three indices 
to calculate casemix-adjusted admission is a reasonable summary statistics for hospital 
services. Using the scalar casemix conserves degree of freedom and makes the estimable 
equations tractable (especially when a flexible cost function is used). However, the 
weights in the scalar index are population specific. We should expect deviation if we do 
not derive the weights from our own sample. Since the Healthcare Financing Authority 
updates DRG weights for U.S. hospitals annually, 53  using DRG weights has the 
advantage that these weights are derived from our target population in 1997. 
  
                                                 
53 This requirement is enacted in the Social Security Act. 
 54
4.5.2 Measuring Care Quality 
 
We have explained the need to include care quality in section 4.5. Hospital care quality is 
a multi-dimensional construct and some dimensions are not easily measured (Newhouse, 
1980). The crux of delivering high care quality is the balance of benefit and harm in 
treatment (Donabedian, 1980; 1988). Donabedian (1980) proposes the Structure-Process-
Outcome approach to measure care quality. Structural measures meter the hospital’s 
capacity to deliver care. Structural measures in the empirical literature include teaching 
status, accreditation54 , the availability of expensive medical equipment 55 , and labor 
intensity such as nurse per bed. Process measures refer to the treatment protocol which 
physicians use. For example, some hospitals implement clinical pathways56 to manage 
selected diseases such as diabetes. Outcome measures are the desired states resulting 
from the care processes. Indicators for outcome measure are best developed in the 
literature and deserve a separate discussion. These three types of quality measures are 
linked in an underlying framework. Donabedian (1988) argues that good structure 
promotes good process, and good process in turn promotes good outcome.  
 
The crux of the cost-quality nexus is whether quality increases, decreases, or is 
independent of hospital cost. Scott, Forrest and Brown (1976) show that care quality is 
positively correlated with cost. This result is intuitive: if the marginal cost of quality is 
not positive (and assuming positive marginal utility of quality), a rational economic agent 
will employ infinite resource to deliver higher quality. However, Neuhauser (1971), 
Shortell, Becker and Neuhauser (1976), and Longest (1978) report negative correlation 
between cost and care quality. This result arises because of product uncertainty in the 
Arrow (1963) sense. Physicians prescribe treatments which have benefits and side effects. 
An aggressive treatment plan is more costly and some of the treatments actually cause 
                                                 
54 For example staff accreditation (e.g. Board certification) and hospital accreditation (e.g. Joint 
Commission of the Accreditation of Hospitals certification). 
55 Magnetic resonance imaging is an example. 
56 The clinical pathway is a standardized process in the “best practice” of medicine. Here is a link that 
provides some basic information http://www.openclinical.org/clinicalpathways.html. The motivation for 
clinical pathway is really a mix of the quest for care quality and cost containment.   
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harm 57 which further increases cost. A conservative treatment plan can benefit from 
increasing treatment to increase care quality. It is impossible to determine if a treatment 
is ex ante excessive (even if it is clear ex post) because of product uncertainty. Garber, 
Fuchs and Silverman (1984) argue that the cost-quality nexus depends on the clinical 
condition. Donabedian, Wheeler and Wyszewianski (1982) propose that the cost-quality 
relation is non-linear and monotonically increasing. Furthermore, the marginal cost of 
care quality diminishes over output range. Therefore, care quality clearly affects cost 
through clinical efficiency and must be part of the hospital output in the structural cost 
function. Given this background, we now examine two outcome measures for care quality: 
 
(A) Risk Adjusted Mortality Index 
 
Unlike most outcome data, mortality rates are readily available, and consistently and 
unambiguously recorded. Mortality rates, especially those associated with unexpected 
mortality, represent an adverse care outcome and therefore measure care quality in 
hospitals. Mortality rates correlate with less drastic failure in care quality such as delayed 
recovery, residual disability and increased risk of future illness. However, raw mortality 
rates are not useful because care quality is only one of many factors for hospital 
mortality.58 Pollack, Ruttimann and Geston (1987) emphasize the importance of adjusting 
mortality rates for disease categories because casemix and severity have substantial 
impact on mortality.  
 
Desharnais et al (1988) develop the risk adjusted mortality index using 6 million 
discharges59 and validate its reliability and generalizability. The authors divide the cases 
by diagnostic related group (DRG) cluster60 into the high mortality group (with raw 
                                                 
57 This is call iatrogenesis in the medical jargon. 
58 The other factors are the patient’s physiological attributes (such as age, gender and co-morbidity), social 
conditions (such as financial situation affecting nutrition and housing; education affecting health behavior 
and self care), and the type, stage and severity of diseases.  
59 The database was from the Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities, which is now part of the 
Cecil G Sheps Center for Health Services Research, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
60 Some DRG were the same disease with modifiers for different age group and co-morbidity. The authors 
needed to use DRG cluster instead of DRG because age group and co-morbidity are parameters of the 
logistic regressions.  
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mortality rate above 5%) and the low mortality group. There are 64 high mortality 
clusters that accounted for 17% of the discharge and 72% of the mortality. The authors 
prepare a contingency table for each cluster in the low mortality group and use logistic 
regression (with nine patient characteristics including age and co-morbidity) for the high 
mortality group. Desharnais et al then compare the predictive power of mortality rates, 
defined as mean error per cluster, under four specifications: using the crude mortality rate 
(i.e. no adjustment for casemix), DRG adjusted mortality rate, only contingency tables 
(i.e. only adjust for casemix, age and co-morbidity), and combination of contingency 
table and logistic regressions. They find the corresponding mean errors per cluster are 
1.08, 0.416, 0.393 and 0.357. This result shows that the full model is the most powerful, 
but casemix alone accounts for 92% of the improvement in predictive power.  
 
Desharnais et al (1988) use in-hospital mortality to determine the risk adjusted mortality 
index. This measure can become bias if hospital administration is able and willing to 
transfer pessimistic cases to tertiary (e.g. teaching hospitals) and palliative care centers 
(e.g. hospices). In-hospital mortality is sensitive to the length of stay (Jenks, William and 
Kay, 1988). Specifically, hospitals in New York State have longer length of stay than 
California and 25% higher in-hospital mortality, but 1.6% lower 30-day post 
hospitalization mortality. Therefore, including mortality within a reasonable post-
discharge time window can improve the validity of the measure. The Healthcare 
Financing Authority uses an arbitrary 30 days post-discharge window for insurance claim. 
Fleming et al (1991) improves the reliability with a DRG adjusted variable time window. 
However, three issues arise from adding this post-discharge window. First, the window 
increases the influence of patient’s socio-economic characteristics and can be wrongly 
attributed as hospital care quality. Second, if patient has re-admission to another hospital 
during this window period, the hospital to assign the case becomes ambiguous. Third, 





(B) Surgical Complication Rates 
 
We need another care quality measure to supplement the risk-adjusted mortality because 
of two related reasons. First, mortality is an extreme outcome in medical care and not the 
full spectrum. Second, care quality is a multi-dimensional construct according to 
Newhouse (1980). Therefore, it is sensible for us to use a supplementary outcome 
measure such as surgical complication rates. These indicators measure different aspects 
of care quality. For example, mortality measures quality delivered in intensive care ward 
(using more uncertain technology) and surgical complication rates measure care quality 
in surgical units such as theatre and surgical wards. Re-admission rate is another possible 
indicator, but it is more sensitive to administrative factors such as discharge policy. 
 
Using the healthcare financing authority’s co-morbidity and complication list, Desharnais 
et al (1988) designate 70 ICD9CM codes as those likely due to surgical complication. 
The authors assume a condition as co-morbidity, and not complication, if either is 
possible. For example, the authors exclude pneumonia from the list because pneumonia 
may be a primary medical condition or arise from poor post-operative care. This surgical 
complication rate is a feasible measure although it understates the prevalence of surgical 
complications. 
 
4.6 Issues Relating to Hospital Inputs 
 
The main issue related to measuring hospital input is the treatment of physician labor. 
The hospital uses capital and hospital labor as inputs for producing hospital services. If 
we view the hospital industry as part of a system to deliver medical care, instead of a 
producer of intermediate products, then physician labor and cost ought to be part of the 
hospital cost. A hospital cost function without physician is infeasible, i.e. the input 
requirement set V(y) will be empty. Most U.S. hospitals and physician practices are 
separate legal entities, and most (if not all) cost analyses use accounting data. This 
implies that most hospital cost analyses exclude the physician component, and it is rare to 
see physician input price in the cost function. The trend in physician hospital integration 
 58
(i.e. hospital hiring physician as employee) adds to this complication as the accounting 
data from integrated and segregate hospitals are not comparable. 
 
Bays (1980) is a rare paper that include physician inputs in the cost function. The author 
exploits the fact that hospital record case diagnosis, treatment and procedure by using the 
ICD codes. 61 He matches the ICD8A code to the relative weights for insurance payment 
scheme for physician62 to estimate the (market) value of physician input. Given this 
information, Bays compares his estimations, with and without the correction, for the 
average cost function, AC=AC(Bed Size, Case Flow, Casemix Proportion). He finds that 
the average cost function is quadratic with physician input adjustment and linear 
otherwise, showing that physician inputs matter. The healthcare financing authority’s 
decision to pay for physician services using the resource based relative value system63 
(RB-RVS) since 1992 means that we have a more refined database than Bays. Therefore, 
including physician inputs in hospital cost analysis is theoretically mandatory and 
technically feasible.  
 
4.7 Issues Relating to Teaching Hospital 
 
There is strong evidence that teaching hospitals have higher average cost after adjusting 
for casemix. 64 Cameron (1985) finds that after adjusting for casemix, university hospitals, 
major and minor teaching hospitals are respectively 26%, 10% and 8% more costly than 
non-teaching hospitals. From our review of the hospital industry in section 1.1, hospitals 
are part of a system to deliver patient care using inputs from the supporting industries 
such as pharmaceutical industries and professional schools. In this sense, the teaching 
component is part of the input65 to produce skilled clinicians and not the output of the 
                                                 
61 Specifically, Bays used the ICDA8 (International Classification of Diseases, version 8, adopted for US). 
62 Bays used the weight data from the California Relative Value study. 
63 The billable procedures are coded using a modified form of the Current Procedure Terminology version 4 
(commonly called CPT-4) developed and maintained by the American Medical Association. 
64 Some examples of cost studies that found higher cost in teaching hospitals are Pauly (1978), Culyer, 
Wiseman, Drummond and West (1978), Watts and Klastorin (1980), Sloan and Steinwald (1980), Jones 
(1985) and Cameron (1985). 
65 The production of skilled clinical labor will need to include educational institutions like the professional 
schools for nurses, physicians and paramedics. 
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medical industry per se. The debate of whether a patient should pay for the teaching 
component is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it is clear that additional 
teaching cost is not inefficiency.66 Separating clinical components and teaching is the 
crux of the issue.  
 
Sloan, Feldman and Steinwald (1983) argue that because patient care, research and 
clinical teaching are jointly produced. Hence, there is no definite way to allocate time 
devoted to these activities. Since clinical teaching and patient care are produced in 
variable proportions, there is a common cost that is not allocable to each product. Hadley 
(1983) points out that any accounting approach in assigning the cost between teaching 
and patient care is essentially arbitrary. Therefore, we exclude teaching hospitals from 
our sample to increase internal validity of this research. 
 
                                                 
66 Frick, Martin and Swartz (1985) offer four possible reasons for teaching hospitals to have higher cost: 
First, they use more ancillary services that increase cost (empirical evidence from Cameron, 1985); second, 
they attract more severely ill patients; third, they provide better quality (empirical evidence from Becker 
and Steinwald, 1981); and lastly they are simply less efficient. There is also a counter point that teaching 
hospitals have higher cost. Hadley (1983) argues that from Becker (1975) theory of general human capital, 
trainees pay for the clinical teaching by accepting a lower pay than his productivity. There is substantial 
empirical controversy on this point. For example, Hosek and Palmer (1983) and Robinson and Luft (1985) 
find no difference, but Garber, Fuchs and Silverman (1984) finds higher cost in faculty physicians.      
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5. Empirical Strategy 
 
We have argued in chapter 2 that the team agency framework 67  provides a new 
perspective to investigate the debate whether for-profit hospitals are more cost efficient 
than nonprofit ones. Three falsifiable hypotheses are formed using the framework: 
 
H1A: Nonprofit FIOs has higher efficiency score than nonprofit segregate hospital 
H1B: Nonprofit FIOs has higher efficiency score than nonprofit network hospital 
[The above result is due to Holmstrom (1982)] 
 
H2A: For-profit FIOs has similar efficiency score as for-profit segregate hospital 
H2B: For-profit FIOs has similar efficiency score as for-profit network hospital 
[The above result is due to Eswaran and Kotwal (1984)] 
 
H3A: For-profit network hospital has higher efficiency score than nonprofit ones. 
H3B: For-profit segregate hospital has higher efficiency score than nonprofit ones. 
[The above result is due to Alchian and Demsetz (1972)68] 
 
Kooreman (1994) points out that data envelopment analysis (DEA) can only measure 
technical efficiency while the stochastic frontier can measure cost efficiency. We have 
chosen the stochastic frontier because of the need to measure cost efficiency. We have 
chosen cross section over panel data because of our resource constraint (data are 
expensive) and our preference for simpler analytical techniques. Although panel data 
techniques are clearly superior, there are still tradeoffs in each technique. We have seen 
in Chapter 3 that some panel data techniques for stochastic cost frontier need not require 
assumptions about the distribution of the inefficiency term. However, the fixed effect 
model requires the assumption of time invariant efficiency. Accommodating the time 
                                                 
67 This is mainly the arguments in Holmstrom (1982), Eswaran and Kotwal (1984). 
68 We exclude the for-profit vs. nonprofit comparison of FIOs because team agency and property rights 
theories predict opposite result. Therefore, we expect the efficiency score between the two groups to be 
statistically equal. We will discuss this result but not test it out as a formal hypothesis because there is no a 
priori information of the relative size. 
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varying efficiency in the fixed effect model needs the tradeoff of making error terms 
complex and nonlinear. The Achilles’ heel of the random effect model is the assumption 
that efficiency and parameters are independent. We assume the composed errors are 
normal-half normal and use the Battese and Coelli (1998) exact estimator.  
 
Introducing the simultaneous equation system can improve parameter efficiency (i.e. 
reduce the parameter variances), but the Greene’s problem makes decomposing cost 
efficiency into the technical and allocative components difficult. Since our theoretical 
model is silent on the source of the cost inefficiency, decomposing into allocative and 
technical efficiency is not required. Our cost frontier specification has only two cost share 
equations, and one of them need to be deleted to prevent singular covariance matrix (see 
section 5.1 for details). Therefore, expect the reduction in parameter variance is small. So, 
we estimate cost efficiency by the single equation method. 
 
We need to specify a cost function to estimate the stochastic cost frontier. Since we do 
not have a priori information about the production structure, we choose a flexible cost 
function to avoid specification error. The translog form has the least parameters, but we 
expect multicollinearity to remain serious. Harvey (1977) explains that multicollinearity 
makes the parameter estimates less precise (i.e. high variance producing insignificant 
estimates) but the estimates remain unbiased. Since characterizing the production 
structure is not our objective, insignificant parameter estimates do not pose a problem. 
We only need the parameters to be unbiased because they are used in the second stage to 
partition the composed errors into inefficiency and white noise. Farrar and Glauber (1967) 
warn that multicollinearity can impart a bias towards incorrect model specification. Since 
multicollinearity arises because non experimental data tend to be correlated, correcting 
the problem by using a priori information is extremely difficult.  
 
A variable cost function is chosen because capital does not adjust instantly (see section 
4.3 for detail). We have argued in section 4.4 that the hospital output is patient care. 
Measuring patient care requires quantity and quality as joint proxies. We should 
aggregate hospital service for parameter parsimony. DRG weighting is used because the 
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annual updates ensure the weights are derived from a population similar to our sample. 
We need at least two care quality measures to accommodate the multi-dimensional aspect 
of this measure. Donabedian’s (1980) structure-process-outcome model of quality shows 
that quality measures are linked. Two outcome measures, risk adjusted mortality index 
(RAMI) and surgical complication rate, are used for two reasons: First, our 
conceptualization of the hospital outputs is closer to care outcome than hospital structure 
or clinical process. Second, we chose outcome measures that can be measured by a 
continuous scale. In section 4.6, we have shown the need to include physician labor, in 
addition to capital and hospital labor, as hospital inputs. The cost of physician labor 
should also be included in the variable cost. Given this overview, we will now proceed to 
the specifics of cost frontier specification, variable construction, data sources and 
software choice. 
 
5.1 Cost Frontier Specification and Programming 
 
We specify the following translog cost frontier where a0 is the intercept; ai  are the 
parameters for inputs; bi are the parameters for outputs; gij are the parameters for mix 
input/output; VC is the variable cost; wi are the parameters for input price, with subscripts 
i=L,M for hospital and medical labor respectively; yi are parameters for quantities, with 
subscripts i=K,D,A,Y for capital69, 1/RAMI, 1/(surgical complication rate), and DRG 
weighted discharge respectively, ei is the error term that can be decomposed into an 
inefficiency term ui and white noise v.  
 
lnVC = a0+Σailnwi+Σbilnyi+1/2ΣΣaijlnwilnwj+1/2ΣΣbijlnyilnyj+Σgijlnwilnyj+ei 
Equation 1: Unrestricted Translog Cost Function 
 
The conditions of symmetry (i.e. aij =aji and bij =bji) and linear homogeneity in input 
prices (i.e. ∂lnVC/∂wi=1 meaning Σai+Σbilnyi+1/2ΣΣaijlnwij+Σgijlnyj=1) are imposed in 
the above equation. The homogeneity condition implies that the first term (Σai) is one, 
                                                 
69 Note that we use a quantity measure for capital (i.e. yK) because we specify a variable cost function. 
Therefore, we lose one cost share.  
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and the subsequent two terms are zero for each lnwi and lnyi. From the first term, we 
obtained aL+aM =1. From the second term, aLLlnwL+aMLlnwL+aLMlnwM+aMMlnwM=0, and 
the condition is true if aLL+aML =0 and aLM+aMM =0. For the third term, the condition 
becomes gLKlnyK+gLDlnyD+gLAlnyA+gLYlnyY+gMKlnyK+gMDlnyD+gMAlnyA+gMYlnyY=0, i.e. 
Σ((gLi+gMi)lnyi)=0. Then, gLK+gMK=0, gLD+gMD=0, gLA+gMA=0, and gLY+gMY=0. 
Substituting these constraints back into the cost frontier gives70: 
 
lnVC = a0+[aLlnwL+(1-aL)lnwM]+Σbilnyi+1/2[aLL(lnwL)2+aMM(lnwM)2+2aMLlnwLlnwM] 
+1/2ΣΣbijlnyilnyj+[gLKlnwLlnyK+gLDlnwLlnyD+gLAlnwLlnyA+gLYlnwLlnyY   
 -gLKlnwMlnyK-gLDlnwMlnyD-gLAlnwMlnyA-gLYlnwMlnyY]+ei,  
 
⇒ ln(VC/wM) = a0+aLln(wL/wM)+Σbilnyi+1/2aLL[ln(wL/wM)]2+1/2ΣΣbijlnyilnyj 
+[gLKln(wL/wM)lnyK+gLDln(wL/wM)lnyD+gLAln(wL/wM)lnyA+gLYln(wL/wM)lnyY ]+ei,  
 
The substitution for aLL(lnwL)2+aMM(lnwM)2+2aMLlnwLlnwM arises from re-writing the 
whole term as aLL(lnwL)2-2aLLlnwLlnwM +aLL(lnwM)2 =aLL(lnwL-lnwM)2. The following 
translog cost frontier is estimated using ordinary least square as the first step of our 
analysis: 
 
ln(VC/wM) = a0+aLln(wL/wM)+bKlnyK+bDlnyD+bAlnyA+bYlnyY+1/2aLL[ln(wL/wM)]2 
+bKDlnyKlnyD+bKAlnyKlnyA +bKYlnyKlnyY +bDAlnyDlnyA+bDYlnyDlnyY+bAYlnyAlnyA 
+1/2[bKK(lnyK)2+ bDD(lnyD)2 +bAA(lnyA)2 +bYY(lnyY)2 +[gLKln(wL/wM)lnyK 
+gLDln(wL/wM)lnyD  +gLAln(wL/wM)lnyA+gLYln(wL/wM)lnyY ]+ei,  
Equation 2 : Restricted Translog Cost Function (Symmetry and Linear Price Homogeneity) 
 
After estimating this equation, we recovered the error term ei for each hospital by 
subtracting the actual variable cost from the fitted variable cost. It is crucial that the 
estimated parameters are unbiased at this step. There is no requirement for best efficiency 
(i.e. smallest variance), hence multicollinearity is not a critical problem71 as long as the 
parameters are of the correct signs. This is the starting point to decompose the error term. 
 
                                                 
70 Ruud (2001) shows the detail of these calculations. 
71 This is unlike studies to evaluate the production structure where the purpose is the precise estimates of 
the parameters. 
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The error term ei  = ui+v is assumed to be normal-half normal, implying the log 
likelihood function is lnL=ln2-Nlnσ +ΣlnΦ(eλ/σ)−1/(2σ2)Σe2 [see footnote for notation72] 
We maximized this function with respect to the parameters to obtain the maximum 
likelihood estimate for the parameter, using the ordinary least square residue (ei) from the 
previous paragraph as the starting point. We then used the estimated parameters to 
recover the new residue (ei) and iterated the process until convergence. We used the 
Battese and Coelli (1988) exact estimator to decompose the residue ei into its components. 
The estimator is * * *
* *
1 ( / ) 1
* *1 ( / ) 2( ) ln[ ].{ }i iii iE u e
σ μ σ
μ σ μ σ−Φ −−Φ −− = − + , where σ*= σu2σv2/σu2 and μ*i= 
eiσu2/σ2. The TSP output contains λ and σ , but not σ*i  or μ*i directly. We obtained σ* and 
μ* using our proof in Appendix E, i.e.  μ*i = eiλ2/(1+λ2) and σ* =λ2σ2/(1+λ2). The point 
estimator is simplified using the symmetry property of the standard normal 1-Φ(z)=Φ(-z). 
Hence, E(ui│ei)=lnΦ((μ∗i/σ*i)-σ∗)+(−μ*i+0.5σ∗)−lnΦ(μ∗/σ*). Finally, CEi=exp(ui│ei) 
gives us the hospital’s efficiency score.  
 
5.2 Data Sources and Software Selection 
 
This research requires two levels of linked data. The construction of three variables (care 
quality, DRG adjusted admission and physician cost component) require the aggregation 
of patient level data to hospital level. Two variables for the cost efficiency modeling 
stage (capital and labor quantities) and two constructs for the hypotheses stage (hospital 
type and ownership) are available at the hospital level. The variable cost calculation 
requires hospital and physician components. The hospital component is available directly 
from hospital level cost data; the physician component requires aggregating patient-level 
data to the hospital level. These variables are calculated using the following databases: 
 
 
                                                 
72 Recall from section 3.1 that ui is the inefficiency term, v is white noise,Φ(.) is the cumulative normal 
density, λ= σu/σv, σ2 =σu2+σv2. 
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5.2.1 The American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey 1997 
 
The AHA annual survey is a comprehensive hospital level database covering more than 
6,000 hospitals. The scope of the survey covers utilization, organizational structure, 
personnel, hospital services and financial and accounting data. The 1983-7 AHA data 
represents 92% of the short-term community hospitals (Gaynor and Anderson, 1995). 
Given its long history73 most U.S. hospital databases are designed to link with the AHA 
survey through an identifier (i.e. the AHAID field). 
 
5.2.2 The National Inpatient Sample (NIS) 
 
The Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)74 produces two patient level 
hospital databases from its healthcare cost and utilization project (HCUP) as at 1997. 75  
The National Inpatient Sample (NIS), derived from the State Inpatient Databases (SID), 
is a stratified random sample of approximately 20% of all U.S. community hospitals. The 
NIS is more suitable than SID for our analysis because SID will not produce a random 
sample of U.S. hospitals if HCUP participation is not random. The NIS sampling frame 
consists of five strata: rural/urban location, number of beds, region, teaching status, and 
ownership. All discharges are retained for each sampled hospital. The NIS database is 
updated annually by using a recursive procedure to account for changes in strata sizes, 
composition and sampling rates. The goal of this procedure is to maximize the year-to-
year overlap while keeping a constant sampling rate for all hospitals within each stratum. 
Consequently, time series analysis may be bias because the data is a subset of hospitals 
with continuous membership in the stratum. Specifically, the subset contains fewer 
hospitals that opened, closed, split, merged or changed strata. 
 
The 1997 NIS includes 1,046 hospitals with about 7.1 million discharges from 22 states. 
However, AHA hospital identifiers are coded as missing to comply with the regulations 
                                                 
73 The first AHA survey started in 1946. 
74 AHRQ is the research arm for the Department of Health and Human Services. 
75 Subsequently, three more databases are added for the statistics of emergency room, ambulatory surgery 
and pediatric cases. 
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from five states (Kansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Tennessee and South Carolina) and are 
rendered unusable. We therefore have usable data from 17 states: Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New 
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Therefore, 
usable data are obtained from 729 hospitals representing 11.6% of all the U.S. hospitals 
at this stage.  
 
5.2.3 Three Databases to Calculate Physician Cost Component 
 
We used three databases to facilitate calculation of the market value of physician cost. 
These databases are the CPT4-ICD9CM crosswalk file, HCFA physician fees and the 
State Occupation and Employment and Wage Estimates 1999 from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.76 The NIS database records the physicians’ claimable procedures coded using 
ICD9CM. We obtained the price for each procedure from the HCFA Physician Fees 
database but HCFA does not use the ICD9CM to code procedure in this price list. The 
code that HCFA uses is the healthcare common procedure coding system (i.e. HCPCS), 
which is a modified form of the common procedure terminology version 4 (i.e. CPT-4)77 
code. We mapped the quantity (coded in ICD9CM) to the price (coded in CPT-4) to 
calculate total cost. We achieved this mapping with the ICD9CM-CPT4 crosswalk file.78 
 
5.2.4 HCFA DRG weight File 1997 
 
The final database is the DRG weight file which HCFA uses to determine the payment to 
hospitals. The file was available at http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/pufiles.htm (The HCFA 
website migrated when the organization changes its name to CMS). 
 
                                                 
76 The database is available from URL: http://www.bls.gov/blswage and is reproduced in Appendix C. The 
data were collected from the National Compensation Survey, Occupational Employment Statistics Survey 
and Current Population Survey.  
77 Recall that the CPT-4 code is administered and maintained by the American Medical Association 
78 This file is obtained from the commercial coding software called CodeBreaker©. Info-X Inc., the 
compnay that produce this product, generously provided this database for my research.   
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5.2.5 Software Selection  
 
Microsoft Assess 2000 is used to manipulate and prepare the databases for analysis. The 
choice of statistical software is limited to what the university has: namely SPSS, SAS, 
Minitab, EView, Gauss and TSP. Frontier, a specialized freeware for stochastic frontier 
analysis written by Professor Tim Coelli, can be also be obtained.  
 
There is an inherent tradeoff between convenience and flexibility in the design of 
econometric software. Menu driven software such as SPSS, EView, Minitab and Frontier 
is easy to learn and convenient to use for common statistical analysis. However, they are 
difficult (if not impossible) for the user to customize.79 Mason (1992) argues that the 
command line interface is better than menu interface for econometric work to enable 
program modification. Gauss, SAS and TSP are all competent software which can serve 
this purpose. The TSP user manual has an example of procedure for estimating a 
stochastic production frontier using maximum likelihood method. Modifying this 
procedure is easier than to program SAS or Gauss from scratch. Furthermore, the author 
for TSP provides technical support for user. TSP is used to estimate the cost frontier to 
benefit from its power and flexibility. Minitab is used to test the hypotheses to benefit 
from the convenience for testing standard procedures. 
 
5.3 Variable Specification  
 
The data described in section 5.2 is used to calculate the variables described in this 
section. These variables are then fed to TSP version 4.3A to calculate hospital efficiency 
scores based on the method described in section 5.1. 
 
 
                                                 
79 EView is menu driven but allow some programming. Users do not have access to the source code for 
Frontier to program it. 
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5.3.1 Measuring Variable Cost  
 
The conventional definition for variable cost is total cost minus fixed cost, where fixed 
cost is commonly measured by using capital cost. The disadvantage of this approach is 
that the measure of capital cost is usually the sum of depreciation and interest expenses. 
The arbitrariness in depreciation policy introduces some degree of measurement error.80 
The alternative approach is to use labor cost to proxy for variable cost. However, the 
tradeoff for this approach is the introduction of weak endogeneity because hospital labor 
wage is also a regressor. The proxy Variable Cost = Total Cost – Capital Cost is used 
because the endogeneity problem is more serious than the measurement error. 
 
We subtracted the physician labor cost from the total cost in AHA survey to correct the 
problem that the total cost in integrated hospitals contains physician labor while the 
others do not. From this common baseline, we added back physician input expenditure to 
obtain the variable cost. We shall discuss the reversal of physician labor cost (in 
integrated hospitals) from the total cost in this section, and postpone our discussion of 
physician input expenditure to section 5.3.3. The AHA survey provides information on 
the number of physician each hospital hires81 (in full-time-equivalent, i.e. FTE82). This 
number is zero in the segregate hospitals. We calculated the average physician wage by 
state using the data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.83 For most states, the salary per 
physician FTE in that state is the weighted average of the mean salary of internists, 
pediatricians, surgeons, obstetricians and gynecologists. The weight is the fraction of the 
specialists who responded to the survey. The estimated physician cost is the product of 
the number of physician in the hospital and weighted salary of physician in the state, i.e. 
Physician Cost = Physician FTE in the hospital*Mean Salary in the State. Therefore, 
Variable Cost = Total Cost - Depreciation & Interest Expenses - Physician Wage + 
Physician Inputs. 
                                                 
80 Recall that we choose the stochastic frontier over DEA because we expect measurement errors. 
81 In the foundation model, the physicians are not directly hired by the hospital (they are hired by the 
foundation). Therefore, the FTE of physician was for the salary and equity models 
82 AHA assumed that each part time physician means half unit. Despite possible error of this approximation, 
it is still better than using headcount. 
83 The specific source is the State Occupation and Employment and Wage Estimates 1999. 
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5.3.2 Measuring Hospital Labor Wage Rate 
 
We first calculated the hospital labor expenditure by subtracting the estimated physician 
cost (obtained in 5.3.1) from the hospital labor cost. Next, we calculated the number of 
full time equivalent (FTE) of non physician staff by subtracting the physician FTE from 
the hospital total FTE. We divided the hospital labor expenditure by the FTE of non-
physician staff to obtain the average hospital labor wage rate. 
 
5.3.3 Measuring Physician Input Price 
 
The physician input price (wM) for each hospital is market value of physician servicesnumber of FTE of nursesMw = . The NIS 
database records every procedure which physician bills the patient (see section 5.2.3 for 
details). This information gives us the number of each procedure done in the hospitals. 
The pricelist which HCFA uses to pay for the Medicare-Medicaid programs gives us the 
market price of each procedure. We calculated the market value of physician services 
from the sum of all physician revenue streams (i.e. price multiple by quantity) in that 
hospital. The coding systems for price and quantity data are different: specifically, 
quantity uses ICD9CM and price uses a modified CPT4 code known as HCPCS.84 We 
mapped the two databases to a common coding system using a crosswalk file. Each CPT4 
code corresponds to several ICD9CM codes, and each ICD9CM code corresponds to 
several CPT4 codes (i.e. the relation is many-to-many). 
 
We use the example of cisternal puncture to illustrate the mapping procedure. Cisternal 
puncture means insertion of a needle into the space between the spines (for diagnostic or 
treatment purposes). This procedure can be used to collect fluid between the spines (call 
cerebral spinal fluid) for analysis, or inject a contrast media for radiography for diagnosis. 
Similarly, we can inject medicine for treatment (such as brain cancer). We started by 
examining the procedures in our NIS database and count the number of cisternal puncture 
                                                 
84 ICD9CM is the international classification of disease version 9 (clinical modification), CPT4 is the 
current procedure terminology version 4, and HCPCS is the healthcare common procedure coding system. 
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(ICD 101) in each hospital. This ICD code corresponds to CPT 61050 (cisternal or 
cervical puncture without injection of substance) and CPT 61055 (cisternal or cervical 
puncture with injection of substance). Together with various local and national modifiers, 
there are 92 prices where the mean for CPT 61050 is 101.12 and the mean for CPT 61055 
is 146.21. The price for ICD 101 is therefore 123.67, the average of these two prices. 
Note that prices for these CPT codes appear again in ICD codes. CPT 61050 corresponds 
to ICD 101 and ICD 392 (spinal canal injection); and CPT 61055 corresponds to ICD 101, 
118 (other brain treatment procedure) and 392 (Rheumatic chorea). After obtaining the 
count of procedures and their (weighted) prices, we calculated the total market value of 
physician insurance billing in each hospital. If the market for physician labor is 
competitive85, all the hospitals will get zero economic profit in hiring physician, i.e. total 
physician revenue stream equals to physician wage expenditure.  
 
The estimated (average) physician wage rate = physician wage expenditurenumber of physician (in full time equivalent terms) . However, 
we did not have the number of physicians who produced the revenue stream in each 
hospital. The number of physician under payroll is zero for segregate hospitals. The 
number of physicians as medical staff (i.e. physicians with admitting privileges) is not a 
useful proxy because some physicians had admitting privileges to several hospitals. 
Therefore, there is no consistent way to allocate the time these physicians spend in each 
hospital. We used the nursing full time equivalent in each hospital to proxy for the 
physician full time equivalent. This substitution requires the bold assumption that the 
ratio of the number of nurses to physicians is stable across hospitals. Variations in the 
specialty mix across hospitals may reduce the reliability of this proxy. For example, there 
are few nurses for each physician in psychiatric practice, but many nurses to each 
surgeon in cardiac surgery. Eliminating government and teaching hospitals from our 
sample reduce this effect to some extent. 
 
5.3.4 Measuring Capital Quantity 
 
                                                 
85 The competition for a physician to be the hospital’s medical staff by employment or by admission 
privileges is strong. This is different from the monopolistic competition among physicians for patients. 
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Capital input is constant in the short run and is a form of hospital capacity constraint. 
Most researchers studying hospital cost use the bed size to proxy for capital quantity 
(some examples are Wagstaff, 1989, Bays, 1980; Granneman, Brown and Pauly, 1986). 
Zuckerman, Hadley and Iezzoni (1994) use depreciation and interest expense per bed to 
calculate capital price, hence indirectly using bed size to proxy capital stock. Carey (1997) 
uses total fixed asset minus depreciation to proxy capital stock. Bilodeau, Cremieux and 
Ouellette (2000) use building area and an index of furniture and equipment to proxy for 
capital stock. The more precise measure has three disadvantages. First, the additional 
inputs increase the number of estimable parameters in the translog form and increase the 
burden of multicollinearity. Second, the data are difficult to obtain. Third, including 
depreciation rate into capital stock introduces an inconsistent measure. This is because a 
wide range of depreciation policy (e.g. recognition of what constitute a fixed asset and 
the method of depreciation) is acceptable with accounting policies. Furthermore, there is 
a systematic variation in the depreciation policy in each group of hospital because of the 
local tax law, ownership type and firm growth. For-profit hospitals have the incentive to 
use aggressive depreciation to obtain depreciation tax shield. While it is true that an asset 
can only be 100% depreciated, an early tax shield is the same as having an interest free 
loan from the government.  
 
There are also some disadvantages in using bed size as the proxy for quantity of capital. 
Hospitals with the same bed size can differ in the amount of capital equipment. 
Eliminating teaching hospitals from the sample reduces this effect. Deeble (1983) argues 
that bed size measures the capacity to accommodate and not the capacity to treat patient. 
It is the latter that is more important in a hospital. Berki (1972) also points out that some 
types of hospital beds are not substitutable (e.g. we cannot replace intensive care bed with 
surgical bed). We evaluated the tradeoffs and used bed size to proxy for capital stock. 
While the variable is measured with error, we did not expect systematic variation after 
eliminating teaching hospitals.  
 
5.3.5 Measuring Risk Adjusted Mortality Index 
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Desharnais et al (1988) use a mixture of logistic regressions and contingency tables to 
calculate RAMI. However, we used only the contingency table method for simplicity. 
This is a three-step procedure. First, we calculated the actual and expected mortality rates 
for each DRG in each hospital. The actual mortality rate is the ratio of the number of 
deaths to the number of cases for a given DRG in a hospital. The expected mortality rate 
is the same ratio (i.e. death/case) for a given DRG in all hospitals in our sample. Second, 
we calculated a quality index by dividing actual over expected mortality for each DRG in 
each hospital. This index exceeds one if the hospital has higher mortality than expected 
for a DRG. Finally, we summed all the quality indices by hospital to obtain the hospital’s 
RAMI. This simplified index is adjusted for casemix differences among hospitals, but 
does not consider the patient characteristics such as age and gender. High RAMI 




5.3.6 Measuring Surgical Complication Rate 
 
We used the surgical complication lists from Desharnais et al (1988) to identify cases of 
surgical complication in each hospital (We reproduce this list in Appendix D). Next, we 
counted the surgical cases in each hospital. The surgical complication rate is the number 
of complication divided by the number or surgery. Technically, a patient can have more 
than one complication for each surgery. Furthermore, long staying patients can have more 
than one surgery. A high complication rate indicates low care quality. Therefore, our 
second quality index is the inverse of complication rate. 
 
5.3.7 Measuring Aggregate Hospital Output 
 
Hospitals deliver “quantitative” patient care through inpatient and outpatient services. We 
aggregated all inpatient services using DRG weighted discharge. First, we used Assess 
2000 to match the DRG of all discharges in National Inpatient Sample database to HCFA 
DRG weight file. Next, we calculated the scalar DRG weighted discharge Y where Y= 
Σ(count of discharge * DRG weights) for each hospital. 
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Since we knew inpatient, outpatient and total hospital revenue, we used the revenue as 
weights to include outpatient services, i.e. (total hospital revenue)*DRG weighted dischargesinpatient revenueoutput = . This 
way of aggregating outpatient services (instead of treating outpatient as another output) 
avoids the problem of zero output in translog functional form.  
 
5.4 Regression Quality Control 
 
We faced substantial difficulties in deriving reliable measures for most variables in the 
cost frontier. Measuring constructs is always a problem in econometrics and becomes an 
extreme challenge when analyzing hospital cost. Measurement errors compound the 
problem of random shocks to produce outliers. Removing these outliers could improve 
the reliability of the regression result. 
 
Belsey, Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest identifying outliers using the hat matrix. The 
diagonal of the hat matrix indicates the amount of influence an observation has on the 
regression. Observations with large hat diagonals have great influence on the regression. 
For a regression with p variables and n sample, the authors suggest that observations with 
a hat diagonal greater than 2p/n are outliers. Removing outliers reduces the sample size. 
Data quality is improved if outliers are due to coding errors. However, the risk of bias 
sample increases if the removed observations are systematically distributed. For example, 
if only inefficient hospitals provide wrongly coded data, removing these observations 
would improve data quality but produce bias sample.  
 
5.5 Testing the Hypotheses 
 
Testing the hypotheses is straightforward after we have classified the hospitals and 
obtained the cost efficiency scores. The statistical principle for evaluating the hypotheses 
involves testing the difference between two means for independent groups, assuming 
unequal sample size and unknown true standard deviations. The null hypothesis is: “the 
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means are the same”. The alternate hypotheses depend on the question, so we shall leave 
the discussion to Chapter 6. Minitab version 13 is used to test the hypotheses. 
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6. Result and Discussion 
 
This chapter consists of the analysis of our cost frontier estimation, the result of the 
hypotheses testing, and examination of the threats to the result’s validity and reliability. 
Following customary convention, we shall report the test significance based on its p-
value (the probability of rejecting a true statement, i.e. Type 1 error) as: 
 
Not significant:  p > 0.1 
Significant:   0.1 ≥ p > 0.01 
Very significant:  p ≤  0.01 
 
Our final sample comprises 313 private hospitals representing 5% of the 6,284 U.S. 
hospitals who have responded to the American Hospital Association 1997 Survey. The 
1997 National Inpatient Sample has patient level data for 1,012 hospitals who have 
participated in the HCUP project. Only 17 out of the 22 participating States provide the 
link to the AHA identifier. We are left with 729 available hospitals with complete data. 
 
Some hospitals from the 729 available hospitals are excluded to increase internal validity. 
These include 137 government hospitals and 168 private teaching hospitals. From the 
remaining 424 hospitals, 28 hospitals are removed because of missing data elements86, 
and three hospitals because of zero mortality or surgical complication rates. As discussed 
earlier, we need to run the cost frontier using ordinary least square to provide the starting 
value for the maximum likelihood procedure. This initial step is also used to identify 
observations with hat matrix diagonal exceeding 2p/n where p is the number of parameter 
and n is the number of observations. Thirty two outliers are identified and removed 
before proceeding to the second stage of the estimation. Finally, 361 valid hospitals are 
used to construct the efficiency model. 
 
                                                 
86 The missing elements are bed size, hospital identifier and total cost. 
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We need to classify the hospitals to proceed with hypotheses testing: among the 361 valid 
hospitals, 56 hospitals are hybrid, i.e. these hospitals report both integrated model and 
network arrangements (e.g. salary model and integrated physician association). Eleven of 
these network arrangements involve only primary care physicians and not hospital 
specialists. As primary care physicians have limited rights for patient admission, we treat 
these eight hospitals as integrated. We eliminate the remaining 48 hospitals from 
hypotheses testing. Hence, we have 313 observations. The sample hospitals have the 
following characteristics: 
 
Sample For-Profit Nonprofit Total Sample % For-Profit Nonprofit Total
FIO 2 29 31 FIO 0.6 9.3 9.9 
Network 23 83 106 Network 7.3 26.5 33.8
Segregate 47 129 176 Segregate 15.1 41.2 56.3
Total 72 241 313 Total 23.0 77.0 100.0
Table 1: Sample Hospital Characteristics 
 
6.1 Parameter Estimates and Cost Efficiency 
 
We used the translog cost function in this study. We tested and rejected the functional 
form for constant return to scale in quantity output (yY) using an F-test (Test Statistics = 
5.776, upper tail area = .00016), and similarly the Cobb Douglas cost function (Test 
Statistics = 5.432, upper tail area = .00029). Our frontier model has high R-square 
(0.8764) and adjusted R-square (0.8711), but many parameter estimates are not 
statistically significant. The result is symptomatic of the multicollinearity problem as we 
expected. In fact, the conditional number is 5375. Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) 
suggest that condition numbers larger than 30 indicate serious multicollinearity, while 
numbers larger than 100 imply severe multicollinearity. [The famous Longley dataset 
(Longley, 1967) has condition number 43,275]. Multicollinearity is a problem when we 
are interested in parameters estimates, but is of lesser concern when we wish to obtain 
cost efficiency.  
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Using Sheppard’s lemma, cost share ln
ln ln lni i ii i
w w xC C
i i ij j mn nw C w CS a a w g y∂ ∂∂ ∂= = = = + ∑ + ∑  
where i=L,M for hospital labor (L) and physician labor (M). For the hospital labor cost 
share, the regression for the stochastic frontier provides the parameter estimates for aij 
and gmn. Actual data for lnwi and lnyj are than substituted into the cost share equation to 
derive the estimated cost share. The procedure for physician labor cost share is similar 
except that the regression for the stochastic frontier does not provide the parameter 
estimates directly. These parameter estimates are derived from the imposed restrictions of 
symmetry and homogeneity in input prices. The estimated cost shares for hospital labor 
and physician labor are positive for all the hospitals. Therefore, the cost function is 
monotonic in inputs. 
 
The estimated output parameters for DRG weighted discharge ( ˆYb =0.15) and inverse of 
surgical complication ( Aˆb = 0.45) are positive but not statistically significant. However, 
the estimated parameter for inverse of RAMI is negative ( ˆ
Db = -1.21). To evaluate the 
monotonicity in output, the cost function is differentiated with respect to the outputs to 
obtain lnln ln ln ln * ii
y
i ii i j ij j i Cij
C
y b b y b y g w MC∂∂ = + + + =∑∑ . Using the estimated parameters 
(bi, bii, bij, and gij) and actual data (lnyi and lnwj), the (estimated) marginal cost for each 
output in each hospital is obtained. It turns out that the marginal costs for DRG-weighted 
discharges and inverse of surgical complication are positive in all the hospitals. The 
marginal cost for the inverse of RAMI is negative for all the hospitals (see Appendix H). 
The DRG-weighted discharge is expected to have positive marginal cost, but there is no a 
priori information about the cost elasticity of care quality. The result for the inverse of 
RAMI is consistent with the findings of Neuhauser (1971), Shortell, Becker and 
Neuhauser (1976), and Longest (1978). We can speculate about the plausible reason that 
the care quality indicators have opposite marginal costs: Physicians facing product 
uncertainty and seriously ill patients prefer aggressive treatment than doing nothing. 
Some treatments are beneficial, some are useless, and some are even harmful. For the 
physician, saving life is the highest priority.87 However, heroic attempts often only delay 
                                                 
87 A common guide for emergency room practice is to “save life, save (bodily) function and then save 
limb” in that order of priority. 
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death and increase cost. On the other hand, the inverse of surgical complication rate is 
associated with low cost. This result is consistent with Scott, Forrest and Brown (1976) 
implying it is costly to deliver quality. 
 
Bilodeau, Cremieux and Ouellette (2000) report checking the curvature of their cost 
function by calculating the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix with respect to inputs and 
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Output Hessian Matrix 
 
The input Hessian is negative definite and only depends on the value of aLL . This matrix 
is actually singular (i.e. determinant =0) because we have imposed homogeneity in input 
prices. Both matrices are symmetrical because we have imposed the symmetry conditions. 
The first, second and third leading principle minors of the output matrix are -0.295, -0.031, 
-0.008 respectively. Hence, the output Hessian is negative definite (and hence negative 
semi-definite). The concavity conditions are satisfied in the cost function.  
 
We used the log likelihood ratio test to check on the joint restrictions of parameters 
symmetry and homogenous in input prices. We estimated the unrestricted cost function 
(i.e. Equation 1) by maximum likelihood and recovered the log likelihood from TSP as L0. 
We then repeated the procedure with the restricted cost function (i.e. Equation 2) and 
recovered L1. The test statistics is TS= -2(lnL0 – lnL1)~χ2 with 13 degree of freedom. Our 
test statistic is 39.83 > 22.36 (critical value at 5%). Hence, the restrictions are 
reasonable88. 
                                                 
88 Note that we are using a single equation and not an equation system of cost and cost shares. This choice 
(to avoid the Greene’s problem) precludes the possibility of estimating the unrestricted cost function 
without imposing the symmetry condition. For clarity, estimating y=f(.)+aijxixj+ajixjxi will produce 
y=f(.)+bijxixj. This is because xixj= xjxi mathematically, and regressing both variables will produce the 
perfect multicollinearity problem. The homogeneity in input prices is a joint restriction, and it is not 
possible to implement restriction on each input price individually (see Berndt (1991) p. 469 for detail), i.e. 
the joint restrictions imposed are: The sum of the input parameters equals one, and parameters for the cross 
products of inputs-outputs are zero.    
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Our most important result from the cost frontier is the cost efficiency in each hospital. 
The mean cost efficiency is 87.4% (median = 87.8%), the standard deviation is 3.6%, and 
the range is 75.8% to 95.4%. The efficiency scores are comparable to most recent studies 
using stochastic cost frontier such as Patel, Needleman and Zechauser (1994), Sloan, 
Taylor, Picone and Chou (1998), Zuckerman, Hadley and Iezzoni (1994). A histogram of 















Figure 1: Histogram of Cost Efficiency in Sample Hospitals 
 
6.2 Results for Hypotheses Testing  
 
Our results show that the 29 nonprofit FIOs have higher mean cost efficiency (0.876 
versus 0.857) than the 83 nonprofit network hospital (p-value=0.028). The p-value 
denotes the chance of Type 1 error for rejecting the hypothesis that the mean efficiency 
score is the same. This is a one tail test because the alternate hypothesis is: the first mean 
is higher than the second. The nonprofit FIO also have higher efficiency (0.876 versus 
0.853) than the 129 nonprofit segregate hospitals (p-value=0.040). Holmstrom (1982) 
argues that a budget breaking incentive scheme can overcome problem of shirking when 




Our results show that physician hospital integration does not increase the cost efficiency 
in for-profit sector. Specifically, the mean efficiency of two for-profit FIOs in our sample 
is 0.879, the mean efficiency of 23 for-profit network hospitals is 0.891 (p-value=0.729 
for comparing for-profit FIOs and network hospitals), and the mean efficiency of 47 for-
profit segregate hospitals is 0.891 (p-value=0.733 for comparing for-profit FIOs and 
segregate hospitals). These are two-tail tests because the (common) alternate hypothesis 
is: the first mean is the same as the second mean. Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) argue that 
the principal in the for-profit firm faces moral hazard problem herself. She can gain 
higher profit by offering higher payoff to one of the agents in the team so that the team 
will miss the team bonus. We find empirical support for this hypothesis (H2). We view 
this hypothesis jointly with the first one as a control. Integration improves cost efficiency 
in the absence of principal moral hazard, but the effect disappears when the principal’s 
profit incentive comes into the picture.  
 
The next question is: what will happen if the principal cannot implement a budget 
breaking scheme? This scenario happens in network and segregate hospital because 
physicians are not hospital employees. Arrow (1963) argues that the physician-patient 
relation is society’s answer to the inherent uncertainty in medical care. Therefore, 
physicians and hospitals are separate legal entities (and financially independent) to ensure 
physicians act in the patients’ best interests. The physician-patient relation prevents 
(segregate) hospitals from providing direct financial incentive (let alone a budget 
breaking one) to physicians, driving the Medical Arms Race among hospitals in the 
1970s. Managed care organization in network hospital may provide financial incentive to 
physician via selective contracting. Physicians remain as independent professionals and 
some are medical staff for several hospitals. Managed care organizations therefore 
administer incentive (if any) to the individual hospital or physician, but not to both as a 
group. Although incentive payments are made, receiving the bonus does not depend on 
the team’s performance (it depends on the individual’s performance). Hence, the 
mechanism that Holmstrom describes does not occur in this case. Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) argue that monitoring is a plausible mechanism for firms to be efficient. Frech 
(1976) argues that for-profit firms are more efficient because there is a clear residual 
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claimant. Our analysis differs from most analyses in the current literature by excluding 
FIOs where budget breaking mechanism can influence efficiency.  
 
From the results, the 23 for-profit network hospitals, with mean efficiency 0.891, are 
more cost efficient than the 83 nonprofit network hospitals in our sample, with mean 
efficiency 0.856, (p-value=0.000). In addition, the 47 for-profit segregate hospitals, with 
mean efficiency 0.891, are also more efficient than the 129 nonprofit segregate hospitals 
with mean efficiency 0.853, (p-value=0.000). Therefore, we find evidence to support the 
property rights theory (H3).  
 
An interesting question remains unanswered: the team agency theory predicts that 
nonprofit FIOs are more efficient than for-profit ones, but the property rights theory 
predicts just the opposite. When two forces act in opposite directions, the comparative 
static will depend on the relative strength of the forces. Our result shows that the mean 
efficiency in nonprofit FIO (0.876) is statistically similar to for-profit FIO (0.879). The 
hypothesis of equal efficiency has a p-value=0.916. We argue that budget breaking and 
monitoring mechanisms are not mutually exclusive in this case.89 After all, firms that 
administer bonus scheme often monitor their employees. 
 
6.3 Review of Research Validity 
 
According to Trochim (2000), we can review the validity of research from four angles: 
internal validity (research design), external validity (inference), constructs validity 
(measurement) and conclusion validity (assumption).  
 
6.3.1 Internal Validity 
 
Internal validity relates to the ability of the research to infer causal relationship. Cook and 
Campbell (1979) state that we can infer causal relation by satisfying three conditions: 
                                                 
89 The groups have equal incentive for monitoring in hypotheses 1 and 2; the groups in hypothesis 3 cannot 
administer a budget breaking incentive; the groups in the current situation can do both.  
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temporal precedence, correlation, and the absence of alternate explanation. Controlled 
experiment has the strongest internal validity. Our research question does not allow us to 
administer treatment effect (such as ownership or organizational form) to the hospital and 
hence precludes true experiment. The second best alternative is the natural experiment for 
hospital conversion and compare ex ante with ex post efficiency. There are two possible 
variations here. The hospital acts as its own control for other factors which may influence 
cost efficiency in the first variation. However, a hospital changing organizational 
structure can take a long time to stabilize. In the interim, environmental shocks can 
influence the hospital’s cost efficiency. There are also fewer samples in this case than 
observing a cross section of hospitals. Small sample size, especially in for-profit FIOs, 
produces the risk of obtaining an empty group. Measuring cost efficiency is also less 
reliable with stochastic frontier (and DEA) using small sample size. In the second 
variation, a matched pair is used as control to avoid the problem of environmental shocks. 
However, there is no sensible way in choosing matched pairs. Halving the sample size in 
the matched pair method increases the chance of missing groups.  
 
Our most feasible choice is to use a correlation design (which is also the most common in 
empirical analysis of hospital cost efficiency). The tradeoff in this decision is the inability 
to establish the temporal precedence of effects because independent variables cannot be 
manipulated. This disadvantage increases the risk of alternative explanation in causing 
the observed effect. Eliminating teaching and government hospitals from our sample 
reduces this risk. Although correlation alone cannot prove a theory, the lack of the 
expected correlation can refute it. We have falsifiable hypotheses to test the application 
of team agency theory to the research question. There is a need to replicate this research 
with other research methodologies to prove the robustness of the application. 
 
6.3.2 External Validity 
 
How valid is our conclusion outside our sample? We started with a census of over 6,000 
U.S. hospitals, obtained 729 usable ones derived from stratified random sampling, and 
finally used 313 hospitals to test our hypotheses. The external validity of our result 
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depends on whether the 313 hospitals are representative U.S. hospitals. Due to the data 
limitation for casemix, we compared our sample with the 729 usable data on dimensions 
which may affect cost or cost efficiency: bed size, average length of stay, occupancy, 
geography, integration, and ownership and casemix.90 Since the 729 usable hospitals are 
derived from rigorous stratified sampling to represent 20% of U.S. community hospitals, 
establishing comparable characteristics to this (reference) group ensure certain level of 
external validity. We tabulate the results as follows: 
 
Characteristics Reference (N=729) Sample (N=313) P-values 
Mean Bed Size 196 154 0.000*** 
Mean Length of Stay (Days) 7.80 6.98 0.205 
Mean Occupancy (%) 56.7 54.5 0.060* 
Nonprofit hospital % 80.8% 77.2% 0.216 
Integrated hospital % 14% 10.8% 0.177 
Region (1-9)* (See Text) (See Text) 0.998 
Casemix (MDC Level)* (See Text) (See Text) 1.000 
Table 2: Comparison of Sample and Reference Population 
 
Our sample hospitals have significantly less beds than the reference population. This is 
due to the elimination of teaching hospitals which tend to have more beds. There is no 
significant difference in the length of stay, although the occupancy rate in the sample is 
lower. There is no statistically significant difference in the composition of nonprofit or 
integrated hospitals between the sample and reference populations. These p-values are 
calculated from t-statistics. We tested the sample-reference hospital differences for 
geographical regions and casemix at two levels. For geographical region, we first 
calculated the t-statistics for the difference in proportion between the sample and 
reference population in each of the nine geographic regions. The proportions of sample 
and reference hospitals in each region are not significantly different (p-values ranges 
from 0.339 to 0.927). We then calculated the χ2 using the sample hospital as observed 
data and reference hospital as expected result for all nine regions. The p-value = 0.998. 
These results show no statistical difference in geography between the sample and 
                                                 
90 Bed size may influence the economy of scale; treatment aggressiveness may affect the length of stay; 
occupancy rate affects the average fixed cost; geography may affect wage rates, and HCFA payment allows 
for geographic adjustment; we argue that integration and ownership influence cost efficiency in this 
dissertation; casemix affect cost. We leave out teaching status.   
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reference hospitals for each region and as a whole. We used the same procedure to 
analyze casemix at the MDC (major disease classification for the DRG system) level. The 
proportion of digestive disorder cases (MDC 6) in the sample hospitals is statically 
smaller than the reference hospitals (p-value=0.042). The proportion of alcohol/drug 
induced mental disorder (MDC 20) cases is also lower in the sample hospitals than 
reference hospitals (p-value=0.022). The low proportion of the MDC 20 cases arose from 
eliminating public hospitals that treat most of the mental disorder cases. There was no 
obvious reason for the digestive disorder cases (MDC 6). From the result of χ2 test, 
casemix difference between sample and reference population at the joint level is not 
statistically different. Overall, our sample is comparable to the reference, and hence the 
population of private U.S. community hospital. 
 
 
6.3.3 Construct Validity 
 
Classifying hospitals into for-profit or nonprofit is unambiguous. When a hospital reports 
both an integrated model and a network model (e.g. a salary model and also an 
independent physician association, IPA), establishing if the hospital has an employment 
relationship with the specialist physicians is less obvious. There are two possibilities. 
First, the hospital may hire specialists and form an IPA with primary care physicians who 
refer patients to the specialists. In this case, the hospital remains as a FIO because the 
primary care physicians do not admit patients to the hospital. Second, the hospital may 
hire some specialists and form an IPA with more specialists and primary care physicians. 
These hybrid hospitals were removed from our sample unless we established the first 
scenario was true. We did not remove all the hybrid hospitals to conserve the number of 
observations. We also removed all the hybrid hospitals and re-tested the hypotheses. The 
results remain unchanged. 
 
The main threat to construct validity is the measurement of cost efficiency. The 
calculation of the dependent variable (VC) requires three approximations. First, we 
subtracted physician salary from the total cost by a quantity Q= FTE*average wage. FTE 
is the number of physician full-time-equivalent in the salary and equity models. Average 
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wage is the specialty weighted average physician salary in each state, or the national 
weighted mean for some states.  This measure is unbiased because of the Law of Large 
Number, but is statistically noisy. Second, the market value of physician inputs is added 
back. The mapping of one code system to another (i.e. cross-walking) which involved 
many-to-many relations is required in this step. The reliability of the measure is reduced 
by the complicated mapping process. Third, the capital cost is added back as the sum of 
interest and depreciation expenses. This measure of fixed cost can vary systematically 
with the ownership type and location of the hospitals. These three sources of errors are 
expected to be uncorrelated. The other acute measurement problem is the calculation of 
the physician input price (more accurately the shadow price). The noise in the calculation 
of the market values of physician services is carried over to the physician input price. The 
second source of noise in the physician input price is the use of nursing full time 
equivalent to proxy for physician. The physician input prices are expected to be noisy 
because physician/nurse ratio can vary by clinical specialty. Nevertheless, using the 
nursing full-time-equivalent is more reliable than the reported number of physicians. This 
is because the reported number of physicians means very different things: the number of 
specialist physicians who can admit patient in integrated models; the number of primary 
care and specialist physicians (many with admitting privileges in several hospitals) in 
network hospitals; zero in the segregate hospitals. Our regression parameter for physician 
wage is not significant. 
 
Strong multicollinearity is another measurement issue. The parameter estimates remain 
unbiased but inferences using the parameter are imprecise. Fortunately, this problem does 
not affect the cost efficiency measure if the cost frontier is specified correctly. Our 
counter-measures to mitigate the effects of potential measurement errors are to use the 
stochastic frontier (instead of data envelopment analysis) and remove outliers using the 
hat matrix. Our counter-measure for possible specification error in the cost kernel is to 




6.3.4 Conclusion Validity 
 
The conclusion validity rest on the assumptions we made in the empirical strategy. We 
assumed a stable technical relationship exists in hospital production which allows the 
specification of a cost function. The results show that our cost frontier is monotonic in 
inputs and (most) outputs, concave, and conform to restrictions in parameter symmetry 
and homogeneity in input prices. However, the mortality measure (RAMI) is not 
monotonic in output because of the special characteristics of the hospital industry 
(physician should commit infinite resource to reduce mortality). Otherwise, the cost 
function is reasonably well behaved. 
 
We made a strong assumption that the composed error was normal-half normal. This is a 
tradeoff between the risk of specification error and econometric tractability. Using panel 
data techniques circumscribe the need for specifying a distribution structure for the 
efficiency term, but introduce new problems: the assumption of time-invariant firm 
effects in fixed effect model, and the problem of error-parameter independence in the 
random effect model. In the context of the hospital market, there is no clear preference 
about assumptions for error specification, time invariance and efficiency-parameter 
independence. We acknowledge the limitation of our specifications and shall leave the 




This final chapter concludes the research question in the context of existing research. We 
shall explain how the result can contribute to theory, policy and managerial practices. 
Finally, we shall identify areas which require further investigations. 
 
7.1 Conclusions about Research Problem 
 
Our result shows the empirical evidence in the nonprofit hospital to support Holmstrom 
(1982) hypothesis: Administering a budget breaking incentive scheme to the production 
team can overcome moral hazard (i.e. shirking) when individual effort cannot be metered. 
This effect disappears in the for-profit hospital where the principal’s moral hazard 
problem arises (maximizing the residual is not socially optimal). The result extends the 
research if for-profit hospitals are indeed more efficient than nonprofit ones by adding an 
integration dimension. However, we cannot administer the budget breaking incentive in 
network and segregate hospital. In the absence of this effect, we find that for-profit 
hospitals are more efficient than nonprofit ones. An indeterminate situation arises when 
comparing FIOs where the theory of property rights and team agency predict opposite 
effects. We find no difference in cost efficiency in this case. 
 
7.2 Implications for Theory and Research 
 
The research on the relative cost efficiency of for-profit and nonprofit U.S hospitals in 
the 1980s has reached consensus by the late 1990s. Heightened competition in the 
hospital market would eliminate any difference which might exist. At the same time, the 
increased competition in the market produces new organizational alliances that attracted 
the attention of researchers. Are these new alliances more cost efficient? Why? Cuellar 
and Gertler (2006) examine whether these alliances exercise market power to raise price 
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without improving care quality. They find that “integration” in the network setting is 
about exercising market power and not about the gain from transaction economies. They 
also find that FIO is different. We believe their FIO sample comprises mostly nonprofit 
hospitals, and their result is related to our first hypothesis.91 Our rationale for the cost 
efficiency gain arise from reducing agency cost (a form of transaction cost), the pro-
competitive mechanism highlighted in Varney (1995) healthcare antitrust speech. We 
have introduced team agency to enrich the analysis of the relative cost efficiency in the 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. There is a clear trend for physician hospital integration 
in the 1990s. However, the empirical research on the relative efficiency of these 
integrated organizations (e.g. Wang, Wan, Clement and Begun, 2000) requires a 
theoretical framework for support. 
 
We have specified the hospital cost function differently from most analyses. First, we 
examine the theoretical literature on hospitals (Newhouse, 1970; Pauly and Redisch, 
1973; Harris, 1977) and conclude that we need to include the physician components in 
cost and input. Second, we rely on Arrow (1963) to argue that the hospital’s output is 
really patient care, which needs quantity and quality as joint proxies. 92 The structural 
cost function is appealing if we can accommodate variables that affect cost (This is the 
motivation for the paper by Granneman et al). For the restricted group of hospitals 
excluding teaching and government hospitals, we have bridged part of the gap between 
theoretical framework and empirical specification of the hospital cost function. 
 
7.3 Implications for Policy  
 
In this dissertation, we apply agency theory to predict that nonprofit hospitals are more 
cost efficient if they integrate, but the effect is absent in for-profit hospitals. Our results 
support these predictions. Increasing cost efficiency is welfare enhancing, and we 
identify the source of this efficiency in agency cost. Federal Trade Commissioner Varney 
                                                 
91 However, our measure of efficiency was different from Cuellar and Gertler (2006). 
92 Newhouse (1980) also sees physician as jointly maximizing quantity and quality in hospital production. 
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says in 1995: “… the greatest pro-competitive, efficiency-enhancing benefits are those 
that selectively contract so that they can control costs by ensuring that providers have the 
strongest incentive not to over treat or over utilize”. Therefore, physician hospital 
integration in the nonprofit sector is more likely to generate efficiency enhancing effects 
than integration in the for-profit sector.  
 
7.4 Areas for Further Research 
 
The areas for further research arise from the limitations of this study. First, the small 
number of integrated for-profit hospitals weakens our result. Using an expanded data set 
can overcome this problem. The national inpatient sample expanded from 22 states in 
1997, to 33 states in 2001. Second, cross section data, fixed effect model and random 
effect model have their own tradeoffs. There is a need to apply different techniques to 
confirm the result is robust. Third, the correlation design has weaker internal validity than 
natural experiment. There is yet any reported research which use natural experiments of 
organizational conversion to verify our hypothesis. Duke University (2002) reported to 
have used cross section comparison and natural experiment to examine the effects of 
ownership conversion. Examining our proposition at the organizational level, especially 
for hybrid form, by using the case research method can provide insight for firm level 
“micro-factor” which can influence organizational cost efficiency. Case research method 
complements industry study: the former is weaker in external validity because the firm 
level driver may not generalize to other firm; the latter is weaker in internal validity 
because many firm level factors are not captured. 
 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This research extends the property rights view that for-profit hospitals are more cost 
efficient than nonprofit ones. This is the first research we know that uses the team agency 
theory to explain cost efficiency differences among hospitals. As more and more U.S. 
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hospitals start to “integrate” physicians as alliances or employees, there is a need to bring 
theoretical insight in analyzing cost efficiency of these new organizational forms. This 
research is a first step in this direction and replication with other methods is needed to 
confirm the robustness of the result. Section 6.3 explains the threats to the research 
validities and our counter-measures. Despite the difficult measurement issues, we have 
obtained a reasonably “true and fair” view of the research question.  
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Appendix A: Summary of Notations and Symbols. 
 
The notations and symbols used in this dissertation are similar to most econometric 
textbooks, especially Berndt (1991). In general, lower case denotes function or variable 
and upper case specify input/output. For example, f(.) denotes production function; w 
denotes input price and K denote capital stock. The subscript enables the variable to 
become specific. For example, wL denotes wage or input price of labor. The derivate is 
denoted with superscript and subscript when we have simple terms. For example, fL' 
means first derivative of the production function with respect to labor input, i.e. the 
marginal product of labor. There is also a convention in the coefficients of the functional 
forms. The intercept is always a0. In the translog form, the coefficient for input is ai (i≠0), 
output coefficient is bi, and the cross products coefficients are aij, bij and gij respectively 
for cross products of inputs, outputs and mixture of both. In regression, the subscripts 
make the coefficients intuitive, especially for cross products. The following is a listing of 
the notations and symbols used in this thesis:  
 
f(.)  Production Function 
t(.) Transformation Function, the multi-product production function 
c(.) Cost Function, minimize cost subject to f(.) 
h(.) Input Aggregator Function 
g(.) Output Aggregation Function 
y Output Quantity 
p Output Price 
q Quantity 
x Input Quantity 
w Input Price 
θ  Constant 
K Capital 
L Labor 
M Medical Labor (i.e. physician) 
D Death Rate (i.e. risk adjusted mortality index) 
A Adverse Reaction (i.e. complication rate) 
Y Aggregate Hospital Output 
S Share Equation 
s Elasticity of Scale 
σ Allen’s Elasticity of Substitution or Standard Deviation 
∆ Discrete difference of two quantities 
fL' First derivative of f with respect to L i.e. ∂f/∂L 
fL" Second derivative of f with respect to L i.e. ∂2f/∂2L 
e Composed Error Term (also known as composite error) 
v Random Error Term (i.e. white noise) 
u One-sided Error Term (i.e. related to efficiency measure) 
η Error Term for Cost share/Input  demand in equation system 
λ Ratio of σu 2/ σv2 
E[.] Expected Value (i.e. mean) 
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var(.) or σ2 Variance 
∑ Multivariate covariance matrix 
z(.) Probability density function 
φ(.) Standard Normal Function 
Φ(.) Standard Cumulative Normal 
 
The following are abbreviations used in this dissertation in alphabetical order 
 
AHA American Hospital Association 
AHRQ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
AMA American Medical Association 
AUTOGRP A bio-statistical package/grouper 
BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics, a government agency 
COLS Corrected Ordinary Least Square 
CPT, CPT4 Common Procedural Terminology, CPTE denotes 4th version 
DEA Data Envelopment Analysis 
DRG Diagnosis Related Group 
FTE Full Time Equivalent 
GLS Generalized Least Square 
GPWW Group Practice without Wall 
HCFA Healthcare Financing Administration, renamed as CMS 
HCPCS HCFA Common Procedure Coding System 
HMO Health Maintenance Organization 
ICD9CM International Classification of Disease, version 9, Clinical Modification 
ISM Integrated Salary Model 
JCAH Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals 
LSDV Least Square Dummy Variable 
MAR Medical Arms Race 
MLE Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
MOLS Modified Ordinary Least Square 
MRI  Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
MSO Management Service Organization 
NIS National Inpatient Sample 
OLS Ordinary Least Square 
PHO Physician Hospital Organization 
PPS Prospective Payment System 
RAMI Risk Adjusted Mortality Index 
RB-RVS Resource Based Relative Value System 
SID States Inpatient Database 
SUR Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
TSP Time Series Processor, an econometric program 
VA Veteran Affairs 
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Appendix B: Hospitals in the United States 
 
 1980 1990 2000 
Industry Capacity 
Hospitals (Beds) 
6,965 (1,364,516) 6,649 (1,213,327) 5,810 (983,628)



















Bed Size Distribution 
6-199 Beds 
200-499 Beds 
































































































% Outpatient Surgery 16.3 50.5 62.7
* Community hospital includes all but Federal hospitals 
Source: US DHSS, Health United States 2003 (Table 95, 106) 
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Appendix C: Mean Physician Wage from Bureau of Labor Statistics 58 
 
  Number of Physician Mean Physician Salary 
States Internist OBGYN Pediatrician Psychiatrist Surgeon Internist OBGYN Pediatrician Psychiatrist Surgeon Mean
Arizona 770 0 110 90 210 114,170 140,870 121,720 90,700 127,510 115,458
California 2,870 1,110 1,600 1,530 2,470 131,390 137,170 84,550 110,160 121,170 118,211
Colorado* 48,740 18,780 18,940 17,870 48,450 123,280 135,430 112,760 103,660 135,660 125,100
Connecticut 500 490 330 NA 1,560 124,520 134,280 96,100 NA 133,420 127,745
Florida 2,560 2,090 1,490 450 2,060 132,710 145,020 122,640 119,100 143,310 135,766
Georgia NA NA 120 140 NA 127,650 134,880 104,980 114,980 NA 110,365
Illinois 960 NA 580 690 3,510 96,740 NA 87,040 94,650 106,890 101,715
Iowa* 48,740 18,780 18,940 17,870 48,450 123,280 135,430 112,760 103,660 135,660 125,100
Kansas NA 190 NA 80 NA 110,440 138,680 NA 122,990 145,520 134,031
Maryland NA 560 NA 430 NA 115,750 104,300 93,130 110,610 144,640 107,041
Massachusetts NA 380 610 330 NA 126,810 139,480 101,310 102,630 140,710 112,628
Missouri 1,010 200 340 530 540 116,870 111,150 119,660 114,360 143,700 121,818
New Jersey NA NA NA 280 5,560 NA 131,730 NA 112,210 137,320 136,116
New York 3,570 1,200 1,570 2,360 3,320 100,400 141,100 113,680 111,910 130,650 116,813
Oregon 48,740 18,780 18,940 17,870 48,450 123,280 135,430 112,760 103,660 135,660 125,100
Pennsylvania* 3,950 530 880 1,310 2,270 128,800 138,300 117,520 110,020 139,140 128,126
South Carolina 390 250 120 220 1,020 136,660 123,900 119,330 95,330 138,830 130,586
Tennessee 1,460 580 570 NA 1,780 129,940 143,390 104,780 NA 143,640 134,005
Utah 260 150 270 NA 230 124,730 130,830 107,400 NA 124,090 120,432
Washington 2,750 NA NA 710 1,100 135,850 140,720 117,370 86,450 138,420 128,778
Wisconsin 1,070 70 250 NA 270 140,260 128,170 119,390 NA 140,250 136,605
_____________________________ 
 
58 We denote some data as NA (Not Available) because either they are not available to BLS, or the standard errors are too large. If these occur, 
we do include the missing category to compute the mean (last column). In some states, the * denote the use of US average because the data are 
not available at the state level.
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Appendix D: Complication List in Desharnais et al (1988) 
 
SN ICD9CM Description 
1 2513 Post-surgical hypo-insulinemia 
2 3490 Lumbar puncture reaction 
3 3491 Central nervous system complication from surgically implanted device 
4 47830 Vocal cord paralysis unspecified 
5 47831 Vocal cord paralysis unilateral partial 
6 47832 Vocal cord paralysis unilateral total 
7 47833 Vocal cord paralysis unilateral partial 
8 47834 Vocal cord paralysis bilateral total 
9 5070 Food / Vomit pneumonitis 
10 5304 Perforation of esophagus 
11 65930 Septicemia in labor 
12 66800 Pulmonary complication in delivery unspecified 
13 66802 Pulmonary complication - delivered with postpartum complications 
14 66804 Pulmonary complication postpartum 
15 66880 Anesthetic complication delivery episode of care unspecified 
16 66881 Anesthetic complication delivery [not] mentioned ante partum condition 
17 66882 Anesthetic complication delivered with postpartum complication mentioned 
18 66883 Anesthetic complication ante partum 
19 66884 Anesthetic complication ante partum 
20 66890 Unspecified anesthetic complication delivery episode of care unspecified 
21 66891 
Unspecified anesthetic complication delivery [not] mentioned ante partum 
condition 
22 66892 Unspecified anesthetic delivered with postpartum complication mentioned 
23 66893 Unspecified anesthetic complication ante partum 
24 66894 Unspecified anesthetic complication postpartum 
25 66912 Obstetric shock - delivered with postpartum complications mentioned 
26 66914 Obstetric shock - with postpartum complications 
27 66930 Acute renal failure with delivery episode of care unspecified 
28 66932 Acute renal failure delivered with postpartum complications 
29 66934 Acute renal failure postpartum 
30 67002 Major puerperal infection - delivered with postpartum complication 
31 67004 Major puerperal infection with postpartum complication 
32 67300 Obstetrical air embolism episode of care unspecified 
33 67302 Obstetrical air embolism delivered with postpartum complication 
34 67304 Obstetrical air embolism postpartum complication 
35 67400 Cerebrovascular disorders in the puerperium episode of care unspecified 
36 67402 Cerebrovascular disorders delivered with postpartum complication 
37 67404 Cerebrovascular disorders postpartum complications 
38 67410 Disruption of cesarean wound unspecified 
39 67412 Disruption of cesarean wound delivered with postpartum complications 
40 67420 Disruption of perineal wound unspecified 
41 67422 Disruption of perineal wound delivered with postpartum complications 
42 67424 Disruption of perineal wound delivered with postpartum 
43 67512 Breast abscess delivered with postpartum complications 
44 9954 Shock due to anesthesia 
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SN ICD9CM Description 
45 9970 Surgical complication - central nervous system 
46 9971 Surgical complication - heart 
47 9972 Surgical complication - Peripheral vascular system 
48 9973 Surgical complication - respiratory system 
49 9974 Surgical complication - gastrointestinal tract 
50 9975 Surgical complication - urinary tract 
51 99762 Infection amputation stump 
52 9979 Surgical complication - other specified body systems 
53 9980 Postoperative shock 
54 9981 Hemorrhage complicating a procedure 
55 9982 Accidental laceration during a procedure 
56 9983 Postoperative wound disruption 
57 9984 Foreign body left during a procedure 
58 9985 Postoperative infection 
59 9986 Persistent postoperative fistula 
60 9987 Postoperative foreign substance reaction 
61 9988 Other specified surgical complication 
62 9989 Other surgical complication unspecified 
63 9991 Air embolism following medical care 
64 9992 Other vascular complication following medical care 
65 9993 Other infection as a complication of medical care 
66 9994 Anaphylactic shock - serum 
67 9995 Other serum reaction 
68 9996 ABO incompatibility reaction 
69 9997 Rh. incompatibility reaction 
70 9998 Other transfusion reaction 
 
* Careful readers may notice some differences between Desharnais et al (1988) Appendix 
and the above. There is a correction of a typographic error in SN37, the ICD9CM code is 
67404 not 67402, i.e. the ICD9CM code in SN 36 and 37 are different. Some words are 
inserted in italics after examining the ICD9CM to ensure that the meanings are clear. 
Specifically, for four-digit codes 668.0 (pulmonary complications), 668.8 (Other 
complications of anesthesia or other sedation in labor and delivery) and 668.9 
(Unspecified complication of anesthesia and other sedation), the fifth-digit sub-
classification is (for use with categories 660-669) denotes the current episode of care: 0 
(unspecified as to episode of care or not applicable), 1 (delivered, with or without 
mention of ante partum condition), 2 (delivered, with mention of postpartum 
complication), 3 (ante partum condition or complication) and 4 postpartum condition or 
complication). 
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Appendix E: Proofs relating to μ∗  and σ∗2 
 
Let us define four identities: σ2 = σu2+σv2, λ=σu/σv, μ∗ = eσu2/σ2, σ*2= σu2σv2/σ2 
We wish to re-write μ* and σ*2 in terms of e, λ and σ, so that we can use the TSP result to 
calculate firm efficiency. We have: 
 
σ2 = σu2+σv2 ⇒  σv2 = σ2 − σu2……..(1) 
λ = σu /σv ⇒  σv= σu/λ .......................(2) 
 
Substitute (2) in (1) obtains σ2 = σu2+ (σu2/λ2) =σu2(1+1/λ2) 
⇒   σu2/σ2=λ2/(1+λ2) ....................(3) 
Therefore,  μi* = eλ2/(1+λ2) 
 
Next, σ∗ 2 = σu2σv2/σ2 
Substitute (1) in above obtains σ∗ 2 = σu2(σ2-σu2)/σ2 
Substitute (3) in above obtains σ∗2 =λ2/(1+λ2)∗(σ2- λ2σ2/(1+λ2)) 
 =λ2/(1+λ2)∗((1+λ2−λ2)/(1+λ2))σ2 =λ2σ2/(1+λ2)2 
 





Appendix F: TSP Program Code for Stochastic Frontier  
? This is batch file to run TSP. Any line starting with (?) is a remark 
line and will not be run.  
? Any line that ends (;) is recognized as (FORTRAN) command and will be 
executed. 
? 
OPTIONS CRT, MEMORY =8;  
READ (FILE=’INITIAL.WKS’) AHAID,HOSPID,VC,wL,wM,yK,yD,yA,yY; 
? 
? After reading the file, generate the variable. 
?  
? GENR Restricted Cost Frontier Variables,  
? NOTE: VCM and L differ from the Unrestricted Set 
? 
GENR VCM=LOG(VC/wM);  ? Note This 
GENR L=LOG(wL/wM); ? Note This 




GENR LL=0.5*L*L;   ? Note the factor of 0.5  






GENR KK=0.5*K*K;  ? Note the factor of 0.5  
GENR DD=0.5*D*D;   ? Note the factor of 0.5 
GENR AA=0.5*A*A;   ? Note the factor of 0.5 





GENR VCMY=VCM-Y ; 
? 
? Do functional form testing 
? 
TITLE ‘TEST CONSTANT RETURN TO SCALE IN YY’ ; 
OLSQ(SILENT)VCM 
C,L,K,D,A,Y,LL,KD,KA,KY,DA,DY,AY,KK,DD,AA,YY,LK,LD,LA,LY,MK,MD,MA,MY; 
SET SSRU=@SSR; SET DFU=@NOB-@NCID; 
OLSQ(SILENT) VCMY C,L,K,D,A,LL,KD,KA,DA,KK,DD,AA; 




TITLE ‘TEST COBB DOUGLAS FUNCTION’ ; 
OLSQ(SILENT)VCM 
C,L,K,D,A,Y,LL,KD,KA,KY,DA,DY,AY,KK,DD,AA,YY,LK,LD,LA,LY,MK,MD,MA,MY; 
SET SSRU=@SSR; SET DFU=@NOB-@NCID; 
OLSQ(SILENT) VCMY C,L,K,D,A,KD,KA,DA,KK,DD,AA; 




? OLS Restricted Cost Function, Identify Outlier, Conditional Number  
? 





GENER DINO=@HI/(@COEFF/@NOB);  
TITLE ‘WRITE OUTLIER WORKSHEET’; 
WRITE (FILE=USUAL.WKS) AHAID,@RES,DINO; 
? 
? 





MAT XPX = @VCOV";     ? @VCOV = @S2*(X'X)",XPX = X'X 
MAT D = (SQRT(DIAG(XPX)))"; 
MAT EVAL = EIGVAL(D'XPX*D); 





? Eliminate Outlier to get new data. Do stochastic frontier 
? See TSP user manual 9.6.4 
? 
? 
GENR VCM=LOG(VC/wM);  ? Note This 
GENR L=LOG(wL/wM); ? Note This 
GENR K=LOG(yK);  
GENR D=LOG(yD); 
GENR A=LOG(yA); 
GENR Y=LOG(yY);   
GENR LL=0.5*L*L;   ? Note the factor of 0.5  






GENR KK=0.5*K*K;  ? Note the factor of 0.5  
GENR DD=0.5*D*D;   ? Note the factor of 0.5 
GENR AA=0.5*A*A;   ? Note the factor of 0.5 












FRML FRONTP LOGL=LOG(2)+LOG(SIGI)+LNORM(E*SIGI)+LCNORM(E*LAMDA*SIGI); 
PARAM LAMDA,SIGI; 
EQSUB FRONTP RESID; 
REGOPT (PVPRINT STAR) T; 




SET SIGI=1/@S; LAMDA=1; 
ML(HITER=N)FRONTP; ?HITER=N FOR FAST CONVERGENCE 
? 
? Use Battese and Coelli (1988) Estimator 
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? 
GENR RESID @RES; ?Get @RES from ML, else will use OLSQ value 
SET @S=1/SIGI; 
GENR MUS=@RES*LAMDA**2/(1+LAMDA**2); ? SEE Appendix E 
SET SIGS=LAMDA/(SIGI*(1+LAMDA**2));  ? SEE Appendix E 
GENR U=LCNORM((MUS/SIGS)-SIGS)+(-MUS+0.5*SIGS**2)-LCNORM(MUS/SIGS); 
GNER CE=EXP(U); 
WRITE (FILE=FINALCE.WKS) HOSPID, AHAID, CE; 
? 
? 
TITLE ‘LOG LIKELIHOOD TEST OF RESTRICTION’; 
? 
? Run the restricted cost function first because already there.  











EQSUB FRONTP2 RESID2; 
SET SIGI2=1/@S; LAMDA2=1; 
ML(HITER=N)FRONTP2; ?HITER=N FOR FAST CONVERGENCE 
SET L0=@LOGL; PRINT L0; 
? 
? Need to GENR the variables again because some items are different 
? with the unrestricted form. 
? Symmetry will be imposed because A*B=B*A mathematically 
? 
GENR VC=LOG(VC); 
GENR L=LOG(wL);  
GENR M=LOG(wM); 















EQSUB FRONTP3 RESID3; 
SET SIGI3=1/@S; LAMDA3=1; 
ML(HITER=N)FRONTP3; ?HITER=N FOR FAST CONVERGENCE 










Appendix G: Stochastic Frontier Parameters 
 
 
DESCRIPTION Coefficient First Stage p-value Second Stage p-value
Constant A0 0.0925 0.966 0.0343 0.994 
Labor AL 0.9613 0.000*** 0.9642 0.000***
Capital BK 1.2558 0.056* 1.1675 0.225 
1/RAMI BD -1.3502 0.115 -1.2049 0.502 
1/Complication Rate  BA 0.4591 0.175 0.4539 0.312 
DRG weighted Discharge BY 0.1797 0.708 0.1501 0.934 
Labor cross product ALL -0.0612 0.350 -0.0560 0.376 
Capital*1/RAMI BKD 0.1943 0.179 0.1664 0.489 
Capital*1/Complication Rate  BKA -0.0226 0.691 -0.0195 0.757 
Capital*DRG weighted Discharge BKY -0.3656 0.005*** -0.3439 0.088* 
1/RAMI*1/Complication Rate BDA 0.1598 0.046** 0.1639 0.139 
1/RAMI*DRG weighted Discharge BDY 0.1180 0.368 0.0923 0.808 
1/Complication Rate*DRG weighted Discharge BAY -0.1008 0.176 -0.1043 0.297 
Capital cross product BKK 0.3810 0.014*** 0.3766 0.031** 
1/RAMI cross product BDD -0.3540 0.126 -0.2949 0.493 
1/Complication rate cross product BAA 0.0122 0.816 0.0151 0.779 
DRG weighted discharge cross product BYY 0.2382 0.000*** 0.2415 0.555 
Labor*Capital GLK 0.0454 0.456 0.0305 0.657 
Labor*1/RAMI GLD 0.0311 0.543 -0.0005 0.734 
Labor*1/Complication Rate GLA -0.0155 0.932 -0.0191 0.845 
Labor*DRG weighted discharge GLY -0.0435 0.548 0.0004 0.458 




2) SIGI - - 14.4884 0.000***




Appendix H: Marginal Costs  
 
The following table contains the calculated marginal costs for the 313 
hospitals in our sample. We report the marginal cost for quantity output 
as MCY and the cost elasticity of 1/RAMI as ED, and cost elasticity of 
1/(surgical complication) as EA. We can easily convert elasticity to 
marginal cost by: marginal cost = elasticity*VC/quality. Since we need 
to know only the sign of the marginal cost, checking the sign of the 
elasticity is sufficient. As it is hard to interpret a unit of the 
quality measures, the marginal costs are hard to interpret. For the 
quantity output (Y), we expect most marginal costs to exceed one for 
several reasons: (1) the cost captures physician component while the 
quantity does not (2) the cost captures outpatient component while the 
quantity does not. 
 
 
SN yD yA VC ED EA MCY 
1   0.5703    0.0800  158,474,514        0.93 -1.66995          3.63 
2   1.4538    0.0420    90,195,664        1.05 -1.53005          3.49 
3   1.3990    0.0437    37,453,736        0.45 -1.43228          3.38 
4   0.4056    0.0200    19,065,661        0.56 -1.48024          5.80 
5   1.7439    0.0392     76,459,886        0.83 -1.62499          4.80 
6   1.2372    0.0679    80,176,093        1.00 -1.79026          2.89 
7   1.4336    0.0282  124,678,871        0.66 -1.55209          4.55 
8   1.4737    0.0444    84,696,074        0.11 -1.26057          3.13 
9   0.4367    0.0456    24,006,694        1.07 -1.72497          7.72 
10   0.7708    0.0210    42,198,176        0.86 -1.59723          4.50 
11   1.3926    0.0718    23,737,445        0.47 -1.48977          4.43 
12   1.2596    0.0755  267,873,021        0.64 -1.47913          5.67 
13   1.5199    0.0318  115,526,140        0.46 -1.39606          5.52 
14   3.7483    0.0370    76,659,456        0.89 -1.57149          4.31 
15   1.6755    0.0769    76,451,108        0.88 -1.55342          4.89 
16   1.0457    0.0214    47,847,324        1.02 -1.65005          5.16 
17   1.3331    0.0782    75,860,409        1.02 -1.67732          3.01 
18   0.7292    0.0489    29,335,800        0.94 -1.61046          5.48 
19   0.5372    0.0384    17,382,482        0.68 -1.52939          5.42 
20   5.0237    0.0485  213,641,602        0.78 -1.65424          3.87 
21   0.9543    0.0231     32,597,682        1.03 -1.67636        10.20 
22   0.6977    0.0375    57,173,251        1.06 -1.68339          5.77 
23   1.6666    0.0516    74,182,636        0.99 -1.7044          3.03 
24   2.2712    0.0354    41,023,209        0.54 -1.44788          5.28 
25   1.3081    0.0508  102,934,316        0.90 -1.70441          2.39 
26   2.0683    0.0184  111,255,361        0.31 -1.4704          7.85 
27   0.7762    0.0448    43,167,761        0.81 -1.6136          3.60 
28   0.4070    0.0304    15,247,902        0.84 -1.69709          5.72 
29   1.4807    0.0272  353,744,328        0.60 -1.5387          7.26 
30   1.0569    0.0252    70,435,506        0.51 -1.43004           4.08 
31   0.9520    0.0720    33,827,314        0.99 -1.56872          4.48 
32   0.8500    0.0659    24,902,874        0.82 -1.63428          5.60 
33   1.9624    0.0570  186,412,627        0.74 -1.57509          2.48 
34    0.8723    0.0444    81,851,904        0.73 -1.47486          4.22 
35   1.1943    0.0454    83,639,661        0.75 -1.53984          5.02 
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SN yD yA VC ED EA MCY 
36   2.4952    0.0565    68,467,422        0.75 -1.52832          1.63 
37   0.5740    0.0745    77,246,501        1.22 -1.77695          3.10 
38   0.8397    0.0173  245,008,765        0.19 -1.32252          2.97 
39   0.8006    0.0337    50,445,586        1.04 -1.70375          3.23 
40   1.1337    0.0296     62,211,827        0.82 -1.58291          2.55 
41   1.2793    0.0386  212,800,460        1.13 -1.80204          2.97 
42   2.2822    0.0216  137,326,473        0.92 -1.75317          3.20 
43   1.6922    0.0965    16,233,001         0.72 -1.5738          2.45 
44   0.5473    0.0296  157,603,999        0.45 -1.36819          1.96 
45   0.6842    0.0213    28,040,675        0.58 -1.46868          4.88 
46   0.3629    0.0220    27,408,125        1.04 -1.6767          5.22 
47   1.4827    0.0205    40,418,546        0.43 -1.44401          4.42 
48   0.5802    0.0281    29,544,415        1.11 -1.69644          5.26 
49   1.8227    0.0574  152,811,651        0.53 -1.4942          3.57 
50   1.0928    0.0325    51,027,938        1.07 -1.71233          3.50 
51   0.5050    0.0084    14,840,393        0.68 -1.68712          6.77 
52   2.3964    0.0309    44,935,751        0.52 -1.46003          3.53 
53   1.1225    0.0568  188,635,764        0.63 -1.60697          1.93 
54   1.2287    0.0304    77,979,737        1.28 -1.77864          3.74 
55   0.3643    0.0321    29,086,849        0.95 -1.72879          2.25 
56   1.1204    0.0468    55,432,034        0.88 -1.71757          2.96 
57   0.6552    0.0408    79,762,616        0.63 -1.50289          2.27 
58   1.3101    0.0348    51,048,289        0.74 -1.46828          2.98 
59   1.0944    0.0517    41,436,619        0.83 -1.63124          4.79 
60   0.5917    0.0336    62,934,807        0.79 -1.6148          2.17 
61   0.4596    0.0273    26,660,429        1.69 -2.11186          2.31 
62   0.5846    0.1514  253,132,544        0.91 -1.81188          3.91 
63   0.8018    0.0137    27,015,749        0.90 -1.72561          4.66 
64   0.4799    0.1755    22,205,365        1.21 -1.79344          6.47 
65   1.1642    0.1077    44,066,176        1.07 -1.79731          3.82 
66   0.7949    0.0356  120,680,537        0.58 -1.43871          4.26 
67   1.3361    0.0324  217,362,484        0.24 -1.35093          4.85 
68   0.9845    0.0307  129,905,383        0.46 -1.39606          4.94 
69    0.4002    0.0549    29,589,753        0.97 -1.62779          5.51 
70   1.3430    0.0497  114,100,361        1.11 -1.6886          4.40 
71   1.1402    0.3760    20,689,820        0.92 -1.71346          6.08 
72   1.5786    0.0339    76,737,103        1.05 -1.7164          5.62 
73   0.6741    0.0277    78,916,419        0.95 -1.79711          5.62 
74   0.8635    0.0304    45,898,426        1.13 -1.77818          3.88 
75   1.0148    0.0367     65,530,908        1.10 -1.72662          4.28 
76   0.7634    0.0768    39,591,528        0.76 -1.55638          4.69 
77   0.9461    0.0403    24,888,803        0.84 -1.52829          5.68 
78   0.4715    0.0517  113,833,694        0.79 -1.53958          5.58 
79   0.7841    0.0303  155,026,761        0.93 -1.66222          4.21 
80   1.3203    0.0276  165,233,702        0.75 -1.5973          5.02 
81   0.8753    0.1824  166,264,057        1.05 -1.73901          4.36 
82   0.2003    0.0340    19,817,935        1.07 -1.69522          3.74 
83   1.5702    0.0204    18,535,898        0.82 -1.6129          3.19 
84   1.0232    0.0951    80,679,647        0.79 -1.65547           1.91 
85   0.7922    0.0484    39,167,663        0.61 -1.56275          2.32 
86   0.2092    0.0695    26,975,447        0.64 -1.4973          1.70 
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87   1.2881    0.0520  167,717,800        0.85 -1.7007          1.40 
88   1.0728    0.1029    41,949,518        0.82 -1.58636          1.15 
89   0.5603    0.0847    34,548,177        0.94 -1.58986          1.72 
90   1.9128    0.0469  331,136,650        0.48 -1.426          1.92 
91   1.5732    0.0782     35,206,573        0.55 -1.4348          2.10 
92   0.5726    0.0169    61,600,188        0.64 -1.44061          3.98 
93   0.3188    0.0320    29,374,571        0.46 -1.42602          1.96 
94   0.7001    0.0770    44,860,524        1.11 -1.77843          2.20 
95   7.2852    0.0349    31,529,587        0.75 -1.48582          1.77 
96   0.5311    0.0346    77,411,489        0.77 -1.54195          2.53 
97   0.5012    0.0371    70,224,305        1.21 -1.79929          1.23 
98   1.9936    0.0723    88,129,940        1.09 -1.78426          3.50 
99   0.8232    0.0421    61,782,849        0.87 -1.67004          2.14 
100   2.3839    0.0191  116,658,163        0.69 -1.56172          1.89 
101   0.2137    0.0194    20,461,760        0.71 -1.46792          2.51 
102   1.6449    0.0422    98,008,977        0.94 -1.70321          2.38 
103   0.5699    0.0414    94,378,095        1.20 -1.7526          1.26 
104   1.3406    0.0523    15,695,878        0.59 -1.54846          1.82 
105   0.6944    0.0253    63,139,100        0.85 -1.59501          2.01 
106   0.6386    0.0525    82,218,072        0.51 -1.56607          3.73 
107    0.6116    0.0271  241,419,174        0.44 -1.43474          3.01 
108   0.7764    0.0219  218,167,583        1.17 -1.81916          2.10 
109   2.1817    0.0451  151,082,478        0.10 -1.21298          1.79 
110   0.5757    0.0704    34,132,135        0.81 -1.70552          2.96 
111   0.3655    0.0445    61,279,231        0.95 -1.64426          1.59 
112   0.5947    0.0340    20,911,024        0.66 -1.53128          2.12 
113   0.5256    0.0553     25,032,570        0.64 -1.44528          2.26 
114   0.6819    0.0260  267,299,534        0.78 -1.30322          2.24 
115   1.1528    0.0227    76,444,000        0.76 -1.58053          1.27 
116   0.4577    0.0417    53,404,969        1.04 -1.67259          1.44 
117   0.9843    0.0396  220,582,187        0.82 -1.57849          2.63 
118   2.2904    0.0186    43,684,851        1.21 -1.62794          1.39 
119   2.6759    0.0491  161,766,725        0.70 -1.50416          2.25 
120   1.4471    0.0243  281,712,372        0.80 -1.52783          2.25 
121   4.1289    0.0249    62,301,764        0.75 -1.5254          1.94 
122   0.5835    0.0117    24,008,823        0.82 -1.4603          2.39 
123   0.1649    0.0171    17,953,668        0.89 -1.61879          1.49 
124   0.3373    0.0542    36,887,530        0.80 -1.50083          2.37 
125   0.7974    0.0313  693,911,465        0.87 -1.53622           2.05 
126   1.2160    0.0296    88,025,077        0.79 -1.60218          2.18 
127   0.6458    0.0400    45,098,960        0.57 -1.51934          1.70 
128   2.7378    0.0434    46,087,446        0.55 -1.446          1.48 
129    0.5104    0.0654    73,112,108        0.84 -1.57732          1.60 
130   0.6657    0.0231    56,470,327        1.03 -1.60894          1.36 
131   0.6469    0.0604    66,916,064        0.65 -1.51495          2.22 
132   1.8647    0.0354    37,566,652        0.42 -1.32096          2.01 
133   1.3013    0.0459    82,785,244        0.95 -1.6069          2.10 
134   1.2875    0.0371    99,700,533        0.76 -1.5614          1.48 
135   0.8958    0.0292     56,124,354        0.85 -1.59332          1.82 
136   0.9217    0.0435    37,228,499        0.74 -1.5199          1.53 
137   0.6643    0.0780    79,620,986        0.76 -1.52918          1.71 
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138   1.1392    0.0748  226,490,791        0.75 -1.5462          2.30 
139   1.3469    0.0175    58,634,790        0.74 -1.50738          1.80 
140   0.7805    0.0634    67,581,508        0.72 -1.49689          2.11 
141   2.3424    0.0252    81,230,454         0.32 -1.36639          3.57 
142   1.4298    0.0459  107,308,900        0.18 -1.33704          2.33 
143   2.1220    0.0580  189,846,388        0.56 -1.4684          2.05 
144   0.3997    0.0432    37,053,093        0.63 -1.41332          2.04 
145   1.1056    0.1037    30,620,085        0.66 -1.50057          1.35 
146   1.0863    0.0745    27,075,799        0.51 -1.33074          2.12 
147   0.9534    0.0200  127,024,799        0.38 -1.32548           2.65 
148   7.4657    0.0320  117,863,967        0.90 -1.5517          2.12 
149   1.5467    0.0163    65,402,762        0.73 -1.51892          3.03 
150   1.1455    0.0384    66,887,840        0.65 -1.44461          3.47 
151    0.5573    0.0253    72,206,977        0.46 -1.42997          4.92 
152   1.0432    0.0260    31,317,533        0.54 -1.46439          1.82 
153   0.7512    0.0269    69,055,394        0.80 -1.44032          1.38 
154   1.4851    0.0383    90,405,237        0.36 -1.36443          1.36 
155   1.3057    0.0488    50,684,744        0.75 -1.5215          2.11 
156   0.9421    0.0445  190,107,291        0.87 -1.5921          2.52 
157   0.5701    0.0474     42,436,156        0.84 -1.52663          5.13 
158   1.2217    0.0285  126,507,069        0.65 -1.44711          2.50 
159   1.3732    0.0741  170,347,319        0.60 -1.41981          3.10 
160   0.7683    0.0382    48,221,697        0.75 -1.46213          4.19 
161   1.6854    0.0723    28,926,665        0.64 -1.40506          3.59 
162   1.2304    0.0302    34,896,170        0.59 -1.47281          4.29 
163   0.6988    0.0277    96,116,792         0.97 -1.66383          2.22 
164   0.7036    0.0641    86,140,297        0.77 -1.56491          3.41 
165   1.6604    0.0270    40,923,251        0.96 -1.68498          2.93 
166   0.4822    0.0442    83,703,927        1.15 -1.70604          2.37 
167   1.2281    0.0366  123,748,092        0.96 -1.67339          2.62 
168   0.2998    0.0503    23,988,587        1.04 -1.65354          5.01 
169   1.0194    0.0225    66,822,601        0.75 -1.63809          3.64 
170   0.5453    0.0460    25,096,299        0.86 -1.54797          6.19 
171   1.2083    0.0228  191,690,947        0.86 -1.57547          2.68 
172   1.7115    0.0439  110,526,448        0.95 -1.62722          1.97 
173   0.7596    0.0285    27,580,050        0.92 -1.66734          3.02 
174   3.5733    0.2848    47,378,928        0.78 -1.58756          2.62 
175   0.5818    0.0227    80,394,470        0.91 -1.59052          4.20 
176   0.6077    0.0282    22,488,374        1.20 -1.82404          4.55 
177   0.7232    0.0484    52,549,558        0.50 -1.48332          4.04 
178   0.9907    0.0219      7,754,245        0.29 -1.37786          4.62 
179   0.7816    0.0077    35,830,023        1.07 -1.70077          3.72 
180   1.8724    0.0272    87,123,173        0.95 -1.57789          3.86 
181   0.9449    0.0227    70,534,145        1.15 -1.91464          3.89 
182   0.2227    0.0549       6,018,196        0.84 -1.62157          7.17 
183   0.8760    0.0288    21,706,672        0.89 -1.64285          3.86 
184   0.1178    0.0346    10,192,226        1.40 -1.93317          5.69 
185   0.3061    0.0173      6,999,150        0.81 -1.59164          6.72 
186   1.2491    0.0522  181,733,527        0.91 -1.60541          4.42 
187   0.8880    0.0104  164,018,396        1.06 -1.62977          3.28 
188   1.4787    0.0403  200,322,696         0.90 -1.5908          3.47 
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189   1.1946    0.0290    66,621,253        1.17 -1.75428          3.90 
190   0.7318    0.0278    10,451,959        1.10 -1.72549          5.63 
191   0.7189    0.0306    64,109,132        1.09 -1.70336          3.60 
192   1.2410    0.0958  215,543,232        0.98 -1.63653          3.00 
193   2.4321    0.0728  137,203,542        0.78 -1.52712          3.63 
194   1.1004    0.0323    99,259,020        0.33 -1.34136           3.20 
195   0.8794    0.0192    54,431,865        0.47 -1.49864          6.70 
196   0.2525    0.0400    10,904,187        0.80 -1.53883          5.68 
197   0.4218    0.0119    36,702,589        0.71 -1.52558          4.42 
198    0.1984    0.0317    16,357,226        0.48 -1.42585          4.88 
199   0.6369    0.0156    41,498,582        0.51 -1.35735          3.93 
200   0.4277    0.0330      6,476,922        0.83 -1.57216          5.21 
201   0.5378    0.0410    43,176,233        0.86 -1.57229          4.99 
202   0.5407    0.0316    16,376,788        0.84 -1.58554          5.68 
203   1.0304    0.0507  159,318,683        1.07 -1.68722          3.97 
204   0.3034    0.0186    17,183,295        1.08 -1.66599          6.16 
205   0.3126    0.0209    12,387,460        0.75 -1.61094          7.24 
206   2.2147    0.0329  104,446,076        0.62 -1.45551          3.65 
207   0.4354    0.0184     28,191,395        0.47 -1.3657          4.99 
208   1.0510    0.0740  216,171,927        0.52 -1.49822          2.98 
209   0.8110    0.0389    56,561,347        0.87 -1.6809          3.73 
210   0.4727    0.0467    19,693,316        1.14 -1.73626          5.13 
211   1.0820    0.0179  102,622,359        0.77 -1.53099          4.85 
212   0.6166    0.0586  151,491,100        0.83 -1.62937          3.85 
213   0.8979    0.0526    41,420,842        0.77 -1.53199          3.34 
214   0.8522    0.0258    54,563,179        0.70 -1.5503          3.48 
215   0.1483    0.0571      3,383,650        0.78 -1.59098        12.75 
216   0.8355    0.0227    18,493,690        0.82 -1.52707          4.82 
217   0.9451    0.0421    22,909,902        1.05 -1.72371          5.44 
218   1.2280    0.0330    23,326,095        0.51 -1.42362          3.90 
219   0.3875    0.0382    36,486,995        0.77 -1.53814          5.48 
220   0.1406    0.1724      5,484,292        0.84 -1.69687        10.42 
221   0.1723    0.0075      4,373,525        0.96 -1.63291          6.88 
222   0.8002    0.0122    96,709,415        0.97 -1.61246          3.92 
223    1.5255    0.0188    74,177,413        0.91 -1.69403          4.08 
224   0.8965    0.0229  157,242,732        0.57 -1.29466          3.94 
225   0.4687    0.0200    37,410,890        0.64 -1.55371          3.68 
226   0.5287    0.0493    14,579,969        0.86 -1.62718          4.15 
227   0.7483    0.0516    69,811,312        0.48 -1.39848          4.42 
228   0.8486    0.0221  107,983,594        0.82 -1.62966          3.49 
229   0.4536    0.0189     68,707,924        0.88 -1.6803          2.91 
230   0.7935    0.0524    75,355,149        0.67 -1.4765          2.83 
231   1.5422    0.0124  161,484,018        0.48 -1.43387          2.86 
232   0.6676    0.0322    14,956,215        0.84 -1.56929          2.63 
233   0.4584    0.0400    21,907,218        0.47 -1.38403          5.20 
234   1.7991    0.0363    52,819,195        0.81 -1.52075          3.64 
235   2.6098    0.0523    17,958,460         0.83 -1.58976          3.98 
236   0.9147    0.0406    92,541,430        0.62 -1.55358          2.81 
237   2.2999    0.1429    19,942,252        1.17 -1.71742          4.07 
238   1.7417    0.0473  135,851,585        0.71 -1.57251          2.72 
239   1.7787    0.0298  171,402,325        0.51 -1.49829          2.51 
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240   1.1641    0.0695  302,642,769        1.00 -1.46233          3.30 
241   0.9006    0.0264    53,475,436        0.70 -1.47625           3.47 
242   0.7053    0.0148  165,112,636        0.68 -1.62302          3.90 
243   0.5111    0.0435  166,879,762        0.43 -1.48231          2.23 
244   1.2518    0.0355    41,845,149        0.38 -1.39035          2.28 
245    0.7349    0.0799    22,073,721        0.71 -1.38619          2.24 
246   0.9299    0.0243    92,561,832        0.44 -1.38155          3.02 
247   0.0135    0.0330    45,328,434        1.12 -1.68151          8.15 
248   1.9988    0.0199    39,458,480        0.93 -1.66541          2.40 
249   0.5986    0.0466    85,198,148        0.52 -1.39046          2.78 
250   1.2443    0.0284    89,074,660        0.82 -1.44918          1.84 
251   0.7977    0.0378    28,454,716        0.27 -1.37816          3.41 
252   0.1602    0.2388      6,931,570        0.60 -1.44436          4.47 
253   0.0279    0.0833      3,026,676        0.67 -1.51753        14.35 
254   0.1940    0.0123       5,443,665        0.57 -1.4424          9.42 
255   0.5789    0.0364  156,026,780        0.35 -1.48895          4.80 
256   0.6783    0.0545    10,671,580        1.25 -1.74024          5.17 
257   0.6884    0.0300    74,787,502        0.71 -1.51382          4.16 
258   0.4033    0.0286    14,821,839        0.66 -1.46556          6.24 
259   0.2323    0.0028    13,658,695        0.32 -1.35706          8.60 
260   0.8092    0.0229    41,443,309        0.80 -1.61813          3.90 
261   0.8863    0.0196  120,139,256        0.82 -1.57528          4.79 
262   1.5597    0.0256  381,259,813        0.69 -1.53177          6.19 
263   0.7448    0.0272    41,598,523        0.21 -1.21718          4.66 
264   0.7262    0.0273    41,691,896        0.82 -1.64794          4.39 
265   1.2468    0.0406  230,104,318        0.77 -1.54165          3.45 
266   0.7820    0.0350    65,902,381        0.68 -1.62936          4.19 
267   1.0125    0.0661    26,195,545        0.50 -1.20651          6.00 
268   0.8406    0.0321  171,437,070        0.49 -1.40263          4.23 
269   0.2894    0.0330    52,989,986        1.16 -1.6707          3.04 
270    1.1328    0.0355    33,138,751        0.95 -1.71761          5.06 
271   0.6442    0.0325    18,280,957        0.84 -1.6283          4.14 
272   0.3694    0.0371    75,755,173        0.81 -1.57371          3.21 
273   0.5395    0.0235    23,542,411        0.69 -1.61059          3.12 
274   1.3212    0.0713  239,277,096        0.57 -1.46622          2.36 
275   1.3781    0.0102    23,382,127        0.63 -1.50013          1.82 
276   0.4477    0.0277     45,619,636        0.59 -1.45042          1.64 
277   1.3063    0.0319    45,717,438        0.59 -1.4747          2.82 
278   1.2432    0.0403    63,798,724        0.64 -1.404          1.70 
279   0.5781    0.0183    27,544,846        0.95 -1.61441          1.82 
280   1.0754    0.0338  185,322,235        0.86 -1.67583          2.03 
281   0.3365    0.0261      7,585,813        0.50 -1.41445          3.69 
282   0.6181    0.0623    28,340,658        0.76 -1.56595          2.46 
283   1.2600    0.0629    21,135,624        0.72 -1.56831          3.04 
284   1.0093    0.0396  172,319,990        0.76 -1.5716          2.19 
285   1.2138    0.0813  173,951,536        0.83 -1.7428          1.95 
286   0.9219    0.0480    50,410,898        1.00 -1.67876          1.95 
287   0.2372    0.0106    12,362,746        0.97 -1.76899          1.83 
288   2.2761    0.0340    19,443,030        0.66 -1.48585           3.81 
289   0.7090    0.0619  102,951,105        1.06 -1.64435          2.39 
290   0.6517    0.0310  300,967,962        1.00 -1.73789          3.06 
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291   1.0360    0.0439  219,456,957        0.61 -1.46181          2.00 
292    1.4129    0.0442    19,924,958        0.38 -1.45614          1.51 
293   0.4808    0.0605    88,516,442        0.41 -1.38123          2.73 
294   0.7549    0.0180  167,198,552        0.50 -1.34215          2.21 
295   0.7682    0.0225    57,316,227        0.98 -1.69656          1.61 
296   0.6696    0.0598    94,214,388        0.80 -1.59865          2.00 
297   0.3529    0.0591    25,332,373        0.54 -1.51974          3.43 
298   2.5281    0.0368   125,762,607        0.30 -1.42406          1.75 
299   0.7640    0.0540  243,722,350        0.35 -1.41885          2.31 
300   0.2761    0.0195    19,501,526        0.70 -1.52464          4.39 
301   0.6687    0.0881    37,844,128        0.90 -1.67422          4.98 
302   2.7812    0.0402  158,365,952        0.65 -1.43891          2.05 
303   1.6049    0.0828    78,479,873        0.11 -1.29295          1.69 
304   0.6488    0.0141      9,314,905         0.49 -1.32932          5.30 
305   2.6352    0.0383    73,299,456        0.68 -1.51337          3.20 
306   0.8570    0.0197  120,290,185        1.11 -1.82844          2.36 
307   2.1509    0.0459  109,546,022        0.68 -1.50598          2.53 
308   0.4228    0.0664    24,806,730        0.68 -1.58068          1.29 
309   0.8009    0.0521    40,525,088        0.72 -1.53393          3.30 
310   0.5294    0.0547    57,221,012        0.52 -1.48396           2.40 
311   0.9507    0.0831  119,424,276        1.02 -1.69139          1.85 
312   0.2202    0.0402    19,748,018        0.90 -1.56367          4.97 
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